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Chapter 1: Cvclical movements in intra industrv Performance - an introduction 
"The most superficial examination of competition ... shows that, under certain conditions, if the 
bigger capitalist wants to make more room for himsetf on the market and expel the smaller 
capitalists, as in times of crisis, he makes practical use of this advantage and deliberately 
lowers his profit rate in order to drive smaller onesfrom thefield. " Marx (1981[1894] p33 1) 
"The struggle of the average-sized enterprise against big capital cannot be considered a 
regularly proceeding battle in which the troops of the weaker party continue to melt away 
directly and quantitatively. It should rather be regarded as a periodic mowing down of the 
small enterprises which rapidly grow up again, only to be mown down again by large industry. " 
Luxemburg (1970[1900] p47) 
There has been considerable interest in time varying performance particularly that related to 
business cycles in recent years. This topic has been a persistent focus from the end of the last 
century, as evidenced by the quotes above, continuing through much of economics since the 
1930's, when the peculiarities of pricing behaviour, particularly in the United States, during the 
depression years were the driving force behind interest in the topic. Since then, there has been an 
ongoing debate on the effects of the business cycle upon pricing and profitability. In recent years 
this debate has intensified having been fuelled both by technical factors and politico-economic 
developments. On a politico-economic level the ending of the "Golden Age" of capitalism, which 
had been characterised by steady growth, low unemployment and relatively small cyclical 
fluctuations, in the 1970's can be seen as a prime reason for a resurgence of interest in such 
issues. On a technical level within the economics discipline two aspects have promoted increased 
interest in this issue. Firstly there has been a mushrooming of theoretical approaches to the 
question driven by the growing dominance of game theory in particular in trying to explain the 
prevalence of collusion during the business cycle. At the same time, but we would argue not In 
parallel, there has been an expansion of empirical testing of the question of time varying 
performance at a microcconomic level. This expansion can be largely attributed to the advent of 
improved techniques and computing capability for dealing with panel data which facilitates the 
examination of these issues. This thesis seeks to examine one aspect of this question, the relative 
performance of large and small firms, a subject which has been largely overlooked within the 
main body of the literature on time varying performance but which can add to, and point to, 
useftil insights for that literature. 
This chapter sets out to examine the focus on firm size within industries, i. e. relative rather than 
absolute firm size. Section I documents the changes in the size of the small firms sector and 
discusses some of the reasons for these changes. We will then turn to consider two main areas 
which are relevant to the general approach adopted but which have not been pursued extensively 
elsewhere in the thesis. In section II we briefly consider the reasons for differential performance 
between large and small firms focusing largely on the debate concerning market power and 
efficiency, which for reasons outlined, are not addressed within the thesis. Section III assesses the 
contribution of the game theoretic literature to our understanding of cyclical performance and 
collusion. We argue that the game theoretic approach provides us with neither a solid 
methodological basis for pursuit of the analysis nor empirically testable hypotheses of sufficient 
clarity. Section 11 and III therefore address bodies of material that some may have seen as likely 
to contribute to a greater degree to a thesis with this focus and explain why that is not the case. 
Section IV of this chapter presents evidence at an aggregate rather then industry level of the 
relative performance of large and small firms in UK manufacturing. Sections I and W of this 
chapter are designed to describe the background for the theoretical and empirical analyses which 
follow. Sections 11 and III place limits upon the scope of the thesis 
Chapter 2 considers notions of firm flexibility, one of the main areas of cyclical performance of 
firms considered within the recent literature. The chapter critically assesses the concept of 
flexibility and some of the theoretical attempts to model flexibility. In particular the focus is upon 
the relationship between empirical studies of sales variability and notions of Nxibility. It is 
argued that the current tests for flexibility based upon sales or output variability contain flaws of 
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both method and interpretation and suggests a potential alternative framework of empirical 
analysis. 
Chapter 3 addresses the issue of vertical integration and its implications for the measurement of 
economic performance. It is argued that many treatments of the issue of vertical integration and 
intra industry transactions in empirical analysis involve simplistic and/or unstated assumptions 
concerning the transactional relations between input buyers and suppliers or, at very least, these 
relations are under-theorised. The chapter attempts to systematically analyse the implications of 
different forms of supplier/buyer relations for econon-dc performance and provides empirical 
analysis of these relations at the industry level in UK manufacturing. 
Chapter 4 considers intra industry performance in the long run in UK manufacturing. The chapter 
considers the theories of intra industry performance and the methods used for previous tests of 
intra industry performance. The chapter exploits the panel data components of data on intra 
industry performance existing within UK manufacturing to reassess the previous studies of intra 
industry performance and point to inconsistencies of interpretation. 
Chapter 5 examines the cyclical and dynamic behaviour of intra, industry performance in UK 
manufacturing. A detailed discussion of the theoretical predictions concerning the relative cyclical 
performance of large firms is conducted. A variety of empirical tests aimed at revealing 
information concerning these predictions are then conducted using a panel data set combining 
information from the UK census of production and the CBI industrial trends survey. 
Chapter 6 briefly offers some concluding remarks on the results obtained, the methodology 
adopted within the substantive chapters of the thesis and future directions for research. 
Before we proceed two initial notes are necessary. The first note concerns the methodological 
stance of the thesis, the second note concerns use of the term 'business cycle'. 
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It is perhaps conventional in an introduction to a thesis to set out the methodological fi-amework 
which is adopted. This is almost certainly less common however in Economics theses than any 
other discipline within the social sciences. Within this thesis there has been no conscious decision 
to adopt a specific methodological stance. The primary, but not exclusive focus is on empirical 
analysis, but it is hoped that the empirical analysis is based upon sound theoretical foundations. 
Questions of interest have been identified and pursued within an approach dictated by a 
theoretical pragmatism rather than the positivism that is more commonly associated with 
Economic analysis. Therefore, an abiding theme of the thesis is to draw out the implicit 
assumptions of the previous research in this field. It could be argued that the methodological 
stance adopted within the thesis has itself been implicit and it will be the focus of the concluding 
chapter of this thesis to consider some of the implicit methodological approaches adopted within 
the various chapters. The exception to this rule is the direct assessment of the utility of game 
theoretic analysis that is discussed in section III of this chapter. 
Throughout the thesis mention is made of "the business cycle". Ths is a term which has many 
connotations, many of which can be fairly unhelpfiil. It is however a usefiil shorthand for all the 
time-varying aspects of economic behaviour which are not secular trendsl. It is in this respect 
that the term is employed throughout the thesis. Ile reader should note that nothing more should 
be inferred from the use of the term. No specific 'theory' of the business cycle is being adopted 
and any implicit assumptions concerning the amplitude or periodicity of the cycle are hereby 
explicitly eschewed. Movements in most economic variables appear to be only rarely regular in 
time or of uniform size. In addition to this point of clarification, it is probably helpful at this stage 
to explain the use of the terms pro and counter cyclical. An economic variable is described as 
procylical (countercylical) if it realises a higher (lower) value, perhaps at an appropriate lag, 
when the level or rate of growth of demand is high. This is clearly not a precise or all 
encompassing definition but is one which is designed to ensure the vvidest possible applicability. 
At points where a more precise definition is required fuller explanation is given in the text. 
I We do not presuppose any norm for secular trends. Neo-classical economics regards full employment 
as the base case but excess capacity is the norm for most alternative (e. g. Marxist or Post-Kcyncsian) 
schools of economics. 
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Specific problems of interpretation arise in attempting to separate trend from cycle. Many recent 
studies of the business cycle tend to focus on relatively short periods of time that barely cover 
more than one complete cycle. The focus is usually on short term movements around a trend. A 
significant proportion of the theory relating to 'cyclical' movements, especially those originating 
in discussions of the 1930's relates, however, to periods of prolonged slump that cannot be 
accurately characterised as short run departures from a norm of full employment. Indeed, it may 
be argued that the important changes to observe may be the changes from periods where full 
employment is the normal state of affairs to periods of prolonged stagnation, where excess 
capacity is the norm, and that short run movements around these more fundamental shifts are 
therefore incidental. 
The techniques of economic analysis are not well adapted to considering such shifts. To consider 
a 'structural break is to question the ahistorical positivist basis of most economic analysis. In this 
initial chapter of the thesis, we attempt to outline some of the trends and shifts that may have 
occurred in recent history. At other points through the thesis we have attempted to set the analysis 
in context by considering the time period evaluated in relation to studies using different time 
periods. Despite these attempts we are forced by our continual interaction with conventional 
economic theory, to focus, unwillingly to some extent, but not entirely so, on the short run portion 
of the analysis for the substantive elements of the thesis. However we also attempt to be mindful 
of the historical context that is governing the relations we are investigating. 
1. The size of the small firm sectoO 
Generally, within the economics profession small firms have been regarded as of relatively little 
consequence. The focus has been upon big business and its perceived effects on the economy. 
'Mis has partly been a result of rising aggregate levels of concentration and rising levels of 
2A more comprehensive examination of some of the evidence on the size distribution of firms in UK 
manufacturing for the 1980's can be found in Dunne and Hughes (1992). The discussion here examines 
both a longer period and focuses on those elements which arc of more direct interest to the main subject 
of the thesis. 
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concentration within industries. This trend of concentration became particularly marked within 
the post war period. Since the 1970's and particularly in the 1980's there has been a relative 
resurgence of interest in small firms as they have grown in importance and the trends towards 
higher concentration have slowed or been reversed. This has also coincided with a greater focus 
on small firms outside the economics literature, particularly within forms of industrial sociology; 
areas which have had relatively little impact on economic theory3. 
Table 14 indicates the trends over the last 20 years in the size distribution of firms in UK 
manufacturing industry. A note of caution must be sounded that the data is based upon the UK 
Census of Production which changed its definition of unit of observation from establishment to 
business in the 1984 Census. As a result a large increase in the total number of enterprises is 
recorded in that year, most of which appear to be very smalI5. There is, therefore, a discontinuity 
in the figures between 1983 and 19846. Table I indicates that the pattern of employment was 
relatively constant over the 1970's. However, there was a sharp reduction in the proportion of 
employees in very large firms i. e. those employing more than 5000 employees from 1979-1992 
even accounting for the discontinuity in 1984. All other size classes increased their share of 
employment during the 1980's, the largest increase coming from the smallest firms, i. e. 1-199 
employeeS7. As we can see, however, the number of firms in the small category has increased 
3 There are a number of key texts on the borders of the economics and industrial sociology literatures 
which consider the growth of small firms. Some of the more interesting are Piore and Sabel (1984), 
Hirst and Zeitlin (1988) and Best (1990). There are exceptions within the mainstream econontic 
literature, but not many. An example of an attempt to incorporate some of the features identified within 
industrial sociology into economic theory is Nfilgrom and Roberts (1990) 
4 All Tables and Figures in this chapter, and throughout the thesis, arc placed at the end of the relevant 
chapter. 
5 Dunne and Hughes (1992) indicate that most of the increase came from enterprises with less than 10 
employees. It is important to also note at this stage that the definition of establishment is a legal one and 
not a location based one. The establishment is the smallest feasible accounting unit. This may include 
more than one plant. 
6 This change in definition goes unreported in almost all empirical studies of UK manufacturing in the 
1980's. Whether this is through ignorance or an implicit (and in our view invalid) assumption that the 
change had no material effect on the data is unclear. This omission is especially severe for studies, such 
as Henley (1994), that attempt to explain changes in concentration over the period. 
7 It may be argued that enterprises with more than 100 employees are not particularly small. There are 
two reasons for adopting 1-199 employees as a definition of a small firm. Firstly it is consistent with the 
Bolton rcporl on small firms which suggested in manufacturing that less than 200 employees should be 
the criteria, Bolton (197 1). Secondly this is the criteria used by the CBI in their size class analyses and 
therefore this definition enables comparability across our two principal data sources. 
rapidly. Even accounting for the 1983/4 discontinuity, which adds substantially to the number of 
smaller firms, there was a 20% increase in the number of small enterprises between 1972 and 
1983, the largest portion of which occurred in 1972 and 1973. There was a fiinher 16% increase 
between 1984 and 1989, before the number of firms fell back slightly in the early 1990's. 
Meanwhile the number of large firms has fallen consistently over the period apart from a slight 
increase in numbers at the end of the 1980's. 
Figure I puts a more sanguine perspective upon this rising importance of small firms because it 
indicates that, while the share of employment has increased, this has not resulted in substantial 
absolute gains in employment. In fact the increase in share appears to largely result from 
declining employment in the larger firms and broadly constant employment amongst the smallest 
finns. Such a downward trend in industrial employment is the main focus of the ongoing debate 
on deindustrialisations in the UK. If only because the small firm sector appears to be bucking this 
trend it is clear that a greater focus on the smaller firms is warranted. Employment is however 
only one factor and it could be argued that small firms are becoming relatively less productive 
and therefore are absorbing more employment but not increasing their share of net output. This is 
not borne out by Table I and Figure 2 which indicate that, while the shift is less marked than with 
respect to employment, an increasing share of net output has been produced by the smallest firms 
at the expense of the giant firms. Therefore, it would appear that, certainly over the period of the 
1980's, but also continuing into the 1990's, small firms have been becoming relatively more 
important in UK Manufacturing. As most small firms are in the service sector the focus on 
manufacturing also probably understates the importance of small firms. 
Having shown that small firms are becoming more important, in UK manufacturing at least, it is 
now necessary to assess some of the reasons why this may be the case9. One of the main reasons 
put fonvard for the growth of the small firm sector, both here and abroad, is a trend on the part of 
large firms towards vertical disintegration. Large firms may have been more willing to withdraw 
8 Sec for example Ro%%Iliorn and Wclls (1987). 
9 For a fullcr asscssment of the gcneral issucs rclating to the importancc of small firms in the economy, 
sce You (1995). 
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from direct ownership of organisations performing various tasks. Tl-ýs may take the form of the 
tendering out of ancillary services or it may involve a withdrawal from certain aspects of the 
production process itself. The reasons why firms may be more willing to do this now, reversing 
the trend of the post war period to vertical integration, are many and various. It has been argued 
that the objective of circumventing the power of organised labour was one factor in this. Small 
firms have always tended to be less strongly unionised' 0, have paid lower wages II and have been 
exempt from certain employment protection legislation. Millward and Stevens (1986) report that 
the mean union density for establishments with 50-99 employees is 30% while this rises to 72% 
for establishments employing over 1000 workers. 
Vertically disintegrating parts of the production process to smaller units therefore enables firms 
to bypass unions and hence cut labour costs. Whether this has been the case or not is debatable. 
The trade union reforms introduced in the 1980's in the UK have certainly weakened the trade 
unions, but this effect would be expected to benefit the larger, more highly unionised firms to a 
greater extent. This would be expected, therefore, to lead to a consolidation of large firms rather 
than the regeneration of small firms. It is an empirical question what the contribution of structural 
changes in terms of increased presence of small firms has had upon the size of union membership. 
There is some debate concerning this issue but Green (1992) estimates that 30% of the decline in 
union density between 1983 and 1989 can be attributed to compositional factors as opposed to 
the effects of the business cycle or changes in the legal framework. Of these compositional factors 
the changes in industrial sector and establishment size are found to the most important. The 
additional factor which must be considered is that the unit of observation, from the point of view 
of union density, is size of establishment rather than the size of enterprise. 
10 There arc some notable exceptions to this rule, in particular, the printing unions prior to the reforms 
of the 1980's were very highly organised despite being predominantly based in relatively small firms. In 
addition the thriving small firm sector in the "third Italy" is based upon high levels of unionisation and 
relatively high wages. 
II This can be largely explained in terms of different levels of skills in the workers together with 
different capital structure, hence different levels of productivity. 
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Larger firms may have been able to circumvent union power by reducing plant size but running 
more plants. Table 2 indicates that while there is a declining average establishment size across the 
period this largely arises from the increased number of very small businesses. For larger 
enterprises the average size of establishment was on a downward trend from 1972 through to 
1983 then from 1984 onwards establishment size regained an upward trend. The reverse 
observation can be made for the number of establishments per firm which rose almost 
continuously from 1972-1983 and thereafter fell. First we have to decide whether this is a quirk 
of the data redefinition which took place in 1984. It seems unlikely that there would be a 
consistent rise in the number of "establishments" per firm which is accompanied by a consistent 
fall in the number of "businesses" per firm, particularly if a Williamsonian account of the need 
for financial controls in M Division firms is accepted, 12. Even if we can rule data redefinition out, 
the story is still not immediately clear. Such a path is not consistent with the progressive 
introduction of flexible technology which requires smaller scale of plant as this process has 
proceeded throughout the period and the inflow of foreign direct investment is likely to have 
accelerated rather than decelerated the process. It is possible that large firms sought to reduce 
establishment size in the late seventies and early eighties because of the strength of trade unions, 
but, once the reduction in power due to the changed climate and legal environment of industrial 
relations took effect the pressure to reduce establishment size was relaxed and establishment size 
grew once again. Alternatively, the effect could be related to the business cycle although no effect 
is discernible in the recession of the early 90's comparable to the changes from the early eighties. 
The reasons for these changes therefore remain an open question. 
An additional argument for vertical (dis)integration increasing the number of small firms which 
has been put forward by Milgrorn and Roberts (1990) is that the rise in flexible manufacturing 
technology has meant that firms have invested in less specific machinery. As asset specificity is 
one of the prime triggers for opportunism in inter firm relations and this opportunism can be 
circumvented by vertical integration, the decline in the specificity of the technologies being uscd 
12 Williamson's theory of the inultidivisional form of business enterprise (Williamson, 1970) implies 
that the number of accounting units within a firm should closely follow the number of economic units. 
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reduces the need for vertical integration. If flexible manufacturing technology also reduces 
economies of scale, this will be an additional factor favouring the rise of small firms. 
A separate explanation for the rise in the number of small firms is that it results from (as opposed 
to causes) changes in the degree of competition. The relationship between the intensity of 
competition and the size of the small firm sector is fairly complex. The possession of monopoly 
power by an oligopolistic group can permit inefficient small firms to coexist in the same industry, 
what one might call an "uncompetitive fringe". As Cowling (1982) has suggested, the survival of 
these small firms is dependent upon them not impinging too greatly upon the profits of the 
oligopolistic group. If the oligopolistic group feels threatened, the small firms will be eliminated 
through either predation or take-over. This can be seen as a more general version of the 
constraints implied in Fudenberg and Tirole's (1984) puppy dog ploy. Competition in a dynamic 
sense of innovation, changes in markets, import competition, may however benefit small firms if 
small firms are better at adapting to such conditions of uncertainty. Such arguments have been 
put forward by Carlsson (1989) and Mills and Schumann (1985) and aspects of these arguments 
are considered in more detail in Chapter 2. If competition of this form has been on the increase 
then small firms would expect to benefit. 
It has been suggested that the size and strength of the small firm sector is affected by the level of 
unemployment because of the effect of pushing unemployed individuals into self employment or 
small business ownership. There are two effects to this, one is a pure cyclical effect where some 
individuals will shift between self employment and employment depending upon the scarcity of 
employment, i. e. there is a preference for employment but in the absence of such opportunities 
self employment is better than unemployment. 'Iberefore, if opportunistic small businesses of this 
sort are widespread, we should expect rising unemployment to be accompanied by rising numbers 
of businesses, nonetheless as these businesses are unlikely to be more than economically marginal 
we should not necessarily expect the sector as a whole to grow in strength. The second effect of 
unemployment, in addition to providing a motive for small business creation, is the creation 
opportunity in the form of redundancy pay, which may Icad to an increased number of small 
businesses. By the same token, the rate of small business creation is likely to be affected by 
changes in the housing market as house ownership and values determine potential bank lending 
given the high collateral levels required for small businesses. 
An important point in relation to small firms is that frequently they will not be providing identical 
goods and services to those of large firms. Instead they will be producing differentiated products 
and therefore will not necessarily be in direct competition with the larger firms. An example 
would be in the SIC industry, "motor vehicles" where small bus and coach manufacturers or 
sports car manufacturers such as Morgan are classified alongside the mass car producers. If the 
demand for more specialised niche market products is increasing over time with rising incomes, 
this will tend to increase the number of smaIler firms. Again, the attitude of large firms is 
important as their own strategies will set limits upon the ability of small firms to acquire 
significant market niches without retaliation. An example of this would be the reaction, set out in 
Schmalensee (1978), of the major players in the Ready to Eat breakfast cereal market to the 
development of small independent muesli producers. Small independent producers discovered a 
substantial hitherto untapped market niche for muesli type cereals but within a few years the 
major producers such as Kellogg's had managed to don-dnate the niche through highly advertised 
branded versions. Without the continual dynan-dc competition of generating new market niches 
discussed above the size of the small firm sector is inevitably limited. Shaked and Sutton (1987) 
and Sutton (199 1) consider this aspect in more detail. 
11. Cost differentials, market power and small firms 
Now that we have examined the size of the small firm sector and some of the determinants we 
want to look briefly at some of the determinants of the performance of the small firm sector. This 
task is an ongoing theme of the thesis and is therefore taken up again in more detail, relevant to 
the particular pieces of empirical analysis, particularly in section 11 of Chapter 4 and through 
most of Chapter 2. Tbc object of the discussion at this stage is to give a general flavour as 
background to the subsequent analysis. To do this we need to focus on the main aspects which 
diffcrentiate large from small firms. It has been argued, following Marshall's analysis of the 
representative firm, that in essence, small firms should be treated the same as large firms. The 
main distinguishing features which we will concentrate upon, and which overlap in areas, 
particularly with regard to input purchases, are cost differentials between large and small firms 
and differences in the extent of market power13. These factors have been the traditional factors 
affecting performance in the industrial organisation literature and are therefore the focus of the 
next section. 
Throughout the many models of oligopoly and imperfect competition it is frequently assumed that 
all firms share the same cost structure. This appears to have two origins. The first is 
simplification; models become much less complex when all firms: have the same cost function, 
this particularly applies to the game theoretic models. The second is the widespread neo-classical 
assumption of the uniform availability of technology implying that there is a single unique cost 
minin-ýising technology; this view of technology is most crucial in the contestability theory of 
industrial organisation. 
For a number of reasons the case of identical cost structures is, in practice, the exception rather 
than the rule. The existence of specific entrepreneurial and managerial assets will lead to different 
costs of combining inputs. In addition, factor prices will differ across firms because of the 
differences in bargaining power and levels of unionisation, and the ability (or lack of it) to 
achieve economies of bulk transactions. Steindl (1945) has argued that the 'principle of massed 
reserves' whereby large firms by virtue of a greater number of transactions are less vulnerable to 
stockouts of finished or intermediate goods hence require lower levels of inventory to absorb such 
fluctuations. This argument is equally applied to finance where differences in the likelihood and 
impact of punctual or late payment weigh more heavily on small firms requiring them to maintain 
larger amounts of credit or financial reserves to cope with these fluctuations. Whereas the latter 
phenomenon appears to be borne out by anecdotal evidence14, the evidence, see for example 
13 Steindl (1945) focuses in addition on differences in the cost of borrowing, a factor we subsume under 
cost differentials. 
14 In February 1996 the British deputy prime minister publicly confessed to exploiting such advantage 
during his time in control of a large business. 
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section IV of this chapter, does not necessarily support the former proposition that large firms 
hold proportionately lower levels of inventory. 
Different types of technology are one of the main causes of different cost structures. Small firms 
are more likely to make use of older or second hand capital. Also in industries where there are 
economies of scale, small firms may try to compensate for their lack of scale by being more 
adaptable to demand conditions. This argument has been put forward by Stigler (1939) and is 
discussed more extensively in Chapter 2 but at this point it is useful simply to note the two 
strategies firms can adopt to achieve this adaptability. The first is employing where possible fixed 
plant which is divisible and which therefore minimises the cost penalty of operating at inefficient 
scale levels, the second is transforming fixed costs into variable costs principally through a shift 
to more labour intensive services. 
Having briefly considered some of the causes of cost differentials we now examine some of the 
consequences of cost differentials for industrial economic analysis. The most prominent oligopoly 
model of the past few years is the Cowling Waterson (1976) model based upon short run profit 
maximisation with given cost structures. Finns produce a homogenous product therefore there is 
a single uniform price charged within the industry yielding an equilibrium relation. 
P C, (Xi) 
= 
S'(I + A) (1) where P is industry price, il is the industry price elasticity of P 77 
demand, ci(xi) is the marginal cost for firm i based upon output level xi, s is the market share of 
firm i and ki the conjectural term of firm i. Demsetz (1973) argues that the cost differentials 
between firms are the sole cause of differences in profitability hence the differences in both 
structure and profitability between industries are solely determined by the differences in their cost 
structures i. e. differences in levels of cfficiency between firms. 
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This argument is countered by Cowling (1982) who argues that all of the elements on the right 
hand side of equation (1) are subject to the strategic control of capitalist firms". The elasticity of 
demand is controlled through advertising policies, market share is controlled through merger and 
the cost decisions implicit in the strategic choice of technology, and the conjectural term is 
controlled through tacit or explicit collusion. Such arguments shift the focus onto market power 
and away from cost differentials in detennining performance. The notion of market power is more 
broadly conceived than simply through the sustainable level of the conjectural term and applies to 
the scope for, or absence of constraint on, strategic action. It is clear at this point that both 
market power and efficiency considerations would appear to favour large firms implying a 
performance advantage. 
Returning to tile more narrow focus of market power as collusion, if a consensus has emerged at 
all from recent empirical literature, it is that collusion is centred around price. As Geroski (1988, 
pI 11) points out "the evidence suggests that concentration-price correlations are stronger and 
more stable than concentration-profits ones". This can fit in with a view of the coexistence of 
rivalry and collusion, where collusion is centred on price while rivalry is centred upon cost. 
Taking this point of view reinstates Steindl's (1952) theory of profitability based upon a 
conventional, but not exclusively, uniform price structure beneath which there is a system of cost 
differentials which determine the abilities of individual firms to generate profits. 
It is well recognised that the existence of cost differences puts pressure on the sustainability of 
any collusive outcome and, in particular, an agreement on side payments is necessary for the joint 
profit maximum to be maintained (see Schmalensee, 1987). '17his then begs the question as to 
whether any joint profit maximum is practically attainable in this context. In the study of the 
great salt duopoly, where firms are observed to have different cost fiinctions, Rees (1993) is able 
to reject competitive behaviour but also is able to reject the hypothesis of a joint profit maximum. 
'17his recognises that a joint profit maximum can only be achieved with very close co-ordination 
15 To the extent that Dcmsctz believes that efficiency is the outcome of strategic decisions taken by 
firms in pursuit of profit the two arguments are not in complete opposition. Both arguments attempt to 
reinstate a form of causality to (1) that is rejected by others (e. g. Clarke and Davies (1982)). 
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which may involve a firm revealing data about its costs which is likely to be strategically 
damaging and also may also require side payments or uneven profit reductions. Tberefore, even in 
the presence of some form of price co-ordination, joint profit maximisation is unlikely. 
The most important qualification of this discussion and the main obstacle to a formal conclusion 
that there is an ubiquitous performance advantage for large firms is empirical. There have been a 
number of studies looking at the variation of profitability across size class bands in industries 
(e. g. Clarke, Davies and Waterson (1984) and Caves and Pugel (1980)). With the assumption of 
homogeneous conjectures firm size should be directly related to price cost margin through 
variations in cost. Given homogenous products and a uniform price, the firms with the lower cost 
will have the highest market shares. Yet all of the studies find examples of industries where there 
is a negative correlation between price cost margin and firm size. Waterson (1989) has offered 
three explanations for this finding. 
i) there is an aggregation problem when an "industry" is broadly defined. If two distinct industries 
are combined for the generation of statistics, it is demonstrated that while a positive correlation 
between profitability and market share may exist in each industry, a negative correlation may be 
observed in the aggregated industry. This would appear to constitute an important element of the 
empirical findings as a number of cases are reported in n-dscellaneous or aggregated industries 
from the studies including Steindl (1952). This problem would appear to have wider significance, 
in that the existence of multiproduct finns in a well defined industry could equally create this 
problem. 
ii) the second possibility is that firms do not have a common level of conjecture but have firm 
specific conjectures. This can be the case even when firms have identical cost fiinctions, with 
either increasing or decreasing returns to scale but produce different outputs. 
iii) the third explanation is that firms produce differentiated products and therefore firms may 
locate in low volume but high mark-up areas of a market. 
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111. Game theory and cyclical movements in collusion and profitability 
The focus on cyclical movements in collusion has developed in response to the mushrooming of 
game theoretic analyses. The most prominent of these are the models of Green and Porter (1984) 
and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and the latter model has subsequently been extended in two 
papers by Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) and Kandori (1991). In this section we will outline 
the main thrust of these papers and then attempt to critique them from both within and without. 
We argue that each of the papers lacks an important element of realism which raises questions 
about the appropriateness of the choice of game theoretic format. We then go on to argue that 
these game theoretic approaches do not, and perhaps cannot, offer much help in providing a basis 
for empirical analysis, especially at the level of analysis adopted within this thesis. 
Green and Porter acknowledge that their model is an attempt to refashion the Stigler (1964) 
model of oligopoly. 'Mey analyse the situation where firms are setting output in an attempt to 
collude. Finns are assumed to be symmetric. The main feature of the model is that demand is 
subject to exogenous shocks which are i. i. d. and which are unobservable to the participants. This 
brings about a signal extraction problem that in order to maintain the collusive agreement firms 
engage in price wars if the price falls below a certain trigger price. At the margin cheating or 
chiselling is deterred because the expected loss from the increase in the likelihood of a price war 
is greater than the expected benefit from the chiselling. It is therefore predicted that price wars 
occur at low points in demand, however this is not due to cheating but is part of the deterrence of 
cheating. Without the periodic price wars in response to exceptionally low demand then there 
would be no disincentive for each firm to cheat. 
Rotemberg and Saloner point to a different force driving the cyclical movements in prices and 
profits. They suggest that in the case where demand is perfectly observed but is subject to an i. i. d. 
disturbance, it will be more difficult to collude at points of high demand. This is largely due to the 
fact that while the benefits of cheating accrue at periods of high demand hence when greater 
profits can be made from cheating the losses incurred from any punishment phase arc at the 
average level of demand. I'lierefore the gains to cheating (relative to the punishments) are greater 
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in periods of high demand. In the Rotemberg and Saloner model this can lead to situations where 
the price will be lower in periods of high demand compared to the price in periods of low demand. 
This will be because the maximum sustainable price, i. e. the maximum price at which no firm is 
willing to defect, will be less than the full joint profit maxin-dsing or (in the case of symmetry 
between the firms) monopoly price. Therefore while there may be no "price war" in the 
conventional sense in the model there is a clear disposition towards countercyclical pricing. 
The framework has been extended by Kandori (1990) and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) 
who, rather than looking at the case of i. i. d. demand shocks, examine serially correlated demand 
shocks. This more reasonable assumption adds to the analysis of the difficulties of sustaining 
coflusion over the cycle. The findings of Haltiwanger and Harrington are particularly interesting 
in this respect. They suggest that the incentive to cheat on a collusive agreement is greatest at the 
start of a recession. The reason for this is that at the start of a recession the level of demand is 
relatively high whereas the punishment phase will occur during the recession when demand is 
low. The effect is essentially a generalisation of the expectation approach in terms of the 
comparison of payoffs. Different expectations of demand will yield different optimal solutions. 
The important concept is Rotemberg and Saloner's trade-off between current gains from defection 
and expected losses in a punishment phase. 
A criticism which can be levelled at these papers is that despite increases in demand firms never 
become capacity constrained. Models incorporating capacity constraints, such as Staiger and 
Wolak (1992), produce qualitatively different results to models where firms are unconstrained. 
They adapt the Li. d. demand fitriction of Rotemberg and Saloner to a duopolistic situation where 
firms operate with capacity constraints. When demand is high, firms will be operating at or close 
to capacity. Therefore, at times of high demand the opportunities for cheating are decreased 
because the possible output gain from a price cut is constrained to be small. When demand is low 
the opportunities for increasing supply are greater and therefore the equilibrium collusive price 
will be lower. In this way, the results achieved by Rotcmberg and Saloncr are reversed by the 
introduction of capacity constraints. 
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The Staiger and Wolak model builds upon Benoit and Krishna's (1987) multi period version of 
the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) model of price competition with capacity constraints. Benoit 
and Krishna (1987) establish that in an infinitely repeated game excess capacity is a necessary 
condition for a collusive outcome. Davidson and Deneckere (1990) extend this for a class of 
equilibria, finding that increases in the level of collusion are associated with increases in the level 
of excess capacity. Staiger and Wolaks model reverses this result because in their model the 
incentive to cheat is increasing in the current level of excess capacity and decreasing in the 
expected future level of excess capacity, the two being inversely related. 
There are a number of problems which arise in considering the applicability of these models to 
empirical examples of collusion amongst oligopolists. The two features which I wish to focus on 
in the following discussion are, 
i) In none of the models discussed above do the firms actually cheat on the collusive agreement. 
While price and output choices may vary over time, at each point in time all firms are following 
the collusive equilibrium path. 
ii) The models considered above are games of complete information 16 
We will address the second point before considering the first. In the Green and Porter model, 
imperfect information arises from the fact that the realisation of demand is not observed before 
firms make their output decisions. Therefore, the equilibrium price will not be known a priori. 
Despite this everything else is common knowledge for the participants. In particular the mean 
realisation of demand and its variance are known by all participants. It is assumed that with 
symmetry in respect of both cost conditions and the discount rate and with this knowledge of 
demand conditions each firm can calculate the optimal trigger price strategy. In the Rotemberg 
and Saloner type models the realisation of demand is observed before price setting and firms also 
16 This is the sense of complete information as defined in Gibbons (1992, pl), that is "each player's 
playoff function .... is common knowledge among all the players. " Therefore Green and Poricr (1984) is 
a game of complete information even though the players have imperfect information on the realisation of 
demand in any particular subgame prior to moving. 
18 
know the distribution of demand fluctuations or, in the case of Haltiwanger and Harrington, know 
the correct time series path of demand. From this information, again assuming symmetry, firms 
can calculate the maximum sustainable price. There are multiple equilibria in this situation, the 
range of which depends upon both the discount rates and the parameters and realisations of the 
demand process. However because of the perfect knowledge firms can react and choose the 
Pareto optimal17 price given these situations. 
Invoking bounded rationality as a critique of these models may appear artless. The whole 
foundations of the game theoretic approach rest upon a superimposed level of rationality through 
the solution concepts employed. However this criticism would nevertheless appear to have some 
justification. Only in a relatively mature and stable industry could one expect a sophisticated 
implicit agreement such as a trigger price strategy to be developed. Similarly, it requires a degree 
of calculation to find the required monopoly price for each realised level of demand which may 
not be open to all firms. Clearly, mechanisms to bypass this need for independent calculation can 
be set up, such as price leadership but these would then need to be incorporated into the pricing 
framework, with potentially very different results. This goes to the heart of any consideration of 
collusion. A fitridamental aspect of collusion is the monitoring, detection and punishment required 
to enforce the agreement, a subject treated in great detail by these theories. However, anterior to 
this we also have the co-ordination problem implicit in setting up a collusive agreement, tacit or 
otherwise, a topic which is ignored or assumed away in these studies. To remedy this requires an 
analysis using dynamic games of incomplete information. A model which addresses these issues 
directly has been developed in Slade (1989). 
Slade (1989 p295) explicitly recognises the "seemingly disequilibrium" nature of price wars and 
also the prevalence of strategies which do not constitute sub game perfect strategies in the 
complete information context such as tit-for-tat. Slade's model suggests that a change in demand 
or cost conditions which affects all firms will tend to disturb an existing equilibrium which may 
17 Parcto optimal when assessing the two cluopolistic firms as the sole agents dcriving welfare from the 
situation. 
19 
or may not constitute a tacitly collusive agreement. 'Ibis observation of changed conditions will 
induce price changes on the part of participants. This need not represent cheating of the form 
prescribed above, i. e. a deliberate attempt to undercut rivals, but could be simply an attempt to 
adjust price to a new level appropriate to the changed conditions. In Slade's model, firms observe 
a change in demand and cost conditions has occurred but do not observe the new values of the 
demand and cost parameters. Successive price movements will signal information about the new 
demand and cost conditions. Gradually, as firms know more about the new demand (or cost) 
conditions they can move towards the new equilibrium which may be characterised by a greater 
or lesser degree of tacit collusion. 'Me reason why the movement is 'gradual' is because the 
solution concept employed is of a perfect c-equilibrium" as defined in Kalai and Stanford 
(1985). This reduces the problem of co-ordination as firms approach the equilibrium position 
using intertemporal reaction functions rather than through simultaneously calculating the optimal 
price. Analysis using these intertemporal reaction functions therefore relates to the results of 
Axelrod (1984) and Kreps et al. (1982) for as Kalai and Stanford (1985; p146) point out "they 
possess a kind of fractional strength tit for tat character". 
The Slade model therefore has two desirable features absent in the previous models. Firms do 
cheat and they also have plausible mechanisms for co-ordinating on a price that does not require 
the imposition of full rationality. Both of these elements are a key feature of the original Stigler 
model of oligopoly, and the Slade model has a solution to both of them which appears realistic 
because of its focus on the difficulty in attaining the solution. The feature of the Slade model, 
which is slightly problematic given the focus of the thesis is, that price wars are a result of 
changes in cost and demand conditions not of movements in any particular direction in those costs 
or demand. Therefore, it has relatively little to tell us about the incidence of price wars and the 
business cycle although one may seek to hazard some inforrned guesswork on whether it is more 
likely that downward or upward movements is likely to lead to the breakdown of the collusive 
agreement. 
18 The intuition behind this solution is akin to the near rationality concept used in neo Keynesian 
macrocconomics, e. g. Akerlof and Yellen (1985) 
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The element which is an essential part of the Stigler model, but which receives no attention in any 
of the previous models, is the existence of asymmetry between firms. It is the smaller firms which 
are prone to chiselling in the Stigler model because small output changes by these firms are less 
likely to be detected than changes by the large firms. The existence of asymmetry is also 
identified more generally as a source of difficulty in the creation and maintenance of collusion 
elsewhere, e. g. Schmalensee (1987). To examine the effect of asymmetries in the game theoretic 
analyses we have to look at a separate literature. There are two main types of asymmetries which 
are considered in this literature, cost structures and discount rates. The conclusions of these 
studies are unenlightening however, merely confirming formally that which was previously 
intuition and common knowledge. Harrington (1989) considers the case of different discount rates 
and concludes, in addition to the standard result from symmetric analyses that a general lowering 
of discount factors makes collusion more difficult, a conclusion which also carries over to 
asymmetric analysis, that those firms with lower discount factors, those who are most impatient, 
will receive a higher output quota to compensate them for not cheating on the agreement. 
Demange and Ponssard (1985) find that low cost firms have a stronger incentive to price 
competition than high cost firms. Osborne and Pitchik (1987) find that the firm with a smaller 
capacity in a collusive duopoly will, apart from the extreme case of total capacity being less than 
or equal to monopoly output, maintain a higher level of capacity utilisation than the larger firm. 
A fiirther literature addresses the issue of asymmetry in the context of imperfect information 
regarding firms' cost structures. Roberts (1985) notes that imperfect information concerning the 
costs of rivals is of a different order to imperfect information on the actions of rivals. Green and 
Porter model a problem of moral hazard where there is a potential incentive to cheat on a 
collusive agreement. With imperfect information on costs the problem is one of adverse selection, 
a problem of devising a collusive agreement that will be robust in the sense that firms have the 
incentive to correctly reveal their private information enabling joint profit maximisation and 
firms'do not have the incentive to cheat. 
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Crampton and Palfrey (1990) and Kihlstrom and Vives (1992) extend Roberts' analysis from the 
duopoly case to the case of multiple rivals, a case that is particularly relevant to participation in 
agricultural marketing cartels. Ile key results of these papers depend upon three aspects; the 
feasibility of making side payments; the timing of potential withdrawal from the cartel; the 
robustness of the collusive agreement to withdrawal (defection) by a single rival. The main 
conclusion is that in the large numbers case and with side payments a form of efficient cartel 
agreement that obtains truthful revelation of private information is sustainable. 'Merefore 
Kihlstrom and Vives (1992; p3 92) argue "asymmetric information is not a serious deterrent to 
collusion by a profit maximising cartel. " 
Does the game theoretic framework represent a potential way forward for empirically examining 
business cycles and intra industry behaviour? Whilst the literature closely examines the effects of 
demand fluctuations, it is important, in order to make these models consonant with the empirical 
investigation, to assess their implications when the symmetry assumption which underlies all of 
the models is dropped. However, when one tries to extend these model to consider asymmetries 
between firms, beyond the level of fairly trite analysis, they become very complex. 
Sutton (1990) criticises the effectiveness of game theory as a methodological tool for the 
empirical analysis of industries. Tlere are two strands to the argument, firstly the widespread 
presence of multiple equilibria leads to difficulty in predicting outcomes. This problem can be 
reduced but not completely eliminated by imposing a higher degree of rationality, the introduction 
of equilibrium 'refinements' such as renegotiation proofness, to reject certain equilibria. However 
it is not clear whether these additional pressures on strategic decision makers are reasonable19. 
Secondly the flexibility of game theoretic modelling ensures that most 'reasonable specifications' 
can support many outcomes and, by corollary, many outcomes can be supported by a wide 
variety of reasonable specifications. 
19 Experimental evidence in decision theory regularly provides evidence of "irrationality" in the form of 
preference reversal in very simple experiments using intelligent, wc1l educated subjects. 
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The ftirther problem not considered by Sutton is that of observing the relevant variables. Even if 
the problems identified by Sutton had been resolved, the essential difference between the Green 
and Porter and Rotemberg and Saloner models concerns the information set available to decision 
makers prior to the price decision. This information set is not open to us to observe and, even 
more problematically, neither is the counterfactual decision that would have occurred in the 
absence of strategic action open to observation. 
Empirically successful attempts to implement game theory are few and far between". Bresnahan 
(1989) summarises a number of industry studies but the notable feature of most of the studies is 
the absence of an empirical framework derived from game theoretic notions. Instead the major 
shift in terms of the 'New Empirical Industrial Organization! described by Bresnahan was in 
terms of the use of price and output data to investigate industry relations rather than profit, sales 
or other accounting or census based measures of performance. The exceptions have been the 
string of papers by Slade, e. g. Slade (1986,1992) and citations therein, and Rees (1993)21. Slade 
exploits data on a price war in the Vancouver gasoline market and attempts to estimate 
intertemporal reaction functions that may accord with the decisions taken by the gasoline 
retailers. "Me relatively close relationship between theory and empirics in this case derives from 
the very close observation of institutional characteristics. The main conclusion, confirn-iing the 
conclusion of Slade's theoretical work described above, is that the gasoline firms appear to adopt 
simple strategic decision rules in their pricing decisions but that the result cannot be accorded 
generality because of the specific nature of the data set. Rees, by contrast, examines a number of 
game theoretic models for their consistency with the observed behaviour of the UK salt duopoly. 
Despite confirn-drig that collusion is potentially sustainable by the punishment threats of a 
repeated game, Rees finds that no specific model of competition can account for the precise 
structure of prices, capacities and outputs. 
20 Rotemberg and Saloner (1986,1989) among others, present some empirical evidence in support of 
their theories, but the link between the theory and empirical approach is fairly weak and is certainly 
susceptible to the second criticism made by Sutton. 
21 A further exception, noted in Singh, Utton and Waterson (1995) are empirical studies of auction 
markets %% here the "rules of the game" are both closely defined and public knowledge. 
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The conclusion that arises from this discussion is that the game theoretic revolution that has 
swept industrial economics has failed to provide us with obvious new avenues for the empirical 
investigation of the issue of collusion and the business cycle. We may be able to learn something 
from event studies where theory and empirics can be closely tailored to the characteristics of the 
event22. We are, however, unlikely to be able to address issues that are widespread across 
industries. The requirement for such analysis is that robust and simple predictions are available 
from the theory, yet this is precisely the element that is lacking in the game theoretic literature on 
collusion and the business cycle. 
111. Trends, cvcles and the performance of laree and small firms, 1972-1992 
This section will set out at a fairly aggregate level the broad trends in the performance of large 
and small firms with regard to the economic variables with which we will be primarily concerned 
during this thesis. This exercise is usefiil because it sets the background to the empirical work of 
the subsequent chapters. It also enables a broad assessment of whether the trends in the relative 
perfonnance of large and small firms fit with some of the key ideas mentioned in the previous 
discussion of theories of small firms (section 11 above). The section is predominantly data driven 
because it makes of the data sources at an aggregate level which can shed light on these issues. In 
particular, use is made of the size class analyses of the UK Census of Production for 1972-1992 
and the size class analyses of the CBI industrial trends survey for the same period. Ile emphasis 
is not upon the econometric testing of specific hypotheses which is left to the subsequent chapters 
but to set out the main characteristics of the data. We will discuss en passant the issues of 
appropriate specification of variables, some of which will be used in the subsequent analyses, and 
the merits of different data sources. The section will consider three main areas of performance. 
Firstly, profitability, variously defined, and the use of material inputs, secondly, measures of the 
business cycle and economic optimism, and thirdly, the management and use of stocks and 
productive capacity. 
22 Howevcr Sutton's argument presents significant problems for even these types of analysis. 
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As can be seen from Figure 4 there has been a steady rise in the aggregate price cost margins 
over the period. It is interesting to note that this trend has been remarkably uninterrupted for the 
smaller firms but has been more variable for the larger firms. For firms with less than 199 
employees only in two years, 1974 and 1976,23. have price cost margins fallen by more than a 
fraction of a percent. There are significant falls in price cost margins for the firms employing 
over 5000 employees in 1974,1975,1980,1990 1991 and 1992 all of which were recession 
years. Apart from these years price cost margins were either stable or rising. It is interesting to 
note that through the 1980-1982 recession price cost margins were rising for all firms at a fairly 
rapid rate. This is most likely to be a result of the "productivity miracle" of the early eighties 
reducing unit labour costs which are not fully passed on in price reductions. The implication is 
that while the recession was fairly severe, changes made to the economic environment in terms of 
industrial relations or removal or generation of excess capacity prevented competitive pressures 
from being heightened in this period. The behaviour of price cost margins in the late eighties and 
early nineties also poses some questions. For the small firms price cost margins remained static 
through the eighties boom even registering a slight fall at the peak of the boom in 1988. Their 
price cost margins rose through the 1990's recession however. The reverse is true of large firms 
for whom price cost margins display a much more traditionally procyclical pattern registering 
large rises in the boom and an equally sharp decline in the 90's recession. The net effect is that the 
aggregate price cost margin has been fairly static from 1987-1992. 
An alternative measure of the price cost margin uses net output rather than gross output as the 
denominator in calculating the margin. This measure has been fairly widely used in empirical 
studies and the merits or otherwise of its use are examined more closely in Chapter 3. Figure 5 
shows the movements in this measure over the period and comparison with Figure 4 demonstrates 
that they are clearly different in their behaviour. 
23 All price cost margins fell considerablY in 1984, this is ascribed to the influx of very small firms in 
that year's Census rather than to economic factors. 
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Over the 1970's these price cost margins show a slightly more classical procyclical pattern with 
co-movements of the price cost margin measures for large and small firms while the downward 
movements in 1975 and 1980 are more pronounced for the larger firms. This is to be expected for 
more capital intensive firms and firms which act collusively if collusion is procyclical. For the 
1980's the pattern of the alternative price cost margins roughly approximates those of the 
conventional price cost margins a sharp upwards rise which accelerates into the 1988 boom and 
falls thereafter aside from a slight upturn in 1992. For the small firm the picture is of broadly 
constant alternative price cost margins from 1985 onwards with no marked cyclical variation. In 
order to understand the differences between the two measures it is instructive to look at changes 
in the importance of material inputs into the production process. 
Figure 6 illustrates that the level of bought in inputs as a proportion of output is higher for the 
larger firms throughout the period indicating a lower level of vertical integration on the part of 
those firms or alternatively a greater focus on the part of small firms of high value added 
activities. For all firms since 1977 there has been a steady decline in the use of bought in inputs 
as a proportion of output. In the case of the largest firms however the downward trend has been 
reversed since 1988 with the implied level of vertical integration falling as a result since the 1988 
boom. For the smallest firms the trend towards increased vertical integration has increased. 
In general, apart from the end of the period, the ratios for large and small firms move in tandem 
exhibiting almost identical co-movements over time. One possible explanation for this could be 
common price shocks, particularly in terms of fuel prices. Ilere is a marked increase in the ratio 
in 1974 and a marked decline in 1986, both years with oil price shocks of the same direction. 
However the effects of the oil price rise in 1979/1980 is not evident as for those years the ratio is 
in steady decline. It could therefore be argued that Figure 6 actually masks the real situation 
because of the relative price changes between output and material inputs. We can control for 
these factors by using the producer price indices for materials and fuel and for output to deflate 
the nominal figure hence obtain figures in constant 1972 terms. Figure 7 indicates a very different 
story to Figure 6. 
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As is very clear from Figure 7 the relative price changes between materials and output dominates 
the picture. This would appear to indicate that firm are very responsive to relative price changes 
in forming the composition of inputs. The sharp decline in relative materials volumes resulting 
from the oil price shocks of 1973/4 and 1979/80 are both apparent as is a corresponding rise in 
material inputs from the fall in oil prices in 1986 and the decline in prices of raw materials in the 
early 1990's. The magnitude of these shocks means that it is difficult to discern whether there is 
any other trend in the real ratios. Through the early eighties and the late eighties when there were 
no major price shocks the ratios remained roughly constant. These figures would appear to show 
that production techniques are fairly flexible in order to make such rapid adjustments to relative 
price movements. 
However, a word of caution is necessary, the magnitude of these adjustments could be construed 
as being unreasonably high, pointing more to data measurement problems than real changes. The 
data is consistent with a constant relative value of material inputs. Chapter 3 identifies firms 
operating "as if' the value of material inputs is regarded as fixed in the short run as one plausible 
explanation of the empirical data at the industry level on material input costs. The evidence at an 
aggregate level is also therefore consistent with this finding. A further difficulty that must be 
taken into account when comparing small firms against large is that the price series are based 
upon average prices. If small firms operate in different market segments to large firms the price 
movements may well be different particularly if there is preponderance of small (or large) firms 
who provide material inputs. In addition, small and large firms are likely to vary in their intensity 
of energy usage which means that the fuel component of the material input price index is likely to 
vary across firms. Unfortunately no data at this detailed level is available. 
An important element that we wish to examine at this stage is the relative cyclical position of 
small and large firms. This we can do making use of the CBI Industrial Trends Survey which 
partitions the responses to its surveys not only by industry but also, at the aggregate level, by 
firm size class. To investigate the cyclical position we examine two aspects of the questionnaire: 
27 
the existence of below capacity operation and the degree of optin-dsm about the future. Figure 8 
displays the proportion of firms reporting below capacity operation in the largest and smallest 
size classes. Both series display a fairly conventional countercyclical time path as would be 
expected and there is no clear trend in either series. The proportion reporting excess capacity is 
high in the early 80's and early 90's while the trough occurs in the boom of the late 1980's. It is of 
interest to note that large firms appeared to suffer to a greater degree from excess capacity in the 
early part of the period, particularly the period 1975-1978. However by the mid 1980's the small 
and large firms were experiencing roughly similar levels of excess capacity and since 1988 the 
larger firms have been reporting lower levels of excess capacity than the small firms. The size of 
the trough in 1988 confirms the capacity constraint problem that arose in the late 1980's and 
indicates that it was most important for large firms. 
There are a number of plausible explanations for the change in the position of large and small 
firms: firstly, the capital scrapping of the early 1980's which is likely to have affected the large 
firms to a greater extent: secondly, a change in the attitudes of firms to the scheduling of 
production in terms of reliance upon just-in-time production or inventory control to smooth 
output fluctuations: thirdly, a greater willingness on the part of large firms to use subcontracting 
and/or overtime to absorb output fluctuations rather than hold excess capacity. In respect of the 
final argument the changing power of trade unions may have had an effect on this decision. If 
firms are stronger relative to trade unions, the costs of overtime operation and/or the extra shifts 
necessary to meet peak demand may be lower making their use more attractive. Clearly, because 
we are dealing in broad trends, we cannot provide evidence to show causality but they are all 
documented trends that may reasonably be expected to contribute to the effect. 
Figure 9 indicates the net proportion of firms in each size class that indicate that are optimistic 
concerning the next three monthS24. The co-movement between the series for the large and small 
firms is almost exact and both series follow the path of the cycle very closely. The troughs occur 
24 The net proportion is calculated by deducting the proportion reporting pessimism from those 
reporting optimism. A positive figure indicates on average a balance of optimists a negative figure 
indicates a balance of pessimists. 
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as expected in 1974/5,1980 and 1990/1. This co-movement appears to indicate that there are no 
significant differences in the incidence of the business cycle across large and small firms. Neither 
group appears to lead or lag the other in perception of business conditions. 
T'lle further element that needs to be considered and has been alluded to in the previous 
discussions is the use by firms of inventories and how these change over the business cycle. We 
are able to examine this issue using information both from the CBI survey and the data on stocks 
and work in progress available in the Census of Production. As is considered in more detail in 
chapter 5 stocks may be held for both strategic reasons and to smooth either price or output 
responses to demand fluctuations. 
Figure 10 presents the net proportion of firms experiencing an increase or decrease in stocks of 
finished goods over the past four months. For small firms there is very little change across the 
whole period. There is an decline in 1981 and a more sustained decline from 1990-1992 but for 
the rest of the period there is a balanCe25. For large firms there appears to be larger and more 
systematic changes. For most of the 1980's particularly, 1981-1983 and 1986-7 there are 
decreases in stocks that appear consistent with a structural change in terms of a decision to hold 
lower levels of inventory. This is again consistent with the arguments, given above in relation to 
excess capacity, concerning shifts to just-in-time production and lower costs of changing 
production. A further element of inventory reduction that relates to the decline in union strength is 
that stocks of finished goods partially protect firms from strikes, allowing firms to withstand 
strikes more easily hence raising their bargaining power, albeit at a cost. The reducing need for 
such devices with the reduction in the incidence of strikes may lead to lower levels of finished 
goods stocks. 
Figures II refers to the same infonnation but for stocks of material inputs. In this case there 
appears to be more pronounced changes over time and a greater degree of co-movemcnt for large 
25 If changes in finished goods stocks arc simply responses to unexpected, firm specific, rather than 
econoni), wide, shocks or errors in calculating demand we should expect a zero net balance over time. 
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and small firms. The movement is more conventionally cyclical, although apparently at a year's 
lag in recessions, with troughs in 1975,1981 and 1991/2. It seems to be the case that stocks of 
material inputs follow movements in output quite closely, confirming the relatively constant 
materials to output ratio over the cycle indicated in Figure 6 above. The apparent lag in response 
to the cycle may be the result of relatively long term contracts for material inputs which would 
lead to a slow change in response to output conditionS26. 
Finally we look at the ratios of stocks and work in progress to output give by the UK Census of 
Production. At this level, unfortunately, there is no distinction made in the data between stocks of 
finished goods and intermediate inputs. The levels are lower for small firms which may be 
contrasted with the higher materials to output ratio observed in Figure 6. The contrast may be 
explained as a result of shorter production periods leading to less work in progress being recorded 
for the smaller, less vertically integrated, firms and that this effect counteracts any tendency for a 
higher level of stocks of material inputs. The time path for small firms was relatively constant 
over the 1970's a slight rise at the start of the 1980's followed by a sustained fall through the rest 
of the period. For the large firms the changes from year to year are greater but do not appear to 
be systematic. The major fall occurs in 1987 to a level sustained for the rest of the period. We are 
not aware of any reason for a change in this particular year. 
Table 3 presents a correlation matrix for all of the variables taken from the CBI Industrial trends 
survey. As is to be expected in a sample of variables chosen largely for their evidence of cyclical 
conditions most of the variables are reasonably highly correlated. The correlations between the 
observations for large and small firms are . 
7266 for excess capacity, . 
9578 for optimism, . 
5367 
for finished goods stocks and . 8940 
for stocks of material goods. This confirms that, at the 
aggregate level and with the exceptions that we have discussed in detail above, large and small 
firms tend to have broadly similar responses to the business cycle on a variety of indicators. 
26 Machin and Van Reenen (1993) provide evidence to support this showing the incidence of the 
cyclical trough to be in 1980 for consumer goods producers and 1981 for producer goods suppliers, 
many of which will be supplying intermediate material inputs. 
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We have therefore established in this chapter that there are substantial co-movements in the 
economic variables relating to large and small firms. There is relatively little evidence that the 
small firm sector experiences greater volatility of the key variables in response to short run 
changes in demand. Indeed the large firm sector tends to experience greater degrees of variability 
in most of the cyclical variables that we have observed. Of course, this may in itself be indicative 
of one hypotheses that will be considered in chapter 2, that small firms are better at responding to 
hence smoothing the effects of demand fluctuations;. We have also noted that, in theory, market 
power may account for different degrees of response to demand fluctuations. The reasons for the 
relative responses of large and small firms therefore remain an open question, and the attempt to 
find an answer to this question forms the basis of the investigation in Chapter 2. 
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Table 1: Relative Importance of Large and Small Enterprises in UK Manufacturin2 1972- 
1992 
Employee Size Class 
1-199 200499 5004999 5000+ 
% Share of Total Employment 
1972 21.5 8.0 25.6 44.9 
1979 23.1 7.3 24.9 44.7 
1983 27.8 8.6 25.7 37.8 
1984 30.3 9.6 26.6 33.5 
1992 34.4 9.7 28.5 27.4 
% Share of Net Output 
1972 18.4 7.4 25.9 48.4 
1979 19.5 6.7 26.7 47.1 
1983 22.8 8.1 27.2 41.9 
1984 24.7 9.1 28.9 37.4 
1992 27.0 9.1 31.7 32.2 
No of Enterprises 
1972 68971 1823 1321 186 
1979 86838 1543 1186 174 
1983 83482 1361 957 117 
1984 116576 1514 978 104 
1992 128516 1364 963 93 
Notes: 
1. Source of data: calculations based upon information from UK Census of Production Table 12 various 
years. Figures for net output and employment are percentages of the total for manufacturing industries. 
2. A change of definition altered the composition of firms between 1983 and 1984 so the data before and 
after this date arc not strictly comparable. In addition a revision of industrial classification effective from 
1980 means there are slight differences in the definition of manufacturing. At the current level of 
aggregation the latter change is of relatively little significance. See text for further comment upon these 
issues. 
3. Totals may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
Table 2: Establishment Size and Number of Establishments in UK Manufacturinz 1972: 
1992 
1-199 
Employee Size Class (Enterprise) 
200-499 500-4999 5000+ All 
Mean Establishment Size (no. employees) 
1972 21 207 346 760 82 
1979 16 155 237 556 61 
1983 15 141 211 419 48 
1984 12 147 236 456 36 
1992 11 167 276 554 31 
Mean No 
. of 
Establishments per Finn 
1972 1.08 1.50 3.98 22.6 1.20 
1979 1.06 1.99 5.74 30.1 1.19 
1983 1.06 2.19 6.19 37.5 1.19 
1984 1.05 2.07 5.55 34.1 1.12 
1992 1.02 1.84 4.65 23.1 1.07 
Notes: 
1. Source of data, UK Census of Production: Table 12, various years. 
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Figure 1: Logs of Total Employment 
Notes: ItI99, It499, M999,10000 are the log of total employment in firms with 1-199 employees, 200- 
499 employees, 500-4999 employees, 5000+ employees respectively: The vertical line indicates the 
position of the discontinuity in sampling from pre 1983 and post 1984. The changes between 1983 and 
1984 should not be interpreted as having any economic significance. 
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Figure 2: Shares of Net Ouput 
i5-T-aýa 
Note: s199, s499, s4999, s5000 are the shares of net output for firms with 1-199 employees, 200-499 
employees, 500-4999 employees, 5000+ employees respectively. The vertical line indicates the position 
of the discontinuity in sampling from pre 1983 and post 1984. The changes between 1983 and 1984 
should not be interpreted as having any economic significance. 
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Fig 3: Net change in No. of Enterprises 
Note: nent199, nent5OOO are the proportionate change in the number of firms in the size classes of firms 
with 1-199 employees and 5000+ employees respectively. The vertical line indicates the position of the 
discontinuity in sampling from pre 1983 and post 1984. The changes between 1983 and 1984 should not 
be interpreted as having any economic significance. 
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Fig 4: Price Cost Margins 
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Note: pcml99, pcm5OOO and aggpcin are the price cost margins of firms with 1-199 employees, 5000+ 
employees and all firms in UK manufacturing respectively. The price cost margin is defined as (net 
output - operative wages)/(gross output). The vertical line indicates the position of the discontinuity in 
sampling from pre 1983 and post 1984. The changes between 1983 and 1984 should not be interpreted 
as having any economic significance. 
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Fig 5: Ad)usted Definition Price Cost Margins 
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Note: apcm199, apcm5OOO and aggapcm. are the price cost margins of firms with 1-199 employees, 
5000+ employees and all firms in UK manufacturing respectively. The price cost margin is defined as 
(net output - operative wages)/(net output). The vertical line indicates the position of the discontinuity in 
sampling from pre 1983 and post 1984. The changes between 1983 and 1984 should not be interpreted 
as having any economic significance. 
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Fig 6: Materials to Output Ratios 
STZ3Taý 
Note: my199, my5000 and aggmy are the material inputs to gross output ratio of firms with 1-199 
employees, 5000+ employees and all firms in LJK manufacturing respectively. The material inputs to 
gross output ratio is proxied by as (gross output - net output)/(gross output). The vertical line indicates 
the position of the discontinuity in sampling from pre 1983 and post 1984. The changes between 1983 
and 1984 should not be interpreted as having any economic significance. 
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Fig 7: Real and Nominal Material s/Output Ratios 
Note: The materials to output ratios in constant 1972 terms are rmyl99 for the firms with 1-199 
employees and rmy5000 for the firms with 5000+ employees. my199 and my5000 are the nominal 
counterparts as defined in the note to Figure 6. The vertical line indicates the position of the 
discontinuity in sampling from pre 1983 and post 1984. The changes between 1983 and 1984 should not 
be interpreted as having any economic significance. 
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Fig 8: Excess Capacity by Size Class 
sTayra- 
Note: ec199 and ec5000 are the proportion of firms reporting below capacity operation in the 1-199 
employee and 5000+ employee size classes. See Appendix for details of data definitions. 
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Fig 9: Optimism by Size Class 
Note: opt199 and opt5OOO are the proportion of firms reporting optimism in the 1-199 employee and 
5000+ employee size classes. See Appendix for details of data definition. 
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Fig 10: Expected Change in Stocks by Size Class 
Note: stf199 and stf5OOO are the net proportion of firms reporting an increase in stocks of finished goods 
in the 1-199 employee and 5000+ employee size classes. See Appendix for details of data definition. 
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Fig 11: Expected Change : in Stocks by Size Class 
Note: stml99 and stm5OOO are the net proportion of firms reporting an increase in stocks of material 
inputs in the 1-199 employee and 5000+ employee size classes. See Appendix for details of data 
definition. 
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Fig 12: Stocks to Outout Patios by Size Class 
S7.3Ta 
Note: str199 and str5000 are the ratio of stocks and work in progress to gross output in the 1-199 
employee and 5000+ employee size classes. The vertical line indicates the position of the discontinuity 
in sampling from pre 1983 and post 1984. The changes between 1983 and 1984 should not be 
interpreted as having any economic significance. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix of CBI Industrial Trends Survey Variables 
1 ec199 ec5OOO 
---------------------------- 
ec1991 1.0000 
ec50001 0.7266 1.0000 
opt1991 -0.3766 -0.0635 
opt5oool -0.4163 -0.1615 
stf1991 -0.6476 -0.0557 
stf50001 -0.5305 -0.2855 
StM1991 -0.7963 -0.3191 
stm50001 -0.6895 -0.2407 
opt199 opt5000 
---------------- 
1.0000 
0.9578 1.0000 
0.3485 0.3443 
-0.1325 -0.1065 
0.4773 0.4511 
0.1780 0.1738 
stfI99 stf5000 StM199 StM5000 
---------------------------------- 
1.0000 
0.5367 1.0000 
0.8807 0.4587 1.0000 
0.8714 0.6220 0.8940 1.0000 
Variable definitions: 199 refers to the firms with between 1-199 employees, 5000 refers to the firms with 
greater than 5000 employees. ec is the proportion of firms reporting below capacity operation. opt is the 
net proportion of firms reporting that they are more or less optimistic about the future. Positive values 
indicate a majority of optimists, negative values indicate a majority of pessimists. stf is the net 
proportion of firms reporting an increaseldecrease in stocks of finished goods. stm, is the net proportion 
of firms reporting an increaseldecrease in stocks of material inputs 
Data Anpendix 
The data series from the CBI quarterly Industrial Trends Survey are based upon the following 
questions 
Question 1. 
"Are you more, or less, optimistic than you were four months ago about THE GENERAL 
BUSINESS SITUATION IN YOUR INDUSTRY? " to which firms can respond "More" "Same" 
"Less". The calculated figure for optimism is the proportion responding "More" minus the 
proportion reporting "Less" 
Question 4. 
"Is your present level of output below capacity? (i. e. are you operating below a satisfactory level 
of operation)" 
To which firms can respond "Yes", "No" or "N/A" . 
The calculated figure for excess capacity is 
the proportion responding "Yes". 
Question 5c. 
"Excluding seasonal variations do you consider that in volume terms your present stocks of 
firýished goods are " "More than adequate" "Adequate" "Less than adequate" "N/A" 
The measure of excessive inventory is calculated as the difference between the proportion of 
firms reporting "More than adequate" and the proportion reporting "Less than adequate". A 
positive figure indicates on balance excessive stocks of finished goods, a negative figure indicates 
on balance insufficient stocks. 
Questions 10 a and c 
"Excluding seasonal variations, what has been the trend over the PAST FOUR MONTHS with 
regard to-. " 
Q 10 a Volume of stocks of raw materials and bought in inputs 
Q 10 c Volume of stocks of finished goods 
The measure of the change in stocks is the proportion reporting "Increase" minus the proportion 
reporting "Decrease". A positive figure indicates on average an upward trend over the past four 
months, a negative figure indicates on average a downward trend. 
In each case the annual figure of the series is calculated as the mean of the 4 quarterly figures. 
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Chapter 2. Demand Fluctuations, Firm Heterogeneity and Stiglerian Flexibility 
1. Introduction 
Mills and Schumann (henceforth MS)(1985) set out an explanation of and empirical evidence for 
the coexistence of different sized firms within a competitive industry. Their important empirical 
finding is that there is an inverse relationship between measured output variability and firm size. 
It is also found that this relationship holds regardless of the degree of concentration in the 
industry and this is offered as evidence against a market power based explanation for their 
results. Their result is offered as support for the theory of a trade-off between static and dynamic 
efficiency as an explanation for the coexistence of large and small firms in the same industry, we 
will call this trade-off the flexibility hypothesis. This basic empirical result has subsequently been 
confirmed by Chappell, Das and Shughart (1993) and Zimmermann (1995) although 
Zimmermann reports some contradictory evidence which requires further explanation and 
investigation as well as the confirmation of this basic result. 
In terms of the focus of this thesis there is also a natural progression from a consideration of 
cyclical movements in the relative profitability of small and large firms to consider the variation 
in sales (hence market shares) of firms. A direct connection between the two issues has been 
drawn through comparisons between the empirical study of Schmalensee (1989b) which examines 
the cyclical relationship between profitability and firm size within industries and the above 
mentioned studies of the relationship between firm size within industries and sales variability. Ile 
connection between the results of these studies has been commented upon in Schmalensee (1989b, 
p356) and Scherer and Ross (1990, p442), who note that Schmalensee's result that the relative 
profitability advantage of large firms is counter cyclical, i. e. the profitability advantage increases 
in recessions, is consistent with the finding of Mills and Schumann (1985) that large firms have 
lower sales variability. Scherer and Ross further suggest that Schmalense&s result is "inconsistent 
with arguments that large firms are likely to be more burdened by fixed costs in recessions. " 
(Nd. p442). However we would argue that, while the Mills and Schumann and Schmalensec 
results would appear to be consistent, the underlying explanations for the result are very different. 
In particular, Mills and Schumann adopt a framework where they assume perfect competition 
whereas Schmalensee concludes that one explanation for the results obtained in his study, 
Schmalensee's apparent preferred explanation, is variations in market power and the study is 
based in a theoretical fi-amework of imperfect competition. We will examine these two results in 
this chapter and we find that while the consistency exists, strikingly different conclusions must 
be drawn. 
There are three objectives to this chapter. Firstly the chapter seeks to explore the NIS empirical 
result, which would appear to be of wider interest, and question both the theoretical foundations 
upon which it is based and the interpretation which can be placed upon the results. In particular, 
with the generalisation of the model to the situation of imperfect competition, it is possible firstly 
to generate an alternative empirical result while retaining key features of the model and secondly 
to maintain the original result without the key features of the NIS model. The problem of 
observational equivalence is therefore potentially sqVere, yet it is a problem that has been largely 
ignored in the previous discussions. Secondly the chapter seeks to move forward the empirical 
analysis of these issues by advocating an alternative strategy for empirical analysis of flexibility 
arguments which it is argued is more closely grounded in appropriate theory and will be 
potentially more revealing. Thirdly the chapter will consider more closely the relationship 
between fixed costs/capital structure, sales variability and profitability movements to examine the 
true degree of consistency between the empirical findings. 
The structure of the chapter is therefore as follows. Section 11 considers the initial 
conceptuallsation of flexibility put forward by Stigler (1939) and the subsequent refinements of 
the concept discussed in particular by Carlsson (1989) and Del Monte and Esposito (1992). The 
section then considers other elements of industrial organisation which have largely been ignored 
by the literature on flexibility but which have a direct bearing on the central empirical issue of 
this chapter. Section III is an exposition of the theory and assumptions from which MS generate 
their empirical prediction. Section IV develops the extension of the model to a situation of 
41 
imperfect competition. Within this alternative fi-amework the main results of the NIS fi-amework 
are reproduced but exceptions are also generated. Section V assesses the empirical specification 
adopted by NIS and others and the implications for the extension for the testing and interpretation 
of the hypothesis are given. Section VI considers the theoretical determination of the variability of 
price cost margins an aspect not directly considered by MS but which is related, as noted above, 
and is an important element of this thesis. Section VII surnmarises the findings and implications 
particularly for empirical analysis. 
11. Stielerian and alternative conceptions of flexibility 
Stiglees notion of flexibility is derived from his seminal work of 1939. This work has been much 
referred to but, as with so many seminal articles, the distilled essence of the paper, that which has 
been appropriated by subsequent theory, has lost much of the original interesting flavour. There 
are two aspects to Stiglees conception of the use of capital equipment in the short run. The 
adaptability of the equipment and its divisibility. Oi (1982) identifies the adaptability of labour as 
an additional element of flexibility. In general, divisibility of fixed plant will enable marginal 
costs to be maintained at a relatively constant level until the optimum or capacity level of output 
is reached. Adaptability of the plant will enable marginal costs to be maintained relatively 
constant in the region in excess of the optimum output level. The degree of flexibility is then a 
combination of the two. Stigler suggests two strategies that could be adopted by firms to increase 
the degree of flexibility, the first is to ensure that plant is divisible in order to reduce the cost 
penalty of sub-optimal output levels, the second is to reduce fixed costs relative to variable costs 
by a process of substitution of variable for fixed costsI. 
Carlsson surveys the previous literature and suggests three possible levels of flexibility for the 
firm; operational, tactical and strategic. Operational flexibility relates to flexibility in the day to 
day organisation of production. It includes that ability to switch between products, vary the 
length of a production run, and adapt to machinery breakdown ctc. Operational flexibility is also 
I It is interesting to note in passing that Stigler is not rosy eyed with respect to his view of flexibility. He 
recogniscs the efficiency and competitive benefits of flexibility, but also notes that an important feature 
of the second route to flexibility is that it is employed in "the sweatshop industries". 
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deemed to be one of the determinants of the requirements for inventories, shorter production runs 
in principle requiring lower levels of inventory and increasing operational flexibility. Tactical 
flexibility refers to the design of production facilities so that changes in the products niix or level 
of demand can be met in the medium term. This form of flexibility is probably the closest to the 
form of flexibility which is described by Stigler and discussed in most of the literature. It is 
largely concerned with designing a production facility with an appropriate cost structure in the 
sense intended by Stigler. However the correlation between Carlsson's notions of flexibility and 
Stiglees is far from exact. To note but one difference, elements of Carlss&s tactical flexibility 
depends upon the existence of multiple products. Carlsson's notion is more closely related to the 
economic notion of economies of scope in the short run, rather than short run econon-ties of scale. 
In this situation of tactical flexibility, there is a potential trade-off noted between inventories and 
flexibility. What is described as a "functional plant layout", where it is possible to shift between 
production of one good to another relatively easily and thereby vary the production of individual 
products at the same time as maintaining high levels of capacity utilisation, leads to higher overall 
levels of inventory as throughput of semi processed stock is slower. Strategic flexibility relates to 
the ability to be flexible in the attitude towards strategic decision making. This means that the 
response to new product developments and design changes must be adequate. It also requires a 
flexibility of organisational form in terms of information processing so that all parts of a firm 
may be aware of the new developments in other areas and a strategic overview can be taken. 
Alongside these three levels the usefulness of a different partition of flexibility is noted by 
Carlsson, what Klein(1984) has described as type I and type Il flexibility. Type I flexibility refers 
to the ability of firms to respond to foreseeable outcomes, such as a particular realisation of the 
level of demand from a predictable range, type 11 flexibility refers to the ability of firms to 
respond to unforeseeable outcomes, such as the advent of a radically different technology or 
product. There is no exact concordance with Carlsson's schematisation, as Carlsson notes, 
however type 11 flexibility would largely come within the scope of strategic flexibility and would 
only be seen in terms of tactical and operational flexibility in relation to the ability of primarily 
staff and to a lesser extent machines, to trouble shoot without reference to specialist help. Type I 
43 
flexibility would appear to accord with the general features of operational and tactical flexibility 
in terms of design of production to deal with the anticipated fluctuations in the medium and short 
run. In terms of observation, Carlsson notes that aspects of strategic flexibility are very difficult 
to measure, and the same applies to type II flexibility. 
An important aspect of tactical flexibility is the ability to operate at different output levels 
without significant cost penalties and t1iis, therefore, accords with Stigler's definition. It is also 
the empirical aspect which has been focused upon within the existing literature. However the 
additional aspect relevant to empirical analysis which is implicit in the concept of operational 
flexibility is the notion of output adjustment costs. In part, adjustment costs could come under 
tactical flexibility but both analytically and empirically the point is different. A firm may be able 
to operate at different levels of output at the same per unit cost but changing between the levels of 
output cause the firm to incur significant costs. This necessarily implies a dynamic cost function 
which is not easily comparable with the static cost functions analysed below. This is a significant 
weakness of the empirical application of the flexibility approach. To give an example: suppose 
that a company is faced with an order of either 50 units per month or 100 units per month. A 
flexible firm in terms of the definition of Mills and Schumann would be able to produce either 50 
or 100 at a similar cost. But the real advantage would be if the order is for 50 units in odd months 
then 100 units in even months. If there are costs of adjusting the level of output the flexible firm 
is one which can switch between the levels of output easily. 
To incorporate the above argument we need a dynamic cost function which contains an allowance 
for adjustment costs. This point was included in Stigler's consideration but has been lost from 
subsequent discussions. Stigler notes "The situation in real life is complicated by the fact that the 
optimum output may be an optimum through time, i. e., the optimum may be based upon 
anticipated increases or decreases in the output of the finn. "(Stigler, 1939, p308) Ilius he 
restricts his theoretical analysis to the static or stationary case which must implicitly assume zero 
adjustment costs or alternatively subsumes adjustment costs into the definition of adaptability. 
More precisely, Stigler comes to "the conclusion that time must be an implicit variable which 
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affects the form of the production function. 71bere is not a short run and a long run; rather there 
are continuous variations in the marginal cost curve from very short periods to full, long run 
equilibrium. "(ibid. p3 11) The theoretical framework developed by Mills, following from the 
previous analyses, has proved attractive for its simplicity; it is able to tackle an apparently 
dynamic issue using a framework which is essentially static in origin. How far this simplification 
can and should be taken is clearly open to question. 
The other explicit acknowledgement made by Stigler is that a one to one plant firm ratio is 
assumed i. e. there are no multi plant firms, a factor which must be considered when returning 
from theory to empirical analysis. 'Me existence of multi plant firms clearly implies that there is 
greater divisibility of output and therefore will lead to greater flexibility. Multi product firms 
need also to be taken into consideration when considering flexibility. Carlsson assumes for most 
of his discussion that firms are multi product firms although Stigler's and Mills and Schumann's 
analysis refers to only monoproduct firms. Del Monte and Esposito (1992) examine the Mills 
framework but extend it to multiproduct firms and reverse the conventional theoretical finding 
suggesting that for multiproduct firms large firms will be more flexible. T'hey provide no 
empirical support for this conclusion, however, and Mills and Schumann do attempt to control for 
diversification in their empirical analysis but find no evidence of a relationship. 
From a different perspective, noted but not considered in detail by Zimmermann (1995), it can be 
viewed that the small and large firms are producing differentiated products in which case this 
must be taken into account when considering the intra, industry relations. This aspect is difficult 
to analyse empirically because of the detailed information necessary to examine the relationships. 
However it is possible to speculate as to the consequences of this. Firstly the relationship may 
potentially differ between consumer and producer goods industries if consumer goods industries 
are more susceptible to such segmentation. If small firms are producing different products from 
the large firms then it can be of two main forms; vertically related products which arc potentially 
supplied to larger companies, or horizontally related products which do not necessarily compete 
head on but instead use niche markets for their products. If we consider the latter initially, as 
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Sutton (1991) shows, with differentiated products industries investment in sunk costs particularly 
in advertising and research and development can lead to the acquisition of large market shares 
while accompanied by small firms with little investment in sunk costs and smaller market shares. 
It does not stretch the imagination too greatly to suggest that the nature of advertising will not 
only tend to increase the demand for a product but will also tend to reduce the variability of 
demand for the product. Advertisers are keen on generating brand loyalty which would tend to 
smooth out demand fluctuations as consumers become less responsive to price changes. By 
contrast for smaller firms niche markets are likely to be more volatile both because tastes will 
change more quickly and be less manageable and because cyclical fluctuations which affect 
consumers' incomes lead to greater shifts in consumption of the non staple items than for mass 
market items. In this way small firms would tend to have more variable sales than large finns if 
they have differentiated products. For small firms vertically related to large firms, the effect of 
demand fluctuations will depend on the nature of the technical relationship but a plausible 
account of subcontracting relations might see small firms to be used as surplus capacity in booms 
which therefore smoothes out production for large firms but increases the variability of 
production for small firms. 
The other major aspect of Suttoifs (1991) sunk costs when considering differentiated products is 
expenditure on Research and Development2. As Caves and Porter (1978) and Geroski (1994), 
inter alia, show, research and development will tend to increase the instability of market shares. 
It is not clear from the evidence, however, whether the variability will affect large firms and small 
finns to an equal extent or not. 'Me firm size distribution of innovations is a much debated and 
complex issue on which the only consensus appears to be that there are no strong resultS3. 'Me 
2 SuttoWs model does not differentiate formally between advertising and research and development 
therefore we might expect them to have qualitatively identical economic clTects. However we can 
consider three potential reasons for a difference; the extent of economics of scale in research and 
development expenditure may differ from advertising economics of scale; the clTects of research and 
development may be less certain or predictable; the degree of persistence of the effects of research and 
development may be lower than the persistence of the clTects of advertising. All of these factors could 
reasonably be expected to lead to different structures in the Sutton model. 
3 Gcrosk : 1 (1994, pl6l)concludes, "thebottom line seems to be that the structure of markets and the 
size (and internal structure of firms) are not the major determinants of innovative activity* 
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research and development literature would therefore not appear to be of assistance in explaining a 
general result relating firm size and flexibility. 
111. Mills and Schumann flexibility hypothesis. 
This section outlines the basis of the theoretical model developed by Mills (1984,1986) that 
underpins the empirical analysis of flexibility. The NIS explanation for the coexistence of large 
and small firms is based upon differences in cost structures and, in particular, the idea of a trade- 
off between flexibility as embodied by the slope of the marginal cost curve and absolute cost 
advantage as embodied by the level of minimum average cost. Mills (1984) shows that in a 
competitive industry with free entry and a continuum of available (quadratic) cost structures only 
one cost structure will be observed in equilibrium. However, Mills (1986) shows that if there is a 
discrete set of technologies it is possible for two different cost structures to coexist and that the 
one with the lower minimum average total cost will be less flexible. 
Following the derivation of Mills (1986, p205) a cost structure is posited for each firm i in the 
competitive industry of the form, 
C(Xi) = (XI + OiXi + 
X2 i (1) 
2yj 
where xi is output of firm i and a, P and y are positive constants which are all allowed to vary 
across firms. Industry demand is assumed to be completely inelastic in each period and 
distributed with mean T and variance cýx. The implied endogenous price distribution has mean 
p and variance CF2 . Finns are price takers, letting output be determined where price equals P 
marginal cost. Combining these assumptions the profit maximising first order condition yields a 
supply function, 
x, = yj (p - 0) (2) 
From (2) we can readily obtain (3) 
x, (p) - x, (p) = yi (p -p) 
which implies, G2, = y2CY2 so that firms with higher y will have a higher variance of output. xiP 
However because the empirical test involves a comparison of firms in different industries, while 
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the theoretical focus is variation within industries, we are interested in the relative rather than 
-/---P 
absolute variability of output4. Mills notes that i7i (p) = xi (p). p /xi (p) =- is the (p - j6, ) 
elasticity of supply for firm i evaluated at mean price. Clearly, this elasticity of supply is greater 
for firms with higher Pi. Dividing (3) by output evaluated at the mean price p yields the 
coefficient of variation of output, 
cv,, = q, (p)cv, (4) 
Where cv,,, is the coefficient of variation of output of firm i and cvP is the coefficient of variation 
of price at the industry level. Mills then establishes that in a zero expected profit equilibrium5 it is 
possible for firms with two different types of cost structure and only two 13Tes to coexist and that 
the firm type with the higher level of minimum average cost will have a more elastic supply (the 
measure of flexibility). As this step is crucial in the argument that follows we will draw it out 
more clearly. The level of average costs according to the cost function in (1) is 
(X Xf (5) 
X, Xj 2 ri 
minimising average costs leads to a point of minimum average costs defined by (6), 
ri 
C(X, *) 
='8' + 
Fýaj 
(6) 
Xi ri 
where x*i is the output at the point of minimum average cost. To obtain a point of closure Mills 
and Schumann then impose a zero expected profit condition. The current period profit function in 
their framework is 
; r, (P)= r, (P_fl, )2 /2 -a, (7) 
taking a Taylor series expansion of this around the mean price yields an expected profit function 
of the form, 
r, (P-A)' ricý E; r, (p) =2a, +2P (8) 
setting this equal to zero and rearranging yields 
(p-, B, )2+cT2 =2aly, (9) P 
4 This an important point. The need to normalise on firm size due to the non comparability of different 
industries is in part responsible for generating the observational equivalence of the two approaches. 
5 Firms are assumed to maximise expected profits within this framework of demand uncertainty under 
the additional assumption of risk neutrality. 
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which can be substituted back into (6) to give a value of minimum average cost in terms of Pi and 
the first two moments of price. This expression can then also be used to show that the crucial two 
relations as far as Mills and Schumann are concerned. 
OD(C(X*)/X*)/L9p >0 (10) 
-ýJ/ap >0. (11) 
Namely that minimum average costs are increasing in P and so is the supply elasticity of output. 
For Mills and Schumann, this establishes that firms with high minimum average costs will have 
high output variability. From (11) this is attributed to be due to a trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency, a rise in P must be accompanied by a rise in y or a fall in cc, both of which 
are consistent with Stiglees flexibility hypothesis in terms of either lower capital intensity or a 
flatter slope of the marginal cost curve. We will demonstrate in the next section that as a general 
conclusion this is logically flawed. However, we will continue with the exposition of the Mills 
and Schumann paper to draw out their results more fully. 
This combination of the trade-off between minimum average cost and flexibility and the result in 
(4) establishes that more flexible firms will have a higher coefficient of variation of output. While 
there are other results which have been established within the framework, this is the important 
one for purposes of empirical investigation. NIS (1985) then assume that economies of scale exist 
so that lower minimum average cost is associated with larger firms and that therefore the larger 
firms must be less flexible in the sense of a less elastic supply curve, and have a lower coefficient 
of variation of output, than small finns if they coexist in a competitive equilibrium with demand 
fluctuations. One should note that this raises problems of interpretation and falsification of the 
hypothesIS6. A rejection of the inverse relationship between output variability and firm size could 
mean that the model is not a fair description of reality or that economies of scale of the kind 
specified are absent hence the assumption is inappropriate. 
MS do consider the possibility that market power could generate the result. To this end they 
cstImatc tile relationship for industries of differing levels of concentration and find that it 
6 This is the conventional problem associated with the Duhem-Quine thesis. 
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continues to hold irrespective of the degree of concentration. The conclusion they draw is that 
market power is irrelevant to the explanation of sales variability. There are two initial responses 
to this: the first is that they do not include concentration as an independent regressor which would 
appear to be a more suitable way of testing for such effects rather than simply truncating the 
sample. By estimating for different ranges of concentration it is difficult to statistically test for 
significant differences in the sales variability - market share relationship or at least this is not 
done. The second response is that the implicit assumption would appear to be that the market 
power and flexibility explanations for sales variability are mutually exclusive, whereas, as we 
will show below, they are actually from a theoretical standpoint largely observationally 
equivalent and perfectly consistent with a combination of the two candidate explanations. In the 
next section we will extend the model to the situation of imperfect competition which allows us 
to examine more rigorously the precise implications of introducing market power into the 
explanation of sales variability. 
There are three points which need to be made or reiterated in respect of this model of firm 
flexibility which are important for the economic implications and potential policy directions 
indicated. 
1. 'Me assumption of perfect competition and marginal cost pricing ensure that any equilibrium 
which is found in the model will be Pareto efficient. 
2. The trade-off between the point of minimum average cost and the supply elasticity is a 
consequence of the zero expected profit condition which is imposed by the assumption of perfect 
competition. 
3. A strong conclusion is that there is no need to resort to either imperfect competition or product 
differentiation in order to explain the coexistence of heterogeneous firms in industries as demand 
fluctuations and cost differences are sufficient to explain their existence. 
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IV. A model of flexibility with imperfect competition. 
We now introduce some degree of imperfect competition into the framework and demonstrate the 
implications of so doing. The most straightforward form for exposition is a Cournot conjectural 
variation duopoly with two firms labelled i and j, so we will focus on this case but it can be 
shown the results are robust to the introduction of more than two firms. We assume that industrv 
demand rather than being completely price inelastic is of the form X=0- o) p7 where demand 
fluctuations are generated by variation in 0 such that it is distributed with mean 
D and variance 
o-, 2. Adopting the same cost function as in (1) 
2 
c(x. ) =a. +, 8. x. + 
Xi (1a) 
IIiI2, v, 
Choosing xi to maximise profits and rearranging the first order condition yields an equilibrium 
relation analogous to (2) of the form, 
X. = 
P'; V i (P (X)-, 8i) (2a) 
I (A + 7), 
Where p, =- -t hence in a pure Cournot model pi=: (o, under the assumption of 
/ 
CW 
competitive conjectures pi-+oo and 2a collapses to 2. In the converse case of fully collusive 
conjectures pi=co. si where si is the market share of firm i. It is clear from this that an increase in 
pi, the competitive stance taken by the firm, and an increase in yP a flattening of the marginal 
cost curve, are identical in terms of their effect on the relations developed. By defining yi*=piyi/(p 
i+yi) it is equally clear that this then follows through to most of the other relations developed 
within the Mills and Schumann framework. The reason for this is clear if one considers that the 
change in optimal output for a firm resulting from a shift in the demand curve will depend on 
both the slope of the marginal cost curve and the slope of the perceived marginal revenue 
schedule. Changes in competitive stance are passed through in changes in pi and also impl% 
different slopes of the perceived marginal revenue schedules. 
7 Throughout the following exposition the main restrictions on the generality of the results are that wc 
assume that the second derivative of the demand function is zero, implying a linear demand function, 
and that the third derivative of the cost function is zero, implying a linear marginal cost curve. Both of 
these restrictions are implicit in the Mills and Schumann exposition although they include the additional 
restriction that the first derivative of the demand function is zero, an assumption inconsistent with 
imperfect competition. 
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It can also be shown (see Appendix I for details) that under a more restrictive formulation of 
demand that output adjustment costs can be incorporated into the value of -fi* yielding a further 
observational equivalence. It should be noted that this requires a specific stationary form of 
demand fluctuations less general than that adopted here. 
We can show that cý- = Y*2 cý and we can also establish that, p 
cvx Ili (p ). cv p 
(4a) 
where Y7, -P (P - 
(4a) indicates that the firm with the higherAwill have a greater coefficient of variation of output 
and be more flexible in the sense defined by Mills (1986). At this point it should be noted that this 
measure is not necessarily consistent with the alternative definition of flexibility, I/yi, the slope of 
the marginal cost curve, which has been used as an inverse measure of flexibility by Stigler 
(1939), Marschak and Nelson (1962) and Mills (1984). Only if there is a trade-off between Pi 
and I/yi are the two interpretations consistent. The slope of the marginal cost curve is the more 
important aspect of the cost function from the point of view of the flexibility hypothesis 
characterised by Stigler. 
From the above it proves relatively straightforward to demonstrate that the imperfect competition 
effects and flexibility effects are inseparable and observationally equivalent at this stage. The 
implications of this equivalence are: 
1. It is no longer necessary for the equilibrium to be Pareto efficient and indeed we can expect, 
given the preponderance of imperfect competition in real markets, that in a large number of cases 
there will be an inefficient allocation of resources. 
2. Because there is no need to impose a zero expected profit constraint there is no necessary 
trade-off between the slope of the marginal cost curve and the level of minimum average costs. 
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Wholly inefficient firms in the sense of cost structure may still coexist with more efficient firms. 
In order to establish that firms with different cost structures can coexist in the same industry, it is 
sufficient only to assume that there exists some barrier to entry so that the number of firms is 
quasi fixed8. 
3. The observational equivalence between approaches does not deny the possibility that the 
flexibility explanation of industry structure is correct, but rather suggests that it is not possible to 
infer from the relations developed to ascertain whether this is the case or not. 
4. A further implication of the imperfect competition framework is that we can relax one of the 
restrictions on the cost function namely that "i>O. It is necessary within a competitive 
framework for the marginal cost function to be upward sloping if the optimal output level for the 
firm is to be defined. This is no longer the case with imperfect competition. Ilerefore we can 
admit constant marginal costs (1/yi=O) or even decreasing marginal costs within a restricted range 
(yi<0)1. In the context of a Cournot conjecture framework this is simply the familiar restriction 
that marginal cost curve should not be more steeply downward sloping than the demand curve. 
This point may appear trivial from a theoretical perspective but as will be discussed below in 
section V it can have important implications for empirical work. 
Developing point 2 above gives the most insight into what is actually being measured in the 
empirical analysis of Mills and Schumann flexibility hypothesis. Their hypothesis depends almost 
entirely on firms having higher levels of P. We can see this from an examination of (4), (10) and 
(11). With the imposition of zero profits a trade-off between P and the other parameters can be 
established; without that imposition no trade-off is necessary but the empirical result will still 
hold. This is because the empirical result only depends upon P and not upon the identification of 
the other parameters. Ilerefore we can turn the Mills and Schumann conclusions on their head. 
Firms which are statically inefficient, in the sense ofhaving higher values offi, will have higher 
output variability. Demonstrating that small firms have higher output variability merely 
8 It should also be noted that within the general Cournot framework more than two different cost 
structures can be present in the same industry at the same time. 
9 In order for yi<O to yield a stable outcome the additional restriction -yi>pi must hold. 
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demonstrates that smallfirms are statically inefficient. In order to show that smallfirms are 
necessarily dynamically efficient it is necessary to show in addition that they are subject to 
competitive pressuresforcing (expected) profits to zero. 
While Mills and Schumann demonstrate the former they merely assume the latter and as we have 
suggested above the two situations are observationally equivalent using their empirical method so 
they can make no empirically based conclusion concerning the issue. 'Ihat the supply elasticity of 
output is solely determined by P may appear surprising. The intuition behind the fact that 
statically inefficient firms will have a greater coefficient of variation of output, regardless of 
whether they are dynamically more efficient or not, is that statically inefficient marginal firms 
will tend to be fairly small but as price rises so output rises fairly rapidly as profitability 
increases. By contrast efficient firms will tend to produce relatively high levels of output even 
when prices are low so the proportionate change in output is lower for these (static) efficient 
firms. 
Following on from this, one of the properties of the Mills and Schumann model which has not 
been exploited previously is that it enables us to establish the market shares of the firms. If we 
can directly obtain relationships between firm size and flexibility the we can minimise on the 
assumptions necessary for empirical application of the framework. We shall now explore the 
conditions under which the more flexible firm, in the empirically observable sense of (4a), will 
also be the smaller firm. To illustrate this the ratio of the output of firm i to the output of firm j 
is given from (2a) as, 
xi 
= 
r, - ß, ) - 
P, yi (pi + yj)(P - ß) : (P 
xi yj(P-ßi) pjyj(A+yi)(p-ßj) 
From (12) we may obtain two propositions 
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a) If there is no trade-off between the intercept value of the marginal cost curve and its slope 
then the market share of thefirm with the higher value offi will be lower than the market share 
of thefirm with the lower value of fi 
This can be seen by observing that if Pi>pj and I/Ij: 51/yi then xi<xj. This proposition establishes 
that we may observe a negative correlation between the coefficient of variation of output and 
market share in situations where flexibility in the Stiglerian sense is positively related or unrelated 
to market share. 
b) If there exists a trade-off between the intercept value of the marginal cost curve and it slope 
there is no unambiguous relation tofirm size. 
As the trade-off becomes more important then it becomes possible for a positive relationship 
between output variation and market share to exist. However, if Oi)pj and yj)yj i. e. there is a 
trade-off between the intercept value of marginal cost and its slope then firm size cannot be 
unambiguously determined. In particular, if the trade-off is small then the firm with the lower 
value of P will still be the smaller firm i. e. a trade-off exists between static efficiency and the 
slope of the marginal cost curve the firm with the lower P will be the smaller firm. However, if 
the trade-off between P and y becomes too great then the situation will be reversed and the more 
flexible firm will become larger than the less flexible firm. 
It also follows from (a) that in the situation that both firm have identical slopes of their marginal 
cost curves the firm with the higherAin the Cournot contextIO will have the lower market share. 
T'herefore it can be demonstrated that within a restricted Cournot model small firms will have a 
greater coefficient of variation of output than large firms, however, Us result is not general. 
Ceteris Paribus, the firm with the flatter marginal cost curve will be the larger firm. This goes 
further than the Mills and Schumann result because they only find that flexible firms have a 
greater cocfficient of variation of output than less flexible firms, they then assumel I that more 
10 Or any framework where the firms have the same conjectural variation. 
II This is not to say that the assumption is implausible but simply that the relationship between 
flexibility and firm size is not derived from within their model. Instead it is generated by a combination 
of the observed empirical relationship between capital intensity and firm size and the theoretical 
relationship bctwccn capital intensity and flexibility. 
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flexible firms are small which is then used to support their empirical framework. Again from (12) 
if all firms have the same P and y but have different conjectural variation terms, p, they will differ 
in size, the more competitive firm being larger. Finns with the same value of P, however will 
have the same coefficient of variation of output. This shows that some cost difference is 
important for establishing the inverse relationship and that market power alone cannot generate 
the result. However it should be noted that the difference in costs relates to static inefficiency and 
not to the dynamic cost advantage suggested by Mills and Schumann. 
Examining the determinants of firm size and incorporating the features of imperfect competition 
in this way therefore raises some problems which are indicative of some of the difficulties with 
this simple theoretical characterisation. A more adequate characterisation of firm market share 
determination would have to take into account product differentiation, output adjustment costs or, 
to a lesser extent, discontinuous marginal cost curves in the case of capacity constraints etc. in 
addition to the current framework, in order to explain some size differentials. 
We have established that it is p that matters for establishing the empirical relationship. Therefore 
looking at price cost margins in this context can potentially yield more insight in trying to 
understand the relationships developed. In doing so we can further demonstrate the general nature 
of the empirical result which has been shown by MS. Clearly, in the competitive context of NIS 
the margin between price and marginal cost is zero. However, the empirical price cost margin that 
is more commonly used is the margin between price and average variable cost. Using (2a) we can 
see that the price average variable cost margin measured at the mean price is defined by, 
(P) Yý/2rj) P /2r, 
PCM, =- (13) 
PP 
In the case of perfect competition y*=y so incorporating (4a) the mean price cost margin is equal 
to 
I-. 
Predictably in relaxing perfect competition the ftirther one moves away from perfect 2.17, (p) 
competition the higher will be the price cost margin, i. e. the lower is y*/2y, the higher the price 
cost margin. From relation (4a) the firms with the higher value of Tji(p) have a greater output 
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variability and from (13) these firms and the more competitive firms will have lower price cost 
margins. It is also conventionally predicted from theory that the price cost margin is positively 
related to market share, whatever the reason one might wish to ascribe to this relationship. 
Combining these results we can therefore show as a general result that as market share is 
positively related to the price cost margin which is in turn negatively related to output variability 
and the level of competition. We can therefore establish with more generality than ascribed by 
Mills and Schumann the empirical relation which shows that market share is negatively related to 
output variability and we should expect this empirical result to hold with the same regularity that 
applies to the price cost margin - market share result. 
A note of caution must be sounded concerning the true generality of this result. Schmalensee 
(1989a, p984) produces two "stylised facts" based upon empirical analysis that are applicable to 
this situation. Stylised fact 4.11 suggests that "In samples of U. S. firms of business units that 
include many industries, market share is strongly related to profitability. " However stylised fact 
4.12 also states that "Within particular manufacturing industries, profitability is not generally 
strongly related to market share. " The implication of the theoretical link between sales variability, 
price cost margins and market share and the empirical facts 4.11 and 4.12 is that we would 
expect confirmation of the flexibility result with cross industry samples of firms but a weaker 
relationship looking at individual industries. As we exan-dne in the next section, the empirical 
analysis of the flexibility hypothesis, that has been broadly affirmed the hypothesis, has 
exclusively been conducted on the kind of firm level data sets covering many industries that have 
produced stylised fact 4.11. 
V Empirical analysis of the flexibility hypothesis 
V. i. Previous empirical studies 
In this section we will examine the previous empirical analyses concerning the flexibility 
hypothesis. These empirical analyses are found to be problematic and in this section suggestions 
are made for a redefinition of the empirical approach which could usefully shed light on these 
issues. There have been three main empirical analyses which have been published within the 
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specific flexibility approach put forward by Mills and Schumann (1985), in addition to the initial 
work two published studies aimed at replicating the results are Chappell, Das and Shughart 
(CDS) (1993) Zimmermann (1995). In addition to these studies it is possible to draw on previous 
empirical work on the nature of short and long run cost functions which clearly have a bearing on 
the questions raised within the flexibility framework. 
In their empirical analysis Mills and Schumann use a basic specification of the form, 
SVARiýa+POMSi+PI(KIS)i+P2ISVj+ci (14) 
where SVARi is sales variance of firm i12' MSi is Market Share of firm i, (K/S)i is the capital 
sales ratio of firm i and ISVj is the variability of total sales in industry j. Where the expectation is 
that PO<O, Pl<O and P2ýO because the prediction of the flexibility hypothesis is that, after 
controlling for capital intensity, there will be a negative relationship between sales variance and 
market share within industries, while an industry with greater sales variance will tend to lead to 
firm with greater sales variance. The need to control for capital intensity as one element of the 
cost structure is identified by Mills and Schumann. As flexibility is a feature identified by Stigler 
which can be achieved by substituting variable for fixed costs then one would expect sales 
variability to be inversely related to the capital output ratio, as a proxy of the importance of fixed 
costs. 
Subsequent to this initial basic regression, in order to counter the possibility that market power 
might be causing the inverse relationship, Mills and Schumann truncate the sample progressively 
according to the level of concentration in the industry, so that industry level differences in market 
power can be catered for. The data is formed of a sample of 856 US companies using data from 
1970-1980. The results of the analysis are that the predictions are met in terms of each variable 
having the predicted sign and being significant. In terms of the control for the degree of market 
power the coefficients remain of the predicted sign and are significant irrespective of the level of 
concentration with the exception of the effect of capital intensity which is insignificant in 
12 All three papers cited above contain discussion of the appropriate empirical measure of sales (or 
employment) variability in this context, using some form of log variance adjusted for trend. As this is 
not the focus here we will not discuss this issue further. 
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determining sales variability for firms in low concentration industries, a point not commented 
upon by Mills and Schumann. On the strength of these latter results they conclude that it is 
flexibility and not market power which drives these results. 
The second empirical study by CDS replicates the same estimating equation (14) with the 
exception that the data used is derived from size class data for the United States from 1977-1988. 
No attempt is made to control for the level of concentration in the industry. Ile results obtained 
confirm the previous findings in terms of being significant and of the correct sign. The third study 
by Zimmermann adopts a more wide ranging approach and therefore is more interesting. Unable 
to obtain data on German companies on output the focus is on the variability of employment and 
capacity utilisation. Three different measures of size, including both absolute and relative 
measures, are compared for their properties. In addition, variables controlling for inventories, 
order backlogs and export propensity as well as dummy variables for consumer and investment 
goods are included as independent variables. There is also an attempt to control for concentration 
by truncating the sample into low concentration industries and comparing results. There is no 
attempt however to control for capital intensity or sales variability at the industry level. In an 
interesting development Zimmern-Lann also derives ways of approximating within the theoretical 
fi-amework, elements of the cost function and can then estimate their relation to firm size. 
Zimmermann's results relating to employment flexibility confirm the usual inverse relationship 
between firm size and employment variability and this occurs irrespective of whether the sample 
is truncated according to the level of concentration or not. This offers support for the Mills and 
Schumann interpretation. However, the estimates of the parameters of the cost function contradict 
this interpretation. In principle there should be a trade-off between minimum average cost and 
flexibiliq,. Those firrns with high minimum average cost will be more flexible because they are at 
a static cost disadvantage which they have to overcome by their flexibility in the dynamic context. 
As Mills and Schumann more formally state "if competitive equilibrium supports technologically 
heterogeneous firms, that is, firms with different cost parameters, the more flexible firms havc 
greater minimum average costs. " (1985, p760). However Zimmermann finds a weak positivc 
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relationship between the level of minimum average costs and firm size. In all cases the estimated 
coefficient is positive but in only three out of six cases is the point estimate significant. 'I'liese 
cases are where the size variable is relative rather absolute. In none of the cases is the expected 
negative relationship found. This result clearly contradicts the Mills and Schumann hypothesis. 
Zimmermann therefore suggests that the relationship is more complex and that further work is 
required. 
To briefly summarise the discussion thus far, the inverse relationslýiip between sales (or 
employment) variability and relative firm size appears to be relatively robust across data sets and 
to the inclusion (or ornission) of a number of control variables. This result would therefore appear 
to be well on the way to becoming an empirical regularity of the form espoused by Schmalensee. 
This it to be expected given we have already established on a theoretical level that it should be the 
case that the relationship should hold in a wide range of circumstances. Attempts at slightly more 
complex corroboration of the flexibility hypothesis have yielded more contradictions and 
therefore indicate that there are issues still to be resolved. 
Vji. Criticisms of previous studies 
Having up to this point uncritically summarised the salient points of the empirical studies we 
must now turn to consider some of the potential problems which arise. The transfer from a 
theoretical model to an empirically estimable framework is nearly always complex and almost 
never exact, therefore the points that are raised relate largely to the specification of the relevant 
variables and their economic interpretation rather than to questioqs of the precise flinctional form, 
debate about which can often be fairly arcane. There is one exception to this rule which is the 
examination of the contradiction outlined above, discovered by Zimmermann, which is discussed 
below. The problem which arises here would appear to be an attempt at too close a relationship 
between the prccise theoretical framework and the empirical relationship which means that the 
framework is insufficiently versatile to cope with alternative theoretical propositions. This is dealt 
with in the following paragraph. 
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The contradiction is that the flexibility hypothesis predicts an inverse relationship between firm 
size and minimum average costs, but Zimmermann in contrast finds a positive relationship. We 
show now that it can be reasonably expected that in the case of a misspecified framework, i. e. 
trying to fit a model developed using perfect competition to data generated within an imperfectly 
competitive environment, that such an apparently contradictory result can be generated. 
Reproducing some of the key equation from the exposition in section 111, the point of minimum 
average costs is given by, 
C(x, *) =A+ (6) where x*i is the output at the point of minimum average cost. 
X, * 
Fri i ý-ýi 
Combining this with the expected profit function (8) and imposing a zero profit condition 
E7r, (P)= yj(p _, 
gl)2 
a, + 
Cý ri P (8) 
yields the key empirical relation 
(p -, 8, )2+ cý =2 aly, (15) which can be substituted back into (6) to give a value of minimum P 
average cost in terms of Pi and the first two moments of price. This is the technique used by 
Zimmermann to obtain estimates of minimum average cost. 
If we instead consider the imperfect competition framework the results concerning the profit 
fiinction are altered such that adopting the terminology of section IV, i. e. y*=py/(p4-y). 
-- ri -A)2 "(2 r- rj*) 0-2 rj(2, v (p y, E; r, (p)= _ a, + (8a) 2 ri 2 
There is no need to set this equal to zero because we are operating within an imperfectly 
competitive environment therefore instead expected profit may be characterised by a level of 
profit described by some function g(zsi) which depends upon a set of potentially relevant 
parameters z and some measure of firm size si. Imposing this and rearranging yields a relation 
analogous to (15) of the form, 
2ar, 2g(zA)ri 
(P_A)2+C2 + (15a) 
P Yj: (2 ri - rj: ) Y': (2 ri - rj: ) 
Equation (15a) demonstrates two things. Firstly, that any attempt to measure the left hand side of 
(15a) in order to approximate minimum average costs will, if there is imperfect competition and 
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positive profits, include some element of profits g(zsi) within the measurement. If profit is 
increasing in fu-m size, the measurement error will be greater for large firms. Secondly, we can 
show that even this assumption of positive profits is not necessary to generate the distortion. If 
expected profits are zero, so that the second term on the right hand side of (15a) drops out, the 
first element of the right hand side will still be incorrectly measured. It is straightforward to show 
that 
2ar, 
>2cci/ji so long as firms do not behave competitively and it is also trivial to 
ri*(2 ri - ri 
show that this inequality becomes greater as a firm's market power increases. Therefore, a 
distortion in the measure of average variable cost will arise as a result of the existence of market 
power. For both of these reasons we can expect that the relationship between the measured 
minimum average cost and firm size will be biased upwards due to the measurement error arising 
from the use of an incorrect framework. 
Paradoxically, this argument actually strengthens the case for a forrn of flexibility hypothesis 
because it does not rule out the possibility that, despite Zimmermann's findings there may indeed 
be a negative relationship between minimum average costs and firm size. 'I'lie implications and 
interpretation would have to be slightly different, however, because imperfect competition is 
implied. 
Turning to the analysis of sales variability, the first, perhaps obvious, but nonetheless important 
point is that the theory relates to production flexibility the data analysed is sales rather than 
output data13. The implicit assumption is that the good is non storable and can be sold 
instantaneously. However, these are not good working assumptions for most industrial firms. 
While it is perfectly possible to abstract from inventories and production lags in theory, the 
minimum necessary adjustment from an empirical point of view would appear to be that the 
variability of output is considered rather than sales. An attempt to incorporate inventories, and 
13 In the absence of output data employment fluctuations have been analysed which represent a more 
plausible alternative although without implausibly detailed data at this level of generality the intensity of 
labour use. necessary to calculate the labour input, is not measurable. 
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also potentially production lags into the framework, both theoretically and empirically, would 
enable a more broadly interesting and engaging line of approach to be adopted. 
The second point concerns the incorporation of the capital sales ratio which on a theoretical level 
is crucial and therefore could only be excluded from empirical work with some strong 
justification. The theory is designed to explain the difference in the output variability of firms 
within the same industry but the measure of capital sales ratio used is the absolute level. 
Although it is clearly an empirical issue, given the wide differences in technology across 
industries, the absolute level of the capital sales ratio is likely to vary to a greater extent across 
industries thari within industries. 'Ilierefore, the appropriate capital sales ratio is that of the firm 
relative to the industry average, and not the absolute level. This point would appear to be 
confirmed by, and provides a potential explanation for, the reducing significance of the capital 
sales ratio in Mills and Schurnann! s study as firms in more concentrated industries are 
progressive excluded from the sample. If the capital sales ratio is indeed picking up inter industry 
effects, it is performing a different economic function to that which it is intended for and a re- 
specification would be appropriate. A further point to be made is that the inclusion of the capital 
sales ratio is intended as a indicator of the importance of fixed costs relative to variable costs. A 
problem with this proxy is that only the fixed costs of plant are included; ideally (quasi) fixed 
labour, advertising and research and development costs etc., which will all enter into the cost 
function as fixed costs. 
T'his problem has implications for their further experiments on the effects of concentration on the 
relationship. By truncating the sample according to the mean level of concentration and 
performing separate regressions of (14) for each group, MS suggest that this can eliminate 
market power explanations for the sales variability phenomenon. It can equally be argued that 
this is not an appropriate rejection anyway because again, the market power must differ between 
firms in the same industry, rather than across the board as is implied by MS. It is clear from 
their results that changing the degree of concentration has negligible implications for the 
cocfficicnt on market share, but has important implications for the coefficient PI which declines 
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in value and significance as the mean level of concentration falls. This would appear to indicate 
further that the effect of the capital sales ratio is an inter industry effect rather than an intra 
industry effect. 
The fourth point and perhaps the most important point to be made is that it is possible that the 
empirical approach of finding the determinants of sales or output variability is misconceived. 'Me 
important aspect is the nature of the cost structures faced (or adopted) by small and large firms. 
From an empirical point of view we need to investigate these directly, although this is likely to be 
a much more difficult task. From the perspective adopted here, we have seen that output 
variability only tells us about P in (1) but not the other parameters of this cost function. We turn 
to this cost function analysis in the following subsection. 
V. iii. Estimating short run cost functions14 
Before going on to outline our own approach, we look at evidence from previous studies of cost 
structures, but before we look at the studies of cost structure per se we need to look at the related 
intermediate work on inventory behaviour. This is usefiil because the initial path of research on 
inventory behaviour mirrors, to some extent, the initial research path followed in the flexibility 
debate. In the empirical inventory literature, as in the flexibility literature, the focus has been 
dominated by the analysis of the relative variability of sales, production or inventories rather than 
on the empirical analysis of the cost function which drives the theoretical results. Much empirical 
work on inventories has found that production tends to be more variable than sales, (as noted 
above the distinction between production and sales has been entirely omitted from the flexibility 
debate) which is empirically the reverse of the production smoothing argument which is implied 
by upward sloping marginal cost curves. There has been a vast literature which has sought to 
explain this anomaly but very little of this literature has taken the apparently radical step of 
14 Zimmermann (1995) was published after the bulk of this chapter had been written. The broad 
direction in which Zimmermann's methodology is pointing, i. e. attempting to identify specific 
parameters of the cost function, is similar to the direction that this chapter pursues. Given the criticisms 
expressed in the previous section and the analysis that follows, it is clear that the specific ways in which 
that paper, and this work, follow such a direction are very different. 
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refuting the idea of upward sloping marginal cost curves. A number of empirical articles15, for 
example, seek to impose upon the data the constraint that the slope of the marginal cost curve 
must be positive or disregard data which give the "perverse" result of a negative slope. Ramey 
(1991) and Guariglia and Schiantarelli (1994) both find that in estimating cost functions on US 
and UK data, the implied slope of the marginal cost curve is negative. Specifically they are 
interested in estimating cost functions of the form given in (14) with the addition of terms for 
output and inventory adjustment costs. In general their estimates of yi are negative, a result which 
is ruled out by Nfills and Schumann by assumption. If the marginal cost curve is negatively 
sloped, this would imply two things: firstly a theory of production bunching rather than 
production, smoothing that would explain why production tends to be more variable than sales; 
secondly the existence of imperfect competition as perfect competition is inconsistent with 
increasing returns16. 
Empirical evidence on long run costs indicates the presence of substantial economies of scale17 
however there is much less evidence" on the nature of short run costs which are clearly the focus 
for the current discussion. This focus on the long run appears slightly odd in this context, 
although the whole force of the structure conduct performance paradigm is oriented to looking at 
the long run. In the presence of uncertainty or instability, in this case demand fluctuations, it is 
even more important to view the long run as a series of short runs, because if instability is ever 
presentý and that seems likely, one will only ever observe the short ran solutions. What evidence 
on short run costs that exists tends to be in the form of survey evidence. This evidence indicates 
that in the short run costs are constant until the capacity level of output, is reached after which 
costs rise quite rapidly. A problem with these analyses are that they are fairly old, mostly dating 
from the immediate post war period when, according to the jargon, both the UK and US were still 
15 A number of these are cited in Ramey (1991). 
16 It is this aspect and the complications that necessarily entail from imperfect competition thatone 
suspects is the cause of the unwillingness of (mainly US) empirical observers and theoretical analysts to 
contemplate decreasing marginal costs. 
17 A brief summary of the methods and results of these studies is contained in Hay and Morris (199 1, 
p47-54). 
18 For example Scherer and Ross (1990) cover the determinants of economies of scale in the long run in 
considerable detail in their overview (p97-14 1) but restrict discussion of the determinants of short run 
costs to a single footnote. 
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employing "fordist" techniques of mass production. 'Me argument of many of the advocates of the 
flexibility hypothesis is that there has been a radical change in the nature of production which is 
dated from the early 1970's onwards. Only evidence from the later period would be deemed useful 
from this point of view. The presence of capacity constraints of the form outlined above does not 
readily fit into the theoretical fi-amework of MS as it implies a discontinuity or kink in the 
marginal cost function. This evidence would however be in accordance with Stigler's view of a 
technology which is divisible but not particularly adaptable. In this sense, the empirical evidence 
which directly examines cost structures is not particularly favourable to the NIS flexibility 
position. 
Studies of cost structures are fraught with difficulties which is probably why they have been 
avoided for the most part. It has been argued, in fact, that the study of cost structures in cross 
section is not feasible. Friedman (1962, p 142) argues that "it [is] impossible to define the average 
cost of a particular firm for different hypothetical outputs independently of conditions of 
demand. " Certainly any attempt to derive cost parameters on the basis used by Zimmermann will 
encounter this difficulty, making extensive use as it does of the variance of prices and outputs. 
However, Friedman's point largely applies to the case of attempting to identify long run average 
costs. It will be argued here however that estimating short run cost functions does offer the best 
way forward for the analysis of the flexibility approach. 
There are two reasons for arguing for this approach; firstly directly estimating a short run cost 
function allows for adaptability of functional form and comparisons of alternative functional 
forms within recognised statistical procedures; secondly, contra Friedman, it can be argued that 
by concentrating on the short run cost function analysis, it is possible to move away from the 
problems of imperfect/perfect competition. With regard to the adaptability of the functional form 
it can and has been argued that many features of small firms may lead to a greater degree of 
flexibility19. We do not dispute any of these contentions, but merely point out that they are only 
important in assessing flexibility, in terms of the definition adopted here, in so far as they 
19 Such as a greater use of more flexible technologies. 
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influence the parameters of the short run cost function. The primary task is to attempt to identify 
the parameters of this short run cost function and then it may be possible to relate these estimates 
back to the factors that 'cause' flexibility. The only point of contention in the first stage is 
therefore the statistical problem of the appropriate pararneterisation of the cost function. 
Turning to the second point contra Friedman, estimating a cost function will usually only require, 
in terms of assumptions on behaviour, that firms are cost minin-dsers. Even this may be relaxed 
slightly. In the case of firms where fixed costs are inflated through managerial discretion and 
perks, or where excessive expenditures on advertising or other means of acquiring market power 
are incurred, it may still be possible to identify important parameters of the coq ffinction. It 
would not, in this case and will not in general in the method advocated below, be possible to 
identify the level of minimum average costs. It is by moving away from the need to examine 
average costs that we circumvent the problems identified by Friedman. 
To illustrate the general approach let us examine the attempts at estimating the "linear quadratic" 
cost fiinction introduced by Holt et al (1960). This has been the most commonly used functional 
form adopted by those interested in studying inventory behaviour. It implies a current period total 
cost function of the form. 
t)2+ 
1 
+1)2 
)2+ (, &Y (I _S (16) C(Y, )= ao + a, Y, + -1 a2(y, a3 a4 , a, 222 
Where Yt is current period production, AYt = Yt-Yt-I , It is the inventory level in period t and 
St+I is the level of sales in period t+l. In principle, this cost fiinction is relatively flexible 
because it is straightforward to add additional cubic terms. 'Me final term in (16) is interpreted as 
an inventory holding cost. This arises because of the potential desire of firms to hold inventories 
against the possibility of stockout or backlog rather than simply a production bunching/smoothing 
exercise and there is, therefore, a desired inventory sales ratio to be maintained. From estimating 
the parameters of such a cost function we can establish the slope of the marginal cost function 
(ignoring the inventory terms) as a2+(1+8)ct3, where 5 is the discount factor. 'Mis would enable 
a form of test of the flexibility hypothesis which focuses on the slope of the marginal cost curve. 
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This is, therefore, a form which is more in tune with the hypothesis developed by Stigler. 
Estimating such relations for firms of differing sizes and different market shares may and should, 
if the flexibility hypothesis is correct, yield differing estimates of the slopes of the marginal cost 
curves. Clearly, there are problems associated with the estimation of such relations which are not 
trivial. In practice al from (16) is expanded to be a function of factor prices so that, 
C(Yt)= ao +(all + a12PM, + a, 3W)Y, +1 a2(Y, 
)2+-! a3(AY, )2+1- a4(I _a S+)2 (17) 
22215, I 
where pmt is the price of intermediate inputs and wt is the wage rate. Noting that 
YýS, + I, - It I (18) and defining the firms objective function asthe profit 
function, 
I- 
V=E(, j: 9(p, St-C(Y, )) (19) 
t=O 
we can substitute (17) and (18) into (19) and maximise with respect to the current level of 
inventories and sales. At this point we should note that it is conventional in the previous literature 
to assume that sales are given, which means that only one of the first order conditions is 
operative, because the only decision to be made by the firm concerns the level of inventories. If 
we allow a downward sloping demand curve, however, the two first order conditions associated 
with maximisation of (19) are given by (20) and (2 1). 
E, (- ajI - b)- a12(PM, - (5'Pm, +I)- aIAW, - 5w,,., )- a2(yt - by, +I) (20) 
- a3(Ay, -2&Y, +, + 
gAY, 
+2)-a. 
(I, 
- aS,,, 
))= 0 
Et(v, +p'(St)S, - a,, - a12PM, - a, 3Wt- a2 Y, - a3AY, +8-1a4a5V, -aSt+, ))=O (21) 
As stated above, (2 1) is usually disregarded and a form of (20) is estimated, where it is necessary 
for purposes of identification that some restriction is placed upon the parameters in (20). Two 
prominent restrictions of this form are that a4= I the restriction used by Ramey (199 1) and (x3= I 
used by Blanchard (1983). In principle, the two equations should be estimated simultaneously 
with parameter restrictions across the regressions. This has not been attempted to our knowledge, 
presumably because of the statistical complexity involved. In order to achieve results within this 
framework, the (implicit) assumption has been made that by estimating (20) as a single equation 
does not lead to significant biases. From an empirical perspective, and combined with the 
theoretical arguments given above, it would appear that this approach offers the best way 
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forward for a better understanding of the differences between the cost structures of small and 
large firms. 
Before we consider previous estimates of (20) we require a slight digression. It is useful to 
observe that equations in the form of a restricted version of (21) have been at the centre of the 
recent upsurge in single industry studies of market power2O. In the usual framework, (see 
Bresnahan (1982)) there are no inventories hence production equals sales. As a result, there is an 
identification problem; it is not possible to empirically separate out the slope of the demand curve 
p'(YO from the slope of the marginal cost curve a2. Bresnahan (1982) has suggested one solution 
to this problem which is contingent upon the adoption of a specific functional form for the 
demand curve. Equation (21) above offers an alternative solution. Whereas previously the slope 
of the demand curve depended upon production by introducing inventories the demand curve 
depends on the level of sales and the cost curve depends upon the level of production. Therefore 
assuming both sales and production are available the two aspects can be empirically separated. 
V. iv. Previous estimates for the US Automobile industly 
It would be helpful from the perspective of equation (20) to examine previous estimates which 
can then be used to shed light on this issue. As far as we are aware no study has particularly 
examined the issue of firm size in this context, hence there are no general results to be reported. 
There are interesting papers, however, the results from which can be used to shed light on the 
issues discussed here. In particular, the information in Blanchard (1983) and the re-estimates 
using the same data set by Ramey (1991) can be used to good effect. These papers present 
estimates of a form similar to (20) for the mass production US car makers. As one of the world's 
most important industries this is a useful case to examine. 
Estimates are presented for ten models, reproduced here in Appendix 2, mostly produced by a 
division of a larger company, as opposed to estimating at the firm level. Rainey reports that in 
estimating a form of (20) in each case the value Of a2 is negative, as is the overall value of 
20 For a fuller description of this resurgence see Bresnahan (1989) 
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marginal cost. This alone clearly contradicts the Mills and Schumann theoretical fi-amework. In 
the context of diminishing marginal costs, the variability of output will increase as the slope of 
the marginal cost function becomes more negative as firms incentive to bunch production 
increases. Overall the estimates reported for the various models do not vary to an enormous 
degree, although some significant differences do exist2l. For Blanchard, most of the estimates of 
a2 are poorly determined, only one is positive and significant at the 5% level, but that is the 
smallest division, Cadillac. The other estimates vary but are not significantly different from zero, 
implying constant marginal costs for all of the other divisions. Ramey adopts a different 
restriction and obtains the negative results reported above. The lowest (most negative) values of 
the slope of the marginal cost curve are obtained for Oldsmobile and Chevrolet while the highest 
(least negative) values are for Cadillac, Buick and American Motors. Chevrolet is the largest 
producer while Oldsmobile ranks 5th out of ten in terms of production. Cadillac, Buick and 
American Motors rank 10th, 6th and 9th respectively. These results are difficult to interpret 
without in addition to these estimates comparing the separate estimates for (x2 and cx3- The 
estimates Of cL3, the output adjustment costs, are lowest and are insignificantly different from 
zero for the three of the smallest divisions, Buick, Cadillac and American Motors and are highest 
for the largest division Chevrolet. However the estimates Of a2 are also most strongly negative 
for Chevrolet although there is relatively little relationship between size and the other estimates. 
For interpretation of these estimates, the lower output adjustment costs for the smaller divisions 
indicates some support for the flexibility hypothesis. The indications are also that there are 
significant short run economies of scale for most divisions. 
From the data given in Blanchard we can also obtain the coefficient of variation of production for 
the specific models. Examining this data appears to confirm most clearly what has been suggested 
with regards the relationship between the variability of production and size. Ford (the second 
largest producer) has the lowest coefficient of variation of output, Chevrolet and Chrysler- 
21 As a consequence of the need to impose a restriction upon equation (11) the parameter estimates arc 
contingent upon the imposed restriction. For Blanchard (1983) that restriction is that the output 
adjustment cost is the same for each model of car. For Ramey (199 1) the restriction is that the inventory 
holding cost is the same for each model. 
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Plymouth22 (first and third in size) rank 7th and 8th in terms of the coefficient of variation of 
output. The smallest models Cadillac, American Motors and Mercury Lincoln rank I st, 2nd and 
4th respectively in terms of the coefficient of variation of output. That small firms (or in this case 
small divisions of firms) have greater proportionate variability of output is therefore clear. While 
the evidence of the cost function estimates gives some indication that this would be the case, the 
presence of substantial short run economies of scale also point to a more complex relationship 
than that advocated by Mills and Schumann. 
VI. Flexibility. capital intensity and variations in price cost mareins 
The original interest in the flexibility hypothesis from the point of view of this chapter was in 
terms of the point of comparison with the work of Schmalensee. In order to consider this we need 
to observe the variance of profitability and price cost margins. If we examine the ratio of price 
minus average variable cost to price, this can be defined for each of the situations described 
above. 
In the Mills and Schumann approach, the price cost margin is determined by substituting (2) into 
the expression for average variable cost, 
P-A- x' 2ri 
_ 
p-A (22) 
p 2p 
'Me only explicit consideration of this relation is found in Chappell, Mayer and Shughart (1993). 
They suggest that because 8PCM/8p=pi/2p2 , then as demand, and hence price, increases so 
those firms with the higher value of Pi will increase their price cost margins to a greater extent 
than those firms with a lower Pi. Since those firms are also the flexible firms, in the Mills and 
Schumann sense of having a higher elasticity of supply iji(p), it can be shown that the more 
flexible and therefore for empirical purposes smaller firms, will increase their price cost margins 
to a greater extent than less flexible firms. The intuition behind this derives from the fact that the 
22 Both of the Chrysler divisions had lower coefficients of variation than would be expected given their 
market shares. This may be a result of the institutional characteristics of the company. It is certainly the 
case that faced with the Japanese penetration of the US market in the 1980's, Chrysler appeared to be the 
least able of the big three to adapt. 
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price cost margin in this context is merely a measure of the difference between marginal and 
average variable cost. This can be illustrated diagramatically in Figure 1. As the slope of the 
average variable cost curve is half of the slope of the marginal cost curve, for any realisation of 
price the distance between price and average variable cost will be half the distance between price 
and the intercept of the marginal and average variable cost curves. Therefore the price cost 
margin depends only on P not on the slope of the marginal cost curve. 
Figure 1 
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In the imperfect competition model the price cost margin has been defined earlier in (13) and can 
be reaffanged as, 
(P - AXI --/ 
Yý2yj) 
_ 
(p-A) (A +2y) (23) 
p 2p (Pi + Yi) 
Clearly as long as this expression is positive, then 52pCM/8p8p is still positive, hence the Mills 
and Schumann flexibility result will still hold. One should note however that the reverse is true if 
one adopts the Stiglerian definition of flexibility as typified by the slope of the marginal cost 
curve. Tliis follows immediately from noting that 82pCMj5p8y<0. In this case, for a given P, the 
flatter the marginal cost curve, i. e. the more flexible in the Stiglerian sense, the less price cost 
margins %%ill respond to price fluctuations. It is this difference in result which causes the apparent 
contradiction discussed in Scherer and Ross (1990, p442). 
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Scherer and Ross discuss the impact of capital intensity on cyclical movements in price cost 
margins and suggest that firms with high levels of capital intensity will tend to have greater 
fluctuations in their price cost margins. In their analysis (ibid., p286-289) however, the crucial 
discriminating feature between capital intensive and other firms, is in fact the slope of the 
marginal cost curve rather than the level of fixed costs incurred. For Scherer and Ross, capital 
intensive firms possess relatively steep marginal cost curves, whilst for Stigler flexible firms have 
a high proportion of variable costs and correspondingly, the marginal cost curve is relatively flat. 
It is this factor which drives their results concerning the effect of capital intensity rather than the 
capital intensity itself. 
If we recall Schmalensee's finding that the profitability advantage of large to small firms is 
counter cyclical, this is consistent with the explanation of flexibility given by Mills and 
Schumann but not that by Stigler. To explain this difference we should note once again that the 
Mills and Schumann results are actually driven by static inefficiency rather than dynamic 
efficiency. Schmalensee's finding is therefore consistent with the fact that small firms are 
statically inefficient and is not wholly consistent with the notion that small firms; are dynamically 
efficient. The dynamic efficiency and capital intensity explanations are very similar as should be 
expected from Stigler's discussion of flexibility. However, they clearly have different predictions 
to the Mills and Schumann hypothesis. The alternative explanation considered by Schinalensee is 
that variations in market power will tend to lead to differences in the cyclical movements. A 
consideration of these issues involves an additional set of theories which are relatively complex in 
themselves. Further discussion of this aspect is not pursued here but is contained in Chapter 5 
which deals separately with the issues of fluctuations in the degree of market power across the 
business cycle. 
Vil. Conclusions 
A large amount of material has been covered in this chapter so a number of conclusions are 
warranted. 
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One clear conclusion which must be drawn from this analysis is that it is not possible to infer 
from the measured output variability anything about the curvature of the marginal cost curves of 
firms. There are two main reasons for this; firstly, the coefficient of variation of output can be 
shown to depend not on the slope of the marginal cost curve but its intercept; secondly, it is not 
possible to empirically separate demand effects from supply effects because of the equivalence of 
prediction. The first reason is important for the interpretation of the relations. It indicates that 
empirical measures of output variation are positively related to static inefficiency but that this 
does not necessarily imply a positive relationship with dynamic efficiency. Analytically the 
second aspect is less important once one takes the first into account. The failure to distinguish 
between the slope of the marginal cost curve and the slope of the perceived marginal revenue 
schedule is less of a difficulty when one considers that, in the absence of perfect competition, both 
are subject to the strategic decision making of the firm. The degree of flexibility not only depends 
upon the cost function but also upon the competitive stance adopted. 
A second conclusion, which derives from the consideration of price cost margins, is that, in the 
same way that there is a general empirical regularity that price cost margins are positively related 
to market share, the theoretical framework considered here points to the existence of an important 
empirical regularity23 of the inverse relationship between market share and measured output 
variability which industrial economists should be aware of 
The final conclusion is that rather than focusing on the variability of output, future empirical 
research should instead focus on attempts to estimate the relevant parameters of the cost function. 
Initial attempts to do this within a relatively tractable framework have been documented in this 
chapter. The evidence from the US motor industry suggests some limited support for the notion 
that output adjustment costs are lower for smaller firms, but also indicates substantial economies 
of scale for most firms. The clear suggestion for fiiture work is that more attempts at identifying 
the parameters of the cost function at an industry level are required. 
23 Of the form which Schmalcrisce (1989a) suggests are so important for industrial organisation. 
74 
Appendix 1: Flexibility and output ad*ustment costs 
To maintain simplicity of analysis we restrict the demand function to be completely inelastic and 
take a value which realises an (endogenous) price p in odd periods and a price p* in even periods. 
We restrict the analysis to perfect competition, the extension to imperfect competition is 
straightforward but tedious and unilluminating. We assume a discount factor of 1, again for 
simplicity. The cost function for the firm (suppressing the i subscript) in odd periods is therefore 
defined by, 
X2 
c(x*, x)= a+ftc+-+Z(x-x*)2 (AI) 2y 
where x is output in odd periods and x* is output in even periods and a, P, y and 8 are all positive 
constantS24. The intertemporal profit fitriction is defined by 
X 
*_X)2+PX 2 
I# X)= P*X*-a-#c*- 6(X -a-, 6x - -ý(X-X*) (A2) 2y2y 
Maximising with respect to x and x* and rearranging the first order conditions we can solve for 
x* and x 
such that, 
X*= 
4r, 57(p-, 6)+(4r8+I)gp*-. 6) 
(M) 
8y. 5+1 
and 
X= 
4. YJ; ýp * -g) +(4, v8+ 1) 7(p -, 6) (A4) 
8, vg+ I 
Clearly if 8=0 i. e. there are no output adjustment costs these will collapse to equation (2) in the 
main text. We can observe the variability of output noting that. 
X-X*= 
r 
-' -- - p*) (M) . 
(P 
8yS+ I 
Therefore the variability of output will rise as the marginal cost curve becomes flatter and the 
cost of output adjustment falls. The coefficient of variation of output evaluated at the mean price 
can be found, defming x =(x*+x)/2 and p =(p*+p)/2 as 
(P-ý) -P 
CVX cv-. i7(p) (A6) 
XP (P-9) 'P 
which is as in (4) in the main text. In principle introducing adjustment costs in this way changes 
little, merely confirming a three way observational equivalence between the conjectural variation 
term, the slope of the marginal cost curve and the level of output adjustment costs. In practice the 
framework in which we have observed adjustment costs is unrealistically restrictive and we can 
expect demand to behave in a less stable more complex fashion which will lead current period 
optimal output to depend upon previous period output and the expectations upon demand 
realisations. 
24 Strictly y may be negative so long as output adjustment costs, in the form of 8, are sufficiently high. 
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Appendix 2: The US Automobile Industry 1966-1979 
The data contained in this appendix are reproduced or generated using the infonnation provided 
in Blanchard (1983) and Rarney (1991) 
Model Market Share % C. V. production Blanchard estimates 
(Domestic Sales) Of a2la3 
Chevrolet 25.4 . 298 0.29 Pontiac 8.9 . 355 -0.04 Oldsmobile 8.6 . 389 1.21 Buick 7.6 . 343 0.89 Cadillac 3.1 . 400 1.85* 
Ford 21.8 . 257 0.11 Mercury Lincoln 5.9 . 365 
0.24 
American Motors 3.1 . 392 1.66 
Dodge 5.9 . 268 3.29 Chrysler Plymouth 9.7 . 275 2.69 Notes: Market Shares are calculated from information contained in Blanchard (1983) Table 1. CV 
production is the coefficient of variation of production, calculated from Tables I and 2 of Blanchard 
(1983). The estimates Of 12/0`3 are from Blanchard (1983) Table 7B. * indicates that the estimate is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level but no standard errors are reproduced. 
Model Rainey estimates of Ramey estimates of Ramey estimates of 
a2 a3 slope of MC 
Chevrolet -1.45* 0.40* -0.651* 
Pontiac -0.88* 0.18* -0.516* 
Oldsmobile -1.27* 0.24 -0.798* 
Buick -0.53 0.07 -0.394* 
Cadillac -0.4 1 0.06 -0.300* 
Ford -0.73* 0.14* -0.446* 
Mercury Lincoln -0.90* 0.17* -0.551* 
American Motors -0.61* 0.09 -0.424* 
Dodge -0.94* 0.19* -0.569* 
Chrysler Plymouth -0.80* 0.14* -0.523* 
Notes: These estimates are taken from Ramey (1991) Table 3. The slope of the Marginal cost curve is 
calculated as a2+(1+8)m3. The parameter estimates are reported, * indicates that the estimate is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level but no standard errors are reproduced. Full estimates are 
presented in Ramey (199 1). 
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Chapter 3. Vertical Integration, Input Bargaining and the Empirical Specification of Price 
Cost Marzins 
1. Introduction 
In recent years it has become common when specifýýing empirical price cost margins to use net 
output as opposed to the more usual gross output in the denominator. Examples of this include 
Hart and Morgan (1977), Conyon and Machin (1991a, 1991b), Haskel and Martin (1992,1994) 
and Conyon (1995) for studies of the W and Baldwin et aL (1984) and Dickson (1991) for 
studies using Canadian data'. As Conyon and Machin (1991b) and Conyon (1995) point out, 
with gross output as the denominator the point estimate on concentration from a regression of 
margins on concentration is lower thart with net output as the denominator and the estimate is 
frequently insignificant. This tendency is discussed in Conyon and Machin (1991b) and the 
argument put forward for the redefinition of the margin is the need to control for the degree of 
vertical integration. In addition to these empirical studies, there have been criticisms made from a 
theoretical point of view concerning the need to incorporate the degree of vertical integration 
explicitly into a consideration of industry relations. This chapter seeks to analyse the logic of 
these arguments and the implications for the specification of the empirical relationship. In 
particular, the chapter argues that only through a consideration of the relationships between end- 
producer firms and firms providing inputs and services, can an adequate resolution of the issue of 
working with net and gross output be found. The chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section 
there is a brief and critical discussion of the rationales used for the use of the alternative (net 
output denominator) margin; secondly a consideration of the theoretical relations under 
alternative assumptions about the way in which bought in inputs are treated by firms; thirdly, 
these theoretical relations are translated into empirical specifications which attempt to take into 
account the elements considered by the theory. Finally, some evidence is presented using a panel 
of industry level UK manufacturing data for 1980-1991 in order to empirically compare the 
predictions of the different approaches. 
I That the finding occurs in at least two countries indicates that it is not solely a problem with a single 
data source, such as the UK census of production, although we are not aware of studies which have 
identified the issue in the US. 
However before we consider the treatment of material inputs as a potential influence on the price 
cost margin we need to consider other sources of potential bias arising from the use of price cost 
margins. In particular Fisher (1987) has criticised the use of the ratio of profits to sales as a 
measure of monopoly power because of the accounting conventions used. Fisher's conclusion is 
that the use of the profits to sales ratio is untenable once differing conventions for assessing 
profits are taken into account. Kay and Mayer (1986) and Geroski (1988) address the same issue 
but are more favourable about the possibilities for using accounting data albeit within 
circumscribed limits. 
Fisher's main point is that firms differ in their assessment of the cost of capital particularly in the 
absence of a well functioning second hand market and that their assessment of the cost of capital 
will generally differ from that conventionally used by economists. Iberefore for any particular 
investment project the profits to sales ratio will not generally be equal to the Lerner index and will 
deviate by the extent to which accounting depreciation of capital differs from economic 
depreciation. Ile point made by Kay and Mayer (1986) is that while in any one year profits may 
not reflect the true economic return of a project, because the cost of capital accounted for may 
differ from the true cost of capital in that year, it is still the case that in the long run a project 
with a higher than average rate of return will yield higher reported profits, therefore in evaluating 
the long run rate of return the profits to sales ratio may still have a role to play. 
Nevertheless we must still take into account the possibility of biases that arise from differing 
accounting conventions between firms. One suggestion made by Fisher (1987) and adopted by 
Machin (1991) is to transform the profit to sales ratio using -log(l- 
K) 
as the dependent variable S 
because the extent of the bias is proportional to unity minus the measured profit to sales ratio. 
Machin (199 1) reports that adopting the transformed dependent variable makes no substantive 
difference to his results. However, even adopting the transformation there is still the potential for 
bias if the adoption of accounting conventions is correlated with the right hand side variables. As 
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one of the most important possible influences is the growth rate of the firm it is important to 
include this in regressions. Similarly advertising expenditures and other investments that may 
have effects over several years will lead to differences in the timing of reported profits hence it is 
important to control for these expenditures. While Schmalensee (1989a; p965) reports that firms 
of different sizes appear to adopt different accounting practices and therefore the extent of bias 
may be correlated with market share there is no similar finding for differences between industries 
of differing levels of concentration. 
'Me results reported in the chapter include measures of both advertising expenditure and the 
growth rate of firm size in the estimation. A potential problem that remains with this study is our 
failure to control for capital intensity due to the absence of data. In addition we must be aware, in 
interpreting the short run results of the later chapters, that one of the determinants of the time 
path of small firms profits is their accounting practices. However, as suggested earlier, the 
problem is substantially lessened when considering the long run performance of firms which is 
less susceptible to these differences in accounting practices. 
11. The relation between theoretical framework and empirical specification 
Steedman (1992) has provided a general critique of the absence of vertical linkages from 
industrial economic theorising. Steedman adopts a Sraffian framework for considering some of 
the problems perceived with the Kaleckian approach to price determination. While the target is 
Kaleckians, the same point applies to any partial equilibrium approach to price determination. 
Tle first relevant point made2 is that, when one considers price determination using a matrix of 
inputs and outputs, prices are determined not only by the mark up in the industry concerned, but 
also by the mark-ups in many (possibly all) of the other industries. In one sense, this is obvious 
and doesn't contradict much empirical work which is interested in determining prices relative to 
costs and not the price level itself Ilie second point Steedman makes denies the usefulness of the 
notion of a vertically integrated industry. "The 'vertically integrated' industry is not an actual 
I There arc a number of interesting points made in the article which arc not directly relevant to the 
current issue. 
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industry but, rather, a theorisfs hypothetical construction, consisting of various bits of actual 
industries. The 'vertically integrated! bicycle industry, for example, contains (most of) the actual 
bicycle industry and bits of the steel industry, the rubber industry, the chemical industry, the 
electricity industry, etc. " (ibid. p137) Steedman therefore suggests that dealing with vertically 
integrated industries is unhelpful and should be abandoned. This appears to be an extreme stance 
and not a particularly interesting one. All industries are linked by some vertical structure and we 
have to incorporate this into our analysis somehow. Making certain formalisations concerning the 
relationships between the vertically related industries enables us to focus more precisely on the 
bicycle industry, for example, in isolation from the influences brought upon it by the steel, rubber 
and chemical industries. What alternative have we if we want to reduce very complex phenomena 
to a tractable level? It is perhaps worthy of note that Steedman's algebraic example (ibid. p 138) 
that purports to cast doubt on the validity of vertically integrated concepts is not as damning as 
appears to be suggested. In the example the price level is determined by the equation, 
p=(u+pA)(I+m) 
where p is a vector of prices of both inputs and outputs (within the input-output framework 
adopted all commodities potentially can be both inputs and outputs) u is a vector of direct unit 
non material costs, A is matrix of input coefficients, I is an identity matrix and m is a vector of 
mark-ups. Vertically integrated direct unit costs are therefore defined by u*=u(I-A)-I and 
p=u*(I+ýt), where the ýL is the vector of vertically integrated mark-ups. Following from this, 
Steedman shows that R>m(I-A)-1 so that "one does not obtain the vertically integrated mark-ups, 
R, simply by vertically integrating the mark-ups, m" (ibid. p138). However, if we define the 
mark-up not as the ratio of price to direct unit cost, as Steedman does, but as the price cost 
margin so that a=(p-(u+pA))/p and W=(p-u*)Ip then W=m'(1-A)- I and one does indeed obtain the 
vertically integrated price cost margins, W, simply by vertically integrating the price cost 
margins, m'. 
However, having rebutted Steedman's criticism on one level, one should not necessarily draw the 
conclusion that using these vertically integrated price cost margins is a valid procedure. The 
foregoing discussion may appear slightly arcane, but it is useful because it is illustrative of two 
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potential problems with obtaining vertically integrated margins that we have to consider in this 
chapter. Firstly, the relation is derived from a system of fixed input output coefficients, there is 
no possibility for substitution between inputs. This derives from the assumption that the A matrix 
is fixed and invariant to the relative prices of commodities. In reality, we have to address the 
likelihood of input substitution as a result of changes in the price of raw materials. Secondly, the 
vector of prices is determined as a system, therefore this form of determination of margins is 
inconsistent with a partial equilibrium determination of margins in which firms act as price takers 
for material input prices. To be consistent with the framework, firms must take into account the 
effect their own price decisions will have upon the pricing decisions of material input producers. 
Both of these important points will be explored below in more detail within a more conventional 
theoretical setting of oligopoly price determination. 
One aspect of this framework which is not considered by Steedman is the potential dynamic 
factors which can provide the link between a framework in wl-&h input prices are assumed to 
adjust to firm decisions, and a ftamework in which firms act as price takers for inputs. For 
example, the effects of a change in demand at the industry level may influence output prices but 
in the common case of some lag in production the input prices will have been determined in the 
previous period(s) and therefore will not adjust3. This point, which is akin to the one of the issues 
raised by Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus (1978), will not be explored ftirther here, where it would 
introduce additional complexity, but will be considered with the other dynamic aspects of the 
analysis in Chapter 5. 
ll. i. Establishing a theoretical framework and the rationales for an altemative vjaMiýn 
Under the assumption of constant marginal cost the Cowling and Waterson (1976) framework 
yields a relationship between price cost margin and market share at a firm level of the form, 
P- OVCj I-I +F Si (I + Aj) 
PR 17 
3A paper considering the effects of production lags on price inertia at the macroeconomic level for this 
precise reason is Lindbeck and Snowcr (1994). One should note however while this paper examines 
price sluggishness it does not examine any variation over time in the Lerner index only in the price 
level. 
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where si is the market share of firmi i. e. yi/Y, Xi is the conjectural parameter 6(Y-y, )146y,, Tl is 
the absolute value of the industry price elasticity of demand and avci is the average variable cost 
of firm i. The definition of the numerator of the left hand side is profits plus fixed costs which, 
when specifying price cost margins, is usually defined as gross output minus the cost of material 
inputs minus labour CoStS4. The denominator is sales revenue or gross output. Using net as 
opposed to gross output for the denominator is equivalent to multiplying the left hand side by the 
ratio of gross to net output. A crude but standard measure of vertical integration is the ratio of net 
output to gross output (see Scherer (1980) p79) so the adjustment for vertical integration is 
simply multiplying the conventional price cost margin by the reciprocal of a measure of vertical 
integration. 
This approach is relatively unsatisýýing as the precise reasoning and implicit assumptions about 
the role of material inputs in the determination of price cost margins which lie behind the 
adjustment are not clear. The reasoning is partially attributed to Cowling (1982) by Conyon and 
Machin (199 1 b), however Cowling's argument appears to be slightly different. In particular when 
Cowling talks of vertical integration in this context (1982; p161-2) it is only a limited form of 
vertical integration i. e. the elimination of intra industry transactions. As is shown by Cowling, the 
existence of intra industry transactions will lead to problems of aggregation at the industry level 
because while these are netted out of the numerator, because sales enter positively and material 
inputs negatively, so that intra industry transactions cancel each other out, the denominator will 
increase with a rise in intra industry transactions as it merely measures the aggregated sales. To 
free the measure from this bias we would need to control for the degree of intra industry 
transactions. In this case, the correct measure of the denominator will be gross output minus 
inputs purchased from within the industry. Unfortunately, this data is not generally available, or 
at least not for most years. To relate this to the original debate, using net output as the 
denominator implies, according to Cowling's framework, the very strong assumption (which 
clearly does not accord with reality) that all inputs are purchased from within the industry. Sincc 
4 As we arc deducting variable costs, labour costs are ordinarily defined as production workcr wages 
and not salaries which arc regarded as overheads. 
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this cannot be adequately sustained, the use of the alternatively defined margin must be 
rationalised in a different way, or be used as means of comparison alongside the conventional 
margin, which is how it is used by Cowling. 
The second approach which is adopted by Haskel and Martin (1992,1994) is to start in their 
modelling fi-amework with a value added production function. Clearly, Haskel and Martin do not 
believe that material inputs are unimportant for the analysis but the implicit assumption is that 
material inputs can be netted from the production function at no significant cost. However, both 
theoretically and empirically, it is not clear that working with a value added production function 
is possible without cost. On an empirical level, significant differences do exist between different 
specifications of the margin, as is evidenced in Conyon and Machin (1991b), and assuming a 
value added production function does not help us understand why these differences exist. On a 
theoretical level, as Rotemberg and Woodford (1993) show, a well defined value added function 
is only possible under the assumption of price taking behaviour in both the product and factor 
markets, an assumption which is not particularly relevant to the circumstance of our 
investigation. In the case of Cournot competition, the implied value added production function 
will contain within it an element of the degree of market power so it is not neutral to the focus of 
our investigation5. In particular, by working below with a very general fiinctional form, which 
includes a class of separable functions, we can reject Haskel and Martin's (1994, p29) assertion 
that in assuming a gross output function which is separable, movement to a value added 
production function is costless. 
A third approach to the problem has been put forward in a recent consideration by Dickson 
(1994). Addressing the specific issue of the difficulty of obtaining a significant correlation 
between margins and concentration, Dickson considers the role of the elasticity of demand as an 
omitted variable in price cost margin concentration regressions. Dickson compares the case6 of 
5 In essence this also follows from the argument made above in relation to Steedman (1992) 
concerning the consistency of price taking within input markets with the assumption of a neutral 
vertically integrated measure of the price cost margin. 
6 The following exposition is taken from Dickson (1994, p330-33 1) but some of the symbols have been 
changed to conform with the rest of the chapter. In addition to the three problems mentioned below there 
83 
firm's marking up value added prices pv over per unit value added costs acv with the conventional 
case of firms marking up finished goods prices on per unit costs which include material inputs. In 
the former case the equilibrium solution is characterised by (2) and also tl=nv(V/S) where il is 
the conventionally defined elasticity of demand. 
p,, - ac, = 
; r+ F=H (2) 
AV 77" 
In this case, using the standard approach, the omitted elasticity variable from the regression, il, 
will actually be aa function of the value added elasticity i1v and V/S. If V/S is correlated with the 
measure of concentration, this will induce bias in the estimates from the original regression. 
Dickson's concludes that, because information on elasticities is not available, the value added 
measure should be used to control for "stage of production effects" and he therefore focuses on 
the "effective rate of market power" and not the "nominal rate of market power". This conclusion 
seems misplaced for three reasons: firstly, the notion of controlling for "stage of production 
effects" would appear ad hoc and not directly related to the forgoing discussion, which is related 
to elasticities; secondly, the existence of bias is conditional on the assumption that firms mark up 
solely on so called value added costs rather than costs including material inpUts7, this would 
appear to be a matter for empirical resolution rather than for assumption; thirdly, if one wants to 
control for the hypothesised ornission of V/S, the empirically correct response would appear to be 
to include it as a right hand side regressor along with other "control" variables such as advertising 
intensity. T'his response has the additional advantage that the issue of whether firms mark up on 
conventional costs or just value added costs is not prejudged. A further issue regarding the 
econometric estimation of such relationships is the question of time variation. If the stage of 
production effects described by Dickson are constant over time then estimation of a panel 
including fixed effects will eliminate the omitted variable bias because all industry specific effects 
which do not vary over time are extracted. Dickson does not discuss this aspect at all, but there 
are two views. Cowling and Waterson (1976) proceed on the assumption that the elasticity of 
is an additional, potentially more damaging query with the method Dickson adopts. The supposed 
difference between margins arises when firms maximise value added profits i. e. pvqi-cvi rather than 
conventionally defined profits pqi-ci. However, under most definitions pv=p-pm(ni/q) in which case the 
two measures of profit are identical. As Dickson does not define his terms precisely, it is not clear 
whether the proposed change is qualitative or merely one of definition. 
7 It is also conditional upon the correlation between concentration and V/S. 
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demand is constant over time and therefore estimation in the form of first differences or, in their 
case, year on year ratios, eliminates the effect of demand elasticities. On the other hand, it has 
been argued (see, Harrod 1936) that this assumption of the constancy of demand elasticities may 
be incorrect and therefore it may be possible for differences in demand movements to effect price 
cost margins. We attempt to control for this element in the estimations reported below. 
II. H. Developing an alternative theoretical framework 
The previous section has critically considered the alternative rationales for the use of the 
alternative margin and found each wanting. This chapter will seek to yield a superior resolution 
of this issue by considering other theoretical relations. A principal argument of tl-ýs chapter is that 
it is only by looking at the treatment of material inputs in the pricing decision and, in particular, 
imperfect competition in the factor market, that we find a satisfactory reason for adjusting the 
margin, but that it appears preferable in Us situation to control for this on the right hand side of 
an empirical equation as opposed to the left hand side. We assume a production function where 
there are two inputs to the production process materials and labour. This is merely for simplicity 
of exposition and labour may be considered to be a general term for internal inputs while 
materials may be considered to include payments for subcontracting etc. and therefore covers all 
bought in elements. The production function for the firm is of a general form y= f(l, m) where y is 
output, m is material input, I is labour input. This function is assumed to be continuous and 
differentiable but no fiirther restrictions are placed upon it. Ilie industry faces an inverse demand 
function p(Y) where Y=Ey over the firms in the industry. The profit function for each firm is 
;r =py -p m -wl, where pm is the price of material inputs and w is the wage. It is assumed 
initially that pm and w are regarded as fixed by the firm. The firm chooses m and I to maximise 
profits. Using Euler's theorem and rearranging the first order conditions yields, 
Py - P"M - W1 7) +r 
Si (I + Ai) (2) 
Py 77 
where y is the degree -of homogeneity of the production function. 'I'llerefore, if the production 
function is linearly homogeneous, (2) reduces to (1) and the conventional definition of the margin 
85 
with gross output as the denominator is the implied correct specification. Ilere appears no need 
to correct for vertical integration8 and this applies whether the function is separable or not 
One possible treatment of materials costs is that they are not marked up on at all, but are treated 
as a fixed cost in the short run at least. In this case introducing a short run production function 
which depends only upon the labour input y=g(l) and maximising with respect to labour input 
yields. 
Py - W1 =(1 - ý)+'v 
S, (I + A) (2a) 
Py 77 
where y is the degree of homogeneity of the production function g(l). This does imply a 
respecification of the price cost margin but alters the numerator rather than the denominator. 
A related alternative to this is if it is assumed that material inputs are used in fixed proportions to 
the other inputs. This would appear to be a reasonable approximation in many cases although it 
does abstract from the firm's decision on the degree of vertical integration. We assume material 
input used in a constant proportion of sm--nVy and a Leontief production function of the fonn9 
y= min( 
g(O 
VM I S. 's. 
Assuming efficient use of inputs, the profit function becomes ;r= py - wl -p.. sy. Maximising 
with respect to labour input and rearrangement of the first order conditions in this case yields, 
Pyi -WIi -P. M, Pyi -P. m, , , 
si('+Ai) (3) 
Pyi Pyi 17 
the right hand side of which collapses to the right hand side of (1) if the function g(l) is linearly 
homogeneous. Clearly, this does not justify the use of a value added deflated margin in empirical 
relations although it does indicate that there may be a role for the Scherer measure of vertical 
integration as an explanatory variable if the function g(l) is not linearly homogeneous. As a point 
of note, it does not appear to be a readily justifiable assumption that g(l) is linearly homogeneous 
as it would imply a fairly contradictory "fixed proportions" production function which, contingent 
8 Vertical integration is here taken to be vertical integration over all inputs, to avoid confusion with the 
Cowling argument which is orthogonal to the following discussion which should more correctly be 
referred to as correcting for intra industry transactions. 
9 This particular functional form is taken from the discussion in Rotemberg and Woodford (1993) 
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upon a particular value of bought in inputs, exhibited constant returns to the labour input. The 
expectation of a pure fixed proportions technology would be that g(l) would in fact be 
homogeneous of degree zero. 
We now investigate the consequences of imperfect competition in the factor market, in particular 
the market for bought in goods and services as opposed to internal activities. Initially, we can 
model some degree of monopsonistic power in the market for bought in inputs. We use the 
original general form of the production function, but the price of inputs pm depends upon the 
quantity demanded by the firm, so the profit function is of the form ;r= py - w/ - p. (m)m. 
Again maximýising with respect to ra and I and using Euler's theorem yields, 
PY-WI-P M 
Y) +Y 
Si (I + Ai )+6 P'M (4) 
Py 77 Py 
where e= 
6P' 
-ý! - is the reciprocal of the elasticity of derived demand for bought in inputs. This &n p. 
elasticity will clearly depend upon the degree of monopsony power being exerted by the 
downstream firm. This suggests that a correct specification for this framework again requires that 
the denominator is gross output but that the ratio of material inputs to gross output should enter 
as a right hand side variable from which we may be able to determine the extent of monopsony 
power. 
The next step we wish to take is to introduce the bargaining of material input prices and, in 
particular, the efficient bargaining of material input prices. While it is not uncommon to consider 
bargaining over wages, it may appear strange initially to consider bargaining over input prices. 
However, this is merely the framework that is encapsulated in the notion of bilateral monopoly 
where a monopsonist and monopolist face each other in the market for material inputs. The 
standard result of this framework is that while the optimal level of material input m* may be 
agreed upon, the price at which that volume of inputs is transacted is indetenninate'O. By 
introducing a Nash bargaining framework, we may solve explicitly for the input price in terms of 
the relative bargaining strengths of the upstream and downstream firm respectively. Specifically, 
10 Scc Watcrson (1984) Ch 6 for a discussion of this. 
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if we take the profits of the upstream material input producer to equal 7cu=(pm-cm)m, where, for 
simplicity, we assume a constant marginal cost of input production and the profits of the 
downstream firm are as' defined above. The Nash bargain is of the form N= ; r. 'x1j' 11, where cr 
is the bargaining power of the input producer so that, if cr--O the input producer has no bargaining 
power at all while, if cr--l the end producer has no bargaining power. Maximising the Nash 
bargain with respect to rn and ; rd with respect to 1, then substituting, yields the relation, 
Py -P M-W1 Si(I+A0 (5) 
Py 77 
It is readily apparent from (5) that if a--O, i. e. the input supplier has no bargaining power, then 
(5) collapses to (2). If a--1, i. e. the end producer has no bargaining power, the input supplier is 
able to extract the full surplus, hence the price cost margin is equal to zero. 
Having derived this relation in (5) we can now make explicit the nature of the assumption implied 
when "controlling for the degree of vertical integration". If it is assumed that a= p. m/ py, i. e. 
the ratio of material input costs to revenue, then (1-a) is equal to the ratio of value added to 
revenue. By substituting this into (5), multiplying through by revenue and dividing by value 
added, we then derive a relation analogous to (2) but with value added as the denominator. 
Py -P M-W1 0- r)+ r 
S, (I + Ad (6) 
Py - P1nM 77 
This gives an indication of the nature of the assumption being made when using net output as the 
denominator, but it should be noted that this is a special case of only one of the frameworks we 
have looked at. 
Clearly, the next question which must be considered is, how reasonable is the assumption that a= 
pmm/py? Under this assumption, if there are no material inputs so the downstream firm is 
completely vertically integrated, cr must be zero and also value added must be equal to revenue so 
the adjustment would appear appropriate in this case. The problem is that pmm/py is partly 
II The implicit assumption is that the "outside option" yields zero profits. While this appears broadly 
sensible it is clear that if the bargaining power of the upstream firm becomes large an outside option for 
the downstream firm of producing the good itself, i. e. vertical integration, may yield positive profits and 
become desirable. 
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determined by cr, itself because even if n-dy is a fixed constant, pm/p will depend upon relative 
bargaining strength. While this is not a unique problem (everything within this framework is 
determined simultaneously apart from, y and 71, which are regarded as exogenous), it likely to be 
of interest to investigate the causes of changes in cr. Relevant influences will be the degree of both 
buyer and seller concentration in the respective factor markets, but will also depend upon the 
particular technological features of production, for example, relating to asset specificity in the 
transaction cost fi-amework of analysis. It is because of these influences that the option of making 
the rather crude assumption that o--pmni/py is not an attractive one. 
II. iii. Consgquences for the empirical specification 
In the previous section, we established that under a number of circumstances there is a role for 
the ratio of bought in input costs to sales as an explanatory variable in a price cost margin 
regression. In this section, we explore the interpretation and specification of empirical relations. 
Clearly, the ornission of this ratio from the right hand side only has implications for the 
interpretation of the coefficient on market share if it is correlated with the market share term. In 
this case, the coefficient is likely to be biased according to the standard framework of on-dtted 
variable bias. As we have discussed above it is likely that the ratio is likely to be correlated with 
the degree of concentration in the industry in the case of monopsony and bargaining and, if these 
models are correct, some bias will indeed be induced. 
Using relation (5) demonstrates another reason why the link between concentration and price cost 
margin may be biased downwards when failing to take into account such bargaining even in the 
absence of the omitted variable effect. A linear estimating equation of price cost margin on 
market share will be of the form. PCM. = 5, +9 Mshare + u. where go = (I - cr)(I - y) and 101iI 
Ji 7- [0 - A, )] I q. Therefore as arises the coefficient on market share falls so it is 
possible that a positive and significant link may fail to be established. 
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If we examine a basic regression of price cost margin at the industry level on concentration and 
the ratio of purchased inputs to sales, the coefficients can be directly interpreted in relation to 
four of the models. We have an estimating equation12 of the form, 
(7) PCM, =j5O +, 5, Conci +(52( R 
)i + Vi 
where v, is an error term, M=pmm and R=py. Figure 1. indicates the expected values of the 
different coefficients in the different models. 
FiRure I Predicted coefficients for the different fi-ameworks 
5() 8? 
Standard Model 1-Y 0 
Quasi Fixed Material I-Y -1 
Inputs 
Leontief Production 1-Y 7(1+x)/Ti 7-1 
Function 
Monopsony I -Y 
Therefore in all of these frameworks we expect similar coefficients on the constant and market 
share tenns. The difference of interpretation occurs with the second term which is predicted to be 
zero in the first case, to be exactly equal to -I in the second case and may be positive or negative 
in the third case. It is expected to be negative in the monopsony case given the conventional 
assumption that the elasticity of derived demand is negative. 
In terms of the specification for the bargaining model, we are really interested in finding a proxy 
for bargaining strength which is, of course, unobserved. By allowing a more structured functional 
form for the bargaining parameter, or by trying to identify the effect of concentration on 
monopsony, we can fiirther develop the empirical specification. Therefore if we model cy in a way 
12 Clearly additional 'control' variables maybe warranted but are omitted from the exposition for 
simplicity. 
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that cr= 0,, + 0, (MIR) or if we model the derived demand parameter explicitly so that 
e= ýO + ý, CONC we obtain the interactive specification. 
PCMi = (50 + 8, Conc, + 
52 (M )1+83(( 
M 
)i * Conci) + vi (8) RR 
The additional element which it is important to explore, given the focus of many recent studies, 
and which has not been addressed until now13, is the extent to which the alternative definitions of 
the margin have different cyclical properties. Clearly, any difference in the cyclical fluctuations in 
the margins depends upon the cyclical movements in the ratio of material inputs to final sales. In 
considering, a ptiori, any movements in this ratio, it is perhaps usefiil to separate out movements 
in the unit input requirements m/y, and movements in relative prices pm/p. There would appear to 
be little reason to expect unit input requirements to vary much according to business fluctuations 
except as a second order effect of substitution between labour and bought in inputs as their 
relative prices change. Given the focus here on fixed coefficient technologies and, additionally, 
given that substitution effects are more likely to occur in response to long term rather short term 
relative price movements, it would appear to be a reasonable working assumption that changes in 
unit input requirements will largely be unaffected by business fluctuations. The sole point which 
could be made is that if in times of boom firms find themselves capacity constrained, they may 
choose to subcontract out some, or a larger proportion, of their work. In this case one would 
expect m/y to rise in booms and fall in slumps as firms adjust to these capacity constraints. 
In analysing the relative movements of pm/p it is necessary to separate out further the semi 
manufactured inputs and raw material inputs. As many of the manufactured goods sold will be 
both outputs and inputs, there would appear to be no immediate consequences for the ratio pm/p. 
In the case of raw materials there is an established literature on the determinants of prices in the 
business cycle. Kalecki (1939) argued that the prices of raw materials were essentially demand 
determined and therefore fluctuated more widely than finished goods prices. If this is the case 
13 Haskcl and Martin (1994, p29) indicate that their result on the effect of capacity constraints on price 
cost margin is unaffected by differences in the definition of margin. The other studies do not examine 
this issue at all. 
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pm/p will fall in recessions and rise in booms. Combining these two elements, in both cases the 
expectation, although small in the case of mly, is that M/R will move pro-cyclically and that, 
therefore, V/R will move counter-cyclically. What are the implications of counter-cyclical 
movements in V/R for the movements in price cost margins? If we assume that price cost 
margins, using the conventional gross output denominator definition, display no cyclical 
movement14 then in recessions net output denominator price cost margins will fall as V rises 
relative to R and this margin will rise in booms. The implication is, therefore, that price cost 
margins defined using the net output denominator will tend, if our hypotheses are correct, to be 
procyclical relative to the conventional margin. A fiirther point is that if the hypothesis with 
regard to subcontracting as a response to capacity constraints is correct, and if such 
subcontracting occurs at least partially within the industry, then the price cost margin measure 
adjusted for intra industry transactions will similarly respond differently to the cycle. The bias 
will be in the same direction tending to make the margin adjusted for intra industry transactions 
procyclical relative to the conventionally defined margin. 
In addition to the empirical tests of the effect of some form of imperfect competition in the 
product market, we also wish to investigate what may be termed the "Cowling effect" of intra 
industry transactions. In order to do diis we need to make use of the UK input output tables 
which indicate the extent of intra, industry transactions. As has been noted above, the problem 
with this empirical exercise is that the input output tables of the UK are only published 
infrequently, namely they have been published for 1979,1984,1989,1990 and 199115. 
Nevertheless with the information available for these latter years, it is possible to use a first 
difference framework which removes fixed effects in order to identify if the use of a margin 
adjusted for intra industry transactions produces empirical results which are quantitatively 
different from those obtained using the standard margin. It is not possible, however, without 
using some form of interpolation concerning the rate of intra industry transactions, to create a full 
14 Clearly this is not necessarily the case and is assumed solely because we are interested in the relative 
cyclicality of the different margins. 
15 The plan is that they will be published annually from 1989 but at the time of writing these are the 
only years available which make use of the SIC 1980 classification. 
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panel from 1980 onwards which would facilitate direct comparison. Interpolation does not appear 
a particularly attractive approach because, following the above discussion, it is difficult to assert 
that if significant changes in the extent of intra transactions are occurring, that they are a smooth 
secular phenomenon, as opposed to a phenomenon which is sensitive to particular cyclical or 
other temporal factors. The use of data from the earlier years would also necessitate a smaller 
sample because changes in the industry classification make the matching process more difficult. 
111. Results of the empirical analysis 
The first empirical exercise is therefore to create the three alternative margins which are 
necessary to test the Cowling intra industry transactions hypothesis. The first margin is defined as 
net output minus operative wages over net output: the second margin is defined as net output 
minus operative wages over gross output. Both of these measures can be readily obtained from 
the Census of Production for the relevant years at the three digit level of aggregation. In using the 
input output tables to generate the measure of intra industry transactions, we need to perform a 
matching of the CSO industry categories used in this table with the three digit SIC classification. 
This matching proved possible at the three digit level of aggregation for 48 industries. A fiirther 
10 observations were added which were amalgamations of more than one three digit industry but 
which correspond to a single CSO input-output table industry. In this case, the measure of the 
third price cost margin was (Enet output-loperative wages)/(1gross output *M where IT is the 
ratio of purchases of inputs from within the CSO industry to total sales in that CSO industry. 
Concentration for these ten observations was calculated as a weighted average of the 
concentration ratio in the component three digit industries. The growth rate of sales was 
calculated as the first difference of logs of the total sales of the industries taken as a group. 
Table 1 presents the surnmary data of the tightly defined sample of 48 industries and the whole 
sample of 91 industries (excluding miscellaneous categories and categories for which data was 
incomplete). This illustrates that, although in the tightly defined sample almost half of the SIC 
three digit industries have been discarded, the samples have very similar means and standard 
deviations so there does not appear any systematic bias in the selection of industries by this 
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method. As a point of note, the mean value of IT across the whole sample was 6% but this varied 
between industries. It was effectively negligible in some industries but in other industries intra 
industry purchases amounted to over 25% of all sales 
In estimating the relationship between margins and concentration, further independent variables 
have been included as control variables. These are a measure of advertising intensity, designed to 
proxy the extent of product differentiation and potential entry barriers, and the growth rate of 
industry sales. Price cost margins may vary with demand conditions16 and, as noted above, this 
effect may differ between measures of price cost margins. In addition to these measures of import 
share and distributors trading margins are included. This data is taken from the CSO input output 
tables. Import share proxies the degree of international competition while distributor's trading 
margins control for the degree of downstream market power. This latter point addresses the 
reason advocated for using the alternative margin by Dickson (1994). He suggests that the 
on-ýission of the industry elasticity of demand will potentially bias results if it is correlated with 
concentration. As has been recognised by Waterson (1980), the derived elasticity of demand will 
depend on the extent of buyer (downstream) market power. Empirically, this downstream market 
power is proxied by Waterson either as the weighted average of buyer concentration or as the 
weighted average of downstream price cost margins. Using distributor's trading margins, 
therefore, seeks to control in this way for such downstream market power effects. In relation to 
the argument by Dickson, by incorporating this we are therefore trying to separate out the intra 
industry transactions effects from those potentially caused by ornission of factors relating to the 
elasticity of demand. If the inclusion of distributor's trading margins matters for the establishment 
of a relationship between concentration and margins, then a part of Dickson's argument would be 
confirmed. 
Table 2 contains the results of OLS levels regressions for the different specification of margins 
for 1989-1991. The use of these years is somewhat problematic. It is well recognised that the 
16 See Dornowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986) and Haskel and Martin (1992) in addition to later 
chapters of this thesis for evidence of this. 
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relationship between concentration and price cost margins is weaker during periods of recession 
than periods of boom. Manufacturing output was stagnant through 1989 and fell in both 1990 
and 1991 without picking up until the start of 1993. Therefore we may not expect to find a strong 
relationship between concentration and price cost margins using data from these years. The other 
point of note is that it is customary for concentration and advertising intensity and frequently 
other right hand side variables to be treated as endogenous within this kind of fiarnework and 
therefore an instrumental variables approach to be used. There remains a problem with this, one 
that has been argued strongly in this context by Schmalensee (1989a), namely that valid 
contemporaneous instruments do not exist and therefore lagged values of variables must be used 
as instruments. If we were to do that in this case, we would lose at least one third of our sample, 
and depending on the result of instrument validity tests, possibly two thirds of the sample17. OLS 
is therefore used to maximise the available sample but with the acknowledgement of the potential 
problems therein. 
The results from Table 2 in levels offer little support for the argument that controlling for intra 
industry transactions has an important impact upon the relationship. It is only with the net output 
margin that a positive and significant relationship is established. With both other margins, the 
point estimate is negative and the t statistic insignificant. Both advertising and distributor's 
margins have effects of similar magnitude and significance irrespective of the definition of the 
margin although the sign of the coefficient on distributor's margin is the opposite of that expected 
from Waterson (1980). Waterson found that greater downstream market power led to a more 
inelastic derived demand for the upstream firm which in turn led to higher price cost margins. In 
this case, downstream margins have a negative impact on upstream margins. This is more 
indicative of a framework where downstream distributors can squeeze upstream margins within 
some kind of bargaining context. Omission of the distributor's trading margin variable did not 
17 It could easily be anticipated that xit. 1 is not a valid instrument hence xit-2 must be used instead. 
Indeed attempts were made to treat concentration as endogenous and used lagged values on which there 
is much information as instruments. However these regressions did not perform well, producing negative 
R squared statistics and thus appearing to reject these lagged values as valid instruments. Another 
possible way of getting around this problem would be to use lagged values of concentration in the OLS 
regressions. Estimations of this form did not produce substantially different results from those presented 
howevcr and are therefore not reproduced here. 
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have any effect on the coefficients on the other variables and this would therefore count against 
Dickson's account of the difference between margins. Imports do not have a significant effect 
irrespective of margin used. This accords with previous evidence from the UK (e. g. Conyon and 
Machin (1991a)) which fails to find a strong effect for imports. The final point of note is that the 
coefficient on industry demand is only significant for the net output denominator margin, this 
would appear to confirm our expectation concerning the relative cyclical movements in input 
prices. There are no important differences between the smaller and larger samples, suggesting one 
does not lose much economic information by conflating SIC groups in the fashion described 
above, but a wider coverage of manufacturing industry is not possible. 
Table 3 repeats the regressions of Table 2 but in first differences so as to remove any 
unobservable industry specific effects which could be correlated with the right hand side 
variables. As stated in section III the removal of fixed effects will control for the omission of 
any non time varying control variables whether observable or not. The results are not easy to 
interpret because in all cases the effect of concentration on margins is insignificant. As suggested 
earlier this could be due to fact that the time period for which the data was available is a period of 
recession. While the point can be made that the point estimates and level of determination are 
similar for the net output margin and the margin adjusted for intra industry transactions and both 
have a stronger level of determination than the conventional margin, the overall level of 
determination is too poor to make any strong conclusions. The only consistent results are for the 
growth rate of industry sales where in this case all margins are positively related although the 
magnitude of the effect is greater for the net output denominator margin. We have only examined 
data for three years and this is, therefore, not a particularly comprehensive test of the 
hypothesis18. However, the evidence from Table 2 indicates that using the net output denominator 
to control for intra industry transactions is inappropriate and that failing to correct for intra 
industry transactions will not seriously distort empirical results. The results from Table 3 qualify 
this to some extent but are too poorly determined for any substantive conclusions. 
18 In particular looking at only two years does not enable one to look at the secular trend in intra 
industry purchases. 
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The second part of the empirical investigation involves a re-specification of the price cost margin 
concentration relationship to account for monopsony or bargaining in the market for bought in 
inputs. Table 4 gives the means and data descriptions for the variables used in this empirical 
section. Table 5 reports results for two way fixed effects estimates19 using a panel of census 
industries from 1984 -1991 and including yearly dummy variables to control for aggregate 
cyclical or secular demand effects. Regression I uses the alternative net output denominator 
margin as the dependent variable. Regression 2 uses the more conventional gross output 
denominator margin. Regressions 3 and 4 are analogous to the specifications given in equations 7 
and 8 in section 11 using the gross output denominator margin. The first difference instrumental 
variables estimator from Arellano and Bond (1988) is used as all of the right hand side variables 
are considered to be endogenous. The growth rate of industry sales and a proxy for advertising 
intensity are included as control variables on the right hand side to account for any industry 
specific demand effects or the effects of product differentiation or advertising related entry 
barriers. Both of these variables are treated as endogenous as is customary in industrial 
organisation studies of this kind (see Schmalensee, 1989a). 
Regressions I and 2 merely illustrate the conventional wisdom that the a net output margin will 
obtain a larger and better determined coefficient on concentration than the gross output 
denominator margin. Neither of the control variables are significant in these or any of the other 
regressions. In the case of demand growth this is likely to be a result of the inclusion of the yearly 
dummies which will absorb economy wide demand fluctuations, these dummies are always jointly 
significant. In the case of the advertising proxy, this would appear to indicate that the effect of 
advertising is largely a fixed effect with relatively little variation over time. There are no 
problems of second order serial correlation with the estimated regressions. Regression 3 yields an 
improvement in the level of determination of the coefficient on concentration although a decline in 
its absolute value relative to the standard case. The coefficient on M/R in this regression is 
19 Estimates in levels were attempted as well but these indicated strong serial correlation which could 
indicate some form of mispecification such as omission of unobservabics. These results are therefore not 
reported. 
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negative and significant. Referring back to Figure I this fits the monopsony story and the fixed 
coefficient approach if there are widespread diseconomies of scale in the use of labour. In fact 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on M/R is equal to -1. A value of -1 for this 
coefficient is predicted by the quasi fixed material input framework. Such a value is also 
consistent with an interpretation that the function g(l) in the fixed proportions production function 
is homogeneous of degree zero. As discussed earlier, this would imply a "pure" fixed proportions 
technology. However that the function g(l) in the fixed proportions framework is homogeneous of 
degree zero also, noting from Figure 1, implies that the coefficient on concentration should be 
equal to zero. This is re*ected by the data. Only the monopsony and quasi fixed material inputs 
approaches are consistent with the findings. This would imply that there may be a problem of 
specification in conventional estimations which arises from their failure to take into account either 
the existence of monopsony power or the precise treatment of material inputs. We would argue 
that including the ratio of bought in inputs to sales as an explanatory variable is helpful in 
resolving this problem. 
In principle, separate effects could occur if we differentiate between bought in goods and bought 
in services2O. As, in the data, we can break down bought in inputs into these two separate 
components, a ftirther investigation which included these in the estimation either separately or 
jointly was made. Both in terms of volume and in terms of statistical estimation the role of bought 
in goods dominated that of bought in services. In terms of the theory, this would imply that firms 
have greater monopsony power over suppliers of goods than over the subcontractors they use. 
The separate effects are not well determined perhaps due to collinearity and therefore the results 
are not reported. 
Ile attempt to further discriminate between the bargaining approach and the other theories using 
the interactive specification is less straightforward. Regression 4 in Table 5 indicates an increase 
in the explanatory power of the right hand side variables, as evidenced from comparing the Wald 
20 These are industrial services such as subcontracting rather than non industrial services which could 
be regarded as overhcads. 
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Statistics from (3) and (4), but no separate effect of either concentration or the interaction term 
can be discerned. This could be ascribed to the existence of some degree of collinearity as 
frequently occurs when using an interactive specification. A Wald test of the joint significance of 
concentration and the interaction term gives a value of 5.26 and the test is distributed as X2 with 
2 degrees of freedom. This value is significant at the ten per cent level but not at the five per cent 
level. Thus, there is limited, but not particularly compelling, evidence of collinearity and we have 
to conclude that the interactive specification is not to be preferred. From a theoretical point of 
view, this would appear to count against a bargaining framework explanation of the relationships. 
However, as the evidence was not conclusive, a further attempt to test this was made and is 
discussed below. 
The alternative approach to this test involves a logarithmic transformation of the estimating 
relationship, so that a log linear specification is adopted in preference to a linear model. As the 
formal theoretical framework is essentially non linear or at least is only approximately linear the 
estimation of log linear relationships between price cost margins and concentration is not 
uncommon. There are a number of disadvantages to the use of log linear specifications however. 
It is unclear what the original functional form would be that would indicate a purely log linear 
relationship between the variables. In particular, the inclusion of a demand growth or advertising 
sales ratio control variable leads to problems of interpretation. If either of these variables takes a 
value of zero, i. e. demand is constant, or there is no advertising in the industry then the 
implication of the log linear specification is that the price cost margin must also take a value of 
zero. In terms of the theory driving the relationship, however, stagnant sales should not 
necessarily imply zero price cost margin. 
Having noted the problems which arise with this form of specification there is also a simple way 
of testing the implicit assumption about the appropriate specification of dependent variable in a 
log linear framework. To see this, note that the alternative price cost margin is defined as 
; r+ F 7r+F S ; r+ Fv taking logs of which becomes In( )- ln(ýý). Within a log linear vSV, SS 
99 
specification the appropriateness of the implicit empirical assumption simply becomes a matter of 
estimating a log linear model using the conventional gross output denominator price cost margin 
as the dependent variable. By including the log of the ratio of net output to gross output as an 
independent variable, at test to see if the coefficient on this variable is significantly different from 
unity is sufficient. This approach was tried but with the reservations expressed above concerning 
the use of log linear specifications borne in mind. 
The results from these estimations are displayed in Table 6. In none of the estimations is there 
evidence of significant second order serial correlation and the Sargan test of instrument validity 
does not raise any problems. Therefore, despite the theoretical misgivings about a log linear 
specification, there do not appear to be any statistical problems of mispecification. The first 
column contains a simple log linear specification using the net output denominator price cost 
margin, the second column presents the same specification but using the gross output 
denominator margin. These results merely confirm the general finding that a positive and 
significant relationship with concentration only exists when using the net output denominator 
margin. Column three replicates column two, with the addition of the log of the ratio of net output 
to gross output. In this case, the point estimate on the added variable is 1.3968 with an estimated 
standard error of . 1358. Therefore, we can reject the hypothesis that the cocfficient 
is equal to 
unity at the one per cent level of significance. The implication is that we can also reject the 
hypothesis that the use of the net output denominator margin is statistically correct for this data 
set with a high degree of confidence. As stated earlier this does not necessarily mean that it is 
either theoretically correct or empirically appropriate for all data sets, but for the current data set 
it does not seem appropriate. Column four of Table 6 replaces the log of the ratio of net output to 
gross output with the log of the ratio of bought in inputs to gross output. This is largely included 
for purposes of completeness and comparison but it fiirther confirms that the inclusion of this 
ratio tends to increase the significance of concentration in these estimations. 
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IV. Conclusion 
In terms of practical work this chapter examines formal rationales for the approach adopted by 
Conyon and Machin (1991b) and Haskel and Martin (1992) in speciPying price cost margins. The 
chapter clearly sets out the assumptions which are implicit in the adopted frameworks over the 
treatment of bought in inputs and finds little theoretical justification for the use of the alternative 
margin. The chapter finds that only under very specific theoretical assumptions is a net output 
denominator margin appropriate, i. e. an efficient bargaining fi-amework between input suppliers 
and input purchasers where the bargaining strengths depend upon the importance of bought in 
inputs as a proportion of final sales. The chapter shows that, in general, the appropriate 
theoretical correction for the degree of vertical integration depends upon the specific framework 
hypothesised for the relationship between end user and input provider. However, while there 
seems to be little justification for the alteration of the left hand side variable there are a range of 
circumstances when a version of the ratio of bought in inputs to total sales should be included as 
a right hand side variable. Additionally the chapter has brought out a different aspect of the 
adjustment to control for vertical integration, namely the adjustment of price cost margin 
measures for intra industry transactions. 
Empirical support for the theoretical conclusion is not particularly easy to come by. The 
proposition is that the ratio of bought in inputs to sales should be included as a right hand side 
"control" variable in price cost margin regressions as this simultaneously accounts for a range of 
theoretical models. By the same token this leads to problems with regards interpretation of a 
significant effect of the control variable as no specific theoretical model is preferred. However, 
the empirical evidence we have presented indicates there is a role for such a control variable 
within the data set we have compiled. Interestingly, while the theoretical framework which 
implies a redefined price cost margin has been rejected on the grounds that it is based upon 
narrow theoretical assumptions, it cannot be rejected empirically within the current data set with 
a high degree of confidence. In terms of prescription for future empirical work, the implication is 
that as a matter of course control on the right hand side of an estimating equation is to be 
empirically and theorctically preferred if the trcatmcnt of bought in inputs is unknown. However, 
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if knowledge about the nature of bargaining is available or, if the relevant assumptions are 
deemed acceptable, the use of an redefined price cost margin may be justified. 
The evidence presented here suggests that, from a theoretical standpoint, the assumptions of the 
framework necessary to justify the alternative margin are sufficiently restrictive to be excluded 
from the ordinary run of things. A statistical test of the assumption was proposed however and 
for the current data set the assumption was rejected on this test. An alternative specification was 
suggested which nests a series of theories. The results presented here are consistent with two 
possible theoretical explanations: firstly, that firms possess monopsony power over suppliers of 
inputs of goods and services; secondly, that the production function used by firms is of a fixed 
proportions form which is not admitted by the conventional theory. It is not clear whether any 
further attempt to distinguish between these two positions would be possible. This chapter has 
therefore suggested a rejection of one approach to specifying price cost margins regressions and 
the adoption of an alternative less restrictive specification which is preferred both on statistical 
grounds for the current sample and in terms of theoretical suitability. 
In addition to these conclusions, the empirical results have cast doubt upon the need to control for 
intra industry transactions when specifying the price cost margin. These results are however 
presented with the caveat that the justification for adjusting for intra industry transactions 
(Cowling, 1982) refers to secular trends while the data available for testing are from a short 
sample period. 
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Table 1 Data Description, Intra Industry Transaction Data 1989-1991 
la. 
Variable I Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Conc 273 . 429473 . 2304068 . 0854078 . 9922145 
PcMl 273 . 7226212 . 0949878 . 4940711 . 9647428 
PCM2 273 . 3211874 . 0892142 . 1248008 . 5948678 
IT 273 . 0603163 . 06106 0 . 26047 
lb. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
-------------------- ---------- --------------------------------- 
Conc 144 . 4223217 . 2261698 . 0854078 . 9922145 
PcMl 144 . 739362 . 095897 . 5462555 . 9218515 
PCM2 144 . 3324778 . 0958325 . 1248008 . 5948678 
IT 144 . 0566883 . 0560254 0 . 26047 
1c. 
PcMl PCM2 PCM3 Conc 
------------------- ---------- ---------------- 
Pcml 1.0000 
PCM2 0.3640 1.0000 
PCM3 0.3963 0.9798 1.0000 
Conc 0.3456 -0.1333 -0.1047 1. 0000 
Notes: 
1. Conc is the five firm concentration ratio by sales; PCMI is the net output denominator price cost 
margin, (net output-operative wages)/net output; PCM2 is the gross output denominator price cost 
margin, (net output-operative wages)/gross output; PCM3 is the price cost margin adjusted for intra 
industry transactions, (net output-operative wages)I(gross output*(I-IT)); IT is the ratio of intra industry 
transactions in industry final demand. 
2. la lists the variable descriptions for a full sample of 91 industries. lb lists the variable descriptions for 
the 48 industries capable of a close matching in the UK CSO input-output tables. Ic Gives the raNv 
correlations of the three price cost margins in the narrow sample of 48 industries. 
3. Data is taken from Census' of Production, Business Monitor PA1002 for 1989,1990 and 1991 and 
Economic Trends 1992,1993 and 1994. 
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Table 2 Price cost mareins, concentration and intra industry transactions (levels 1989-19911 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant . 554 . 255 . 258 . 567 . 253 . 265 
(23.9) (9.17) (9.21) (24.9) (9.92) (10.5) 
Concentration . 162 -. 045 -. 034 . 145 -. 046 -. 033 
(6.25) (1.46) (0.99) (5.79) (1.61) (1.06) 
Advertising . 200 . 216 . 231 . 179 . 199 . 206 
(9.27) (7.32) (7.40) (8.18) (8.39) (8.16) 
Dist margins -. 231 -. 254 -. 317 -. 133 -. 181 -. 241 
(4.04) (3.88) (4.53) (1.89) (3.61) (4.32) 
Import share . 093 -. 024 . 046 . 020 -. 046 -. 003 
(1.62) (0.40) (0.73) (0.39) (1.01) (0.07) 
Growth . 240 . 054 . 060 . 263 . 105 . 109 
(3.28) (0.68) (0.69) (4.02) (1.52) (1.48) 
No of Obs 144 144 144 174 174 174 
R2 . 4862 . 3522 . 3456 . 4149 . 3775 . 3539 
Root MSE . 0699 . 0785 . 0834 . 0736 . 0747 . 0794 
Notes: 
1. The dependent variables are PCMI in (1) and (4), PCM2 in (2) and (5) and PCM3 in (3) and (6). 
Dependent variables are defined as follows: 
PCMI=[(Net Output-Operative Wages)/Net Output] 
PCM2=[(Net Output-Operative Wages)/Gross Output] 
PCM3=[(Net Output-Operative Wages)/(Gross Output*(l-MGRO))] 
where INTGRO it the ratio of Intra Industry Transactions to Gross Output. 
2. Absolute values of Heteroskedasticity robust t statistics in parentheses. All regression are OLS in 
levels for 1989-199 1. 
3. No of Obs is the number of industry sic groups used in estimation. There are 48 SIC industries which 
can be closely matched to the input output tables. Another 10 observations can be constructed as 
amalgams of SIC groups. Details of these SIC groups are given in the data appendix. 
4. Concentration is the five firm concentration ratio, Advertising is defined as the ratio of "cost of other 
non industrial services" to industry gross output, Dist. Margins is the ratio of distributors trading 
margins to industry sales, Import share is the share of imports in sales. Grow is the growth rate of 
industry sales. Sources for data are given in the data appendix. 
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Table 3 Price cost margins, concentration and intra industry transactions (first differences 
1989-1991) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -. 001 . 001 -. 0001 -. 003 -. 0003 -. 002 (0.42) (0.52) (0.06) (1.56) (0.18) (0.91) 
AConc . 078 . 019 . 061 . 059 . 020 . 058 
(1.03) (0.45) (1.12) (0.99) (0.53) (1.19) 
A. Advertising -. 008 . 047 . 056 . 002 . 050 . 058 
(0.31) (1.72) (1.97) (0.10) (2.03) (2.22) 
ADist margins 
. 005 -. 032 -. 054 073 . 090 . 114 
(0.08) (0.54) (0.90) (1.30) (1.85) (2.34) 
AImport share -. 086 -. 053 -. 191 -. 074 -. 074 -. 164 
(0.48) (0.34) (1.13) (0.47) (0.57) (1.17) 
AGrowth . 113 . 067 . 059 . 093 . 051 . 044 (2.83) (2.70) (1.93) (2.70) (2.02) (1.65) 
No of Obs 96 96 96 116 116 116 
R2 . 3761 . 2481 . 2028 . 2904 . 1764 . 1501 Root MSE . 0168 . 0175 . 0207 . 0195 . 0149 . 0228 
Notes: 1. All dependent and independent variables are as defined for Table 2, save that they are in first 
differences. 
2. Absolute values of Heteroskedasticity robust t statistics are in parentheses. All regression are by OLS. 
3. The number of units of observation are as for Table 2, but one year's set of observations have been lost 
through first differencing. 
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Table 4: Data Description: Price Cost Margins and Bought in 
inputs (1984-1991) 
Variable I Obs 
-------------------- 
Pcml 760 
PCM2 760 
Conc 760 
Grow 760 
Ads 760 
P/R 760 
I Pcmi 
------------------ 
Pcmil 1.0000 
PCM21 0.4487 
P/Rl 0.0031 
Concl 0.2288 
Adsl 0.4318 
Growl 0.1021 
Mean Std. Dev. 
- - 
Min 
-- -------- 
Max 
--------- ---------- 
. 7201993 
-- - ----- 
. 0963362 
- - 
. 3925997 . 9647428 
. 3230236 . 0954088 . 1187585 . 6525966 
. 4347352 . 2255123 . 07 . 9922145 
. 0508818 . 0993468 -. 3961051 . 5215284 
. 0653215 . 0295866 . 0174203 . 1786424 
. 5514347 . 1118349 . 2281243 . 8431002 
PCM2 P/R Conc Ads Grow 
------------------------------------------- 
1.0000 
-0.8850 1.0000 
-0.1207 0.2441 1.0000 
0.6038 -0.4519 0.0072 1.0000 
0.0797 -0.0406 -0.0998 -0.0327 1.0000 
Notes: 
1. Conc is the five firm concentration ratio by sales; PCMI is the net output denominator price cost 
margin, (net output-operative wages)/net output; PCM2 is the gross output denominator price cost 
margin, (net output-operative wages)/gross output; Grow is the first difference of the log of total industry 
sales; Ads is a proxy for the advertising sales ratio. P/R is the ratio of bought in inputs to gross output. 
2. The table lists the variable means for a sample of 95 industries from 1984-1991 inclusive. 
3. Data is taken from Census' of Production, Business Monitor PA1002 for various years. 
106 
Table 5: Price Cost Margins and Bought In Inputs 
Instrumental Variables First Difference Equations 1984-1991 
Variable (1) 
ApCml 
(2) 
APCM2 
(3) 
APCM2 
(4) 
APCM2 
Constant 0.003 -0.007 0.005 0.005 
(0.825) (1.324) (2.243) (2.519) 
ACONC 0.4184 0.2311 0.1584 0.1476 
(2.497) (1.539) (2.243) (0.764) 
AGROW 0.0025 0.0052. 0.0011 0.0009 
(0.171) (0.416) (0.158) (0.143) 
0.3773 0.2984 -0.0286 -0.0333 AADS (0.799) (0.757) (0.160) (0.186) 
-0.9856 -1.0043 
, &P/R (8.112) (6.042) 
0.0002 
A(P/R)*CONC (0.060) 
Obs. 760 760 760 760 
Wald 1. 7.208(3) 3.179(3) 110.1(4) 129.5(5) 
Wald 2. 43.20(8) 32.24(8) 94.34(8) 89.69(8) 
Sargan 4.98(2) 5.00(2) 5.60(2) 5.66(2) 
Scl -2.951 -3.220 -2.448 -2.451 
SC2 -0.650 -0.482 -0.536 -0.545 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is PCMI in regression 1, PCM2 in the other regressions. Both as defined in note 
4 Table 1. All regressions include a full set of time dummies. P/R is the ratio of bought in inputs of 
goods and services to gross output. 
2. All regressions are by instrumental variables using the Arellano and Bond DPD program. All right 
hand side variables are treated as endogenoas. Instruments are the full set of time dummies, the first lags 
of each of the independent variables, the second lag of the change in concentration and second lag of the 
level of concentration. 
3. Absolute values of robust one step t statistics are in parentheses. 
4. Wald I is a test of the joint significance of the right hand side variables. Wald2 is a test of the joint 
significance of the time dummies. Both are distributed as Chi-squared with degrees of freedom in 
parentheses. 
5. Sargan is the test of over identifying restrictions, degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
6. SCI and SC2 are robust tests of first and second order serial correlation respectively. They are 
distributed as N(0,1). With first differencing an MA(l) error process is generated therefore it is expected 
and admissible within the model for significant and negative first order serial correlation to exist. 
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Table 6: Price Cost Margins and Bought In Inputs: logarithmic 
specifications 
Instrumental Variables First Difference Equations 1984-1991 
Variable (1) 
ALPCM1 
(2) 
ALPCM2 
(3) 
ALPCM2 
(4) 
ALPCM2 
Constant 0.004 -0.033 0.019 0.008 
(0.670) (2.835) (2.241) (0.620) 
ALCONC 0.2664 0.2868 0.2582 0.3249 
(2.111) (1.207) (2.368) (2.152) 
AGROW -0.0019 0.0029 -0.0025 0.0100 
(0.073) (0.047) (0.116) (0.264) 
0.0818 0.1813 0.0413 0.1105 
ALADS (1.366) (1.371) (0.894) (1.284) 
1.3968 
ALVI (10.28) 
-1.5845 
AL(P/R) (4.679) 
Obs. 760 760 760 760 
Wald 1. 6.043(3) 3.234(3) 146.6(4) 31.69(4) 
Wald 2. 35.36(8) 29.80(8) 51.46(8) 22.17(8) 
Sargan 2.745(2) 2.540(2) 1.760(2) 0.063(2) 
Scl -2.967 -3.454 -2.811 -3.038 
SC2 -1.243 -0.535 -1.447 -0.003 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is ALPCMI, first difference of log of PCMI, in regression 1, ALPCM2, first 
difference of log of PCM2 in the other regressions. LVI is the log of the ratio of net output to gross 
output. LADS is the log of the proxy for advertising sales ratio. L(P/R) is the log of the ratio of bought in 
inputs of goods and services to gross output. All regressions include a full set of time dunin-des. 
2. All regressions are by instrumental variables using the Arellano and Bond DPD program. All right 
hand side variables are treated as endogenous. Instruments are the full set of time dummies, the first lags 
of each of the independent variables, the second lag of the change in concentration and second lag of the 
level of concentration. 
3. Details of all diagnostic tests are as in the notes to Table 5. 
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Data Appendix: 
Data Sources 
'Me sources for the data are various issues of the annual report of the census of production 
Business Monitor publication PA1002, and various issues of Economic Trends which now 
publish the core elements of the UK Input Output Tables. 
In constructing the variables gross output was used rather than total sales to eliminate noise 
created by inventory movements. Net output is calculated by deducting purchases of materials 
and fuel and the cost of industrial services received from gross output and making an adjustment 
for the change in the stocks of materials and fuel. In making use of data on the two elements it is 
therefore possible to differentiate between bought in inputs in the form of goods and inputs in the 
form of services. Advertising is proxied by the ratio of the "cost of other non industrial services" 
to gross output. This is an imprecise definition because in addition to advertising services, 
payments for licensing, use of trademarks and patents, which roughly accord with the economic 
intuition of advertising as product differentiation, the cost of other non industrial services also 
includes payments to lawyers, accountants etc. This measure has been used previously however 
(e. g. Dowrick (1990)) and can be justified on the grounds that the use of professional services 
such as lawyers and accountants is unlikely to exhibit substantial variance across industries in 
comparison to advertising services. Total sales was used to generate the sales growth data, 
defined as the first difference of log of total sales, as a demand side proxy. 
ne data from the Input output tables was constructed as follows. The volume of intra industry 
transactions is the recorded value on the diagonal of Table 3: Demand for Products (the 
"combined use matrix"). Data on Imports, Distributors trading margins and the total supply of 
products are taken from Table 2: Supply of Products. 
I would like to thank Martin Conyon for providing me with part of this data. 
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Data Sample 
Ile SIC(80) groups used in the initial estimation of the intra industry transaction hypothesis 
presented regressions (1)-(3) of Tables 2 and 3 are listed below- For each of these groups a close 
matching between the industry classification used in the input output tables and the SIC group 
(three digit) classification could be found. In addition to those SIC groups for which a close 
matching could not be found, groups with miscellaneous categories or missing data were also 
eliminated from the full sample of manufacturing SIC groups. 
224 241 242 247 248 251 255 256 257 258 259 260 314 316 320 321 322 324 325 
326 329 330 341 342 343 344 346 361 364 411 412 413 419 421 422 428 429 431 
436 437 438 451 455 467 471 472 475 483 
In addition to these groups a further ten industry categories could be formed as combinations of 
two or more SIC groups. These combinations of SIC groups are listed below. In these cases the 
variables are constructed as aggregations of the groups (in the case of sales hence sales growth) 
or weighted averages (in the case of concentration and price cost margins). 
1 221 222 223 
2 243 244 245 246 
3 323 327 
4 351 352 353 
5 362 363 
6 371 372 373 374 
7 424 426 427 
8 432 433 434 
9 441 442 
10 461 462 463 464 466 
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Chapter 4: Strate2ic Asvmmetries and Intra Industrv Performance 
1. Introduction 
We have argued in the previous chapters that strategic asymmetries are important in 
understanding differences between large and small firms within industries whether those 
asymmetries are focused on the competitive stance or on decisions concerning the cost structure 
employed. Indeed, in chapter 2 we have argued that in some cases the two can be conflated in 
empirical terms because of the observational equivalence that can occur. There have been a 
number of previous attempts to investigate these asymmetries both theoretically and empirically. 
In this chapter we will review these attempts and argue that one of the key elements that has been 
lacking from previous empirical studies is an attempt to exploit both time series and cross section 
elements of a data set. While there have been a number of empirical studies using such panel data 
to investigate firm level performance for the U. K. (e. g. Machin and Van Reenen (1993) and 
Geroski, Machin and Van Reenen (1993)) these have not addressed directly the issue of 
asymmetry between firms or groups of firms. In addition, these studies sufferl from the reliance 
upon accounting information for what are, in large part, diversified companies for their data, 
hence they have difficulties mapping industry level information into their data set. We therefore 
argue that there is both a need for, and scope for, fiwffier testing models of such asymmetries 
using a data set that can address the important statistical criticisms that can be made of the 
previous tests. In this chapter, we also present the results of such empirical tests and compare 
these results with the previously obtained results. In section II, we consider the theories that have 
been put forward including the dominant firm competitive fringe model and the mobility barrier 
hypothesis put forward by Caves and Porter as ways of explaining intra industry performance. 
Section III critically reviews the previous empirical studies of intra industry performance. Section 
IV discusses the statistical problems that need to be addressed in an empirical study of this kind. 
I We do not wish to imply from this that such studies make use of data invalid to their purpose merely 
that the data used would have limitations for studies with our focus. 
Section V sets out the alternative empirical specifications of the intra industry performance 
relations and section VI Presents and analyses the results of the empirical analyses. 
11. Theories of strategic asymmetry and intra industry performance 
In this section we will consider four approaches to strategic asymmetry from the literature. 'Me 
four approaches are the standard Clarke Davies / Cowling Waterson framework that seeks to 
explain firm performance while allowing for differences in both costs and in competitive stance; 
the dominant firm competitive fringe model; the mobility barrier hypothesis of Caves and Porter 
(1977), and the "animal motif' framework associated with Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). VVUle 
this cannot pretend to be, and space constraints preclude, a comprehensive survey, these four 
approaches are arguably the most widely used models when seeking to explain intra industry 
performance. The four approaches overlap to some extent, as the dominant firm approach can be 
considered to be a special case of both the Clarke Davies and Caves and Porter approaches. 
III The Clarke Davies model of intra industly performance 
The Clarke and Davies (1982) elaboration of the Cowling Waterson model is essentially a model 
of short run profit maximisation in the context of a homogeneous product and a fixed number of 
firms. Within these two constraints, the model is flexible in that it permits variation across firms 
both in cost structure and in competitive stance and both of these factors can account for 
variation in performance. The model has been considered extensively within industrial economics 
textbooks2 and therefore we will not discuss the model in detail. 
The degree of strategic asymmetry involved in this model is limited. The models that follow 
address some specific asymmetry such as first mover advantage(s) or alternatively the 
advantage(s) associated with incumbency. In the Clarke Davies model, the options for strategic 
asyminctry lie in adoption of differing competitive stances and, if the cost structure is regarded as 
endogenous to some degree, different cost structures. To some extent, this is a direct consequence 
2 Waterson (1984) Chapter 2 presents a relatively comprehensive exposition and discussion of the 
model. 
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of the short term profit maximisation basis of the model which excludes analysis of the long run 
factors that influence the institutional context of price setting. This on-dssion implies a difficulty 
of interpretation for it is customary in the empirical analyses (see section III) to include numerous 
'long run! 'control' variables in the analysis that have little justification on a formal theoretical 
level but which are relevant from the point of view of the empirical determination of performance 
in the long run. 
II. ii. 'ne dominant firm competitive fringe framework 
The dominant firm - competitive fringe model was developed initially by Forchheimer (1908) and 
was then subsequently developed by Saving (1970) and Encaoua and Jacquernin (1980) to 
incorporate the notion of a cartel of dominant firms and the possibility of entry. The idea is 
straightforward enough, a group of small firms act as price takers in a market offering a supply 
curve of output which is upward sloping. This supply curve leaves the dominant firm(s) with a 
residual demand curve and the dominant firm(s) is (are) assumed to act as a monopolist (cartel) 
with regard to the residual demand curve. The profitability implications are equally clear, so long 
as the competitive fringe has a supply curve of finite elasticity the dominant firm(s) will make 
supranormal profits. As the supply curve of the fringe becomes more elastic so more output is 
taken up by the fringe, the smaller will be the residual demand curve and the greater will be the 
fringe market share. The determinants of the shape of the supply curve of the can be split into two 
factors the shape of the marginal cost curve and the propensity towards short run entry by fringe 
firms. If the small competitive firms are flexible, in the sense described in Chapter 2, the slope of 
their marginal cost curves will be relatively small and this will pass over, through the horizontal 
aggregation, in forming an elastic fringe supply curve. Additionally, if, as price rises many small 
but inefficient firms can enter into the industry, the supply curve will be more elastic. The 
conventional assumption3 of the competitive fringe model is that the supply curve is fairly 
3 This is not necessarily an assumption for mathematical convenience. Cowling's arguments below 
imply that the elasticity of a firm's supply/marginal cost curve will be a key determinant of whether it 
forms part of the dominant group or the competitive fringe. By implication firms with elastic supply 
responses will tend to be co-opted into the dominant firm group. 
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inelastic however, otherwise the dominant firm(s) would be left with a very small portion of 
demand. 
From the point of view of changes over time we can analyse demand changes for a linear demand 
curve in two ways; an outward shift in the demand curve and a steepening of the demand curve. 
In the former case, the relative size of the small firm sector will tend to decrease unless the supply 
curve is very elastic, in which case the small firm sector will be fairly large to start with. The 
intuition behind this is that with an inelastic supply curve as the optimal price rises with the 
increase in demand so the output of the fringe is relatively unresponsive, so any increase in total 
demand will be mainly met by the larger firms. If the supply response of small firms is elastic 
then the increase in demand will largely be met by the small firms, but with an elastic supply 
response by small firms the size of the residual demand curve will be small and, therefore, the 
scope for dominant firm output reduced. In the case of a steepening of the demand curve the 
reverse will tend to be the case. The Relihood is that the share of output produced by small firms 
will rise, the exception being if the small firms have a significant absolute cost advantage, an 
outcome which doesn't tend to fit well within the confines of the model. Tle intuition for this is 
that with a steepening of the demand curve the possibility exists for increasing monopoly power, 
this will tend to raise the incentive for the dominant firm to restrict output, hence raise price. This 
raising of price will bring forth additional supply by the smaller firms. 
The previous discussion has proceeded on the basis that the characteristics of the supply curve 
are exogenously given. While this is necessary for a simple exposition of the model, it is 
insufficient for a thorough understanding of the workings of industries. Cowling (1982, p9) has 
rejected the notion of a competitive fringe as a useful way of analysing industries. Two prominent 
points are made, the first is that small firms in an industry are unlikely to be producing similar 
products to large firms and indeed may be producing products for supply to the larger firms, a 
factor examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The second point is that if the fringe becomes too 
strong a constraint on their operation the oligopoly group will take steps to eliminate or assimilate 
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the fringe firMS4. Elimination is likely to take the form of some kind of predation, assimilation is 
likely to take the form of take-over. The implication for modelling of these relations is that the 
supply curve of the fiinge is likely to be fairly inelastic because if it were not the oligopoly group 
would take the necessary steps to ensure that it was. The clear exception is the case of low entry 
barriers and a weak oligopoly group, in which case the supply curve will tend to be elastic and 
the oligopoly group will be relatively powerless to do anything about it. Encaoua and Jacquernin 
(1980) develop their model incorporating this recognition of the possibility that the oligopolistic 
group can act to limit the supply curve, more explicitly in their framework the level of 
expenditures which are intended to curb entry is a decision variable along with price. The result is 
a form of dynamic limit pricing model with non price competition added into the fi-arnework. 
On the assumption that most strong oligopoly groups will have within their power the ability to 
erect some form of entry barrier, it becomes clear from this discussion that the reasoning of the 
competitive fringe dominant firm model can be turned on its head. It is not the size of the 
competitive fringe which places an exogenous constraint upon the actions of the dominant firms, 
instead it is the strength of the dominant firms which determines the size and relative importance 
of the small firm sector. Such an interpretation is almost true by definition. The competitive 
fringe, as price takers, simply react to changes in prices in their respective markets adapting their 
output, the dominant group is made up of strategic actors who will clearly see it as in their own 
advantage to manipulate the industry in a way which minimises the effectiveness of the 
constraint. The competitive fringe model should not be considered an unusually restrictive model 
when one recognises that Saving's fi-amework is merely a limit case of strategic asymmetry 
between firms, where in this limit case one firm (or one group of firms) does not, in fact, act 
strategically at all. 
4 Aaronovitch (1955) makes a persuasive argument that trade associations play (or at least played at the 
time of writing) a key role in the'policing! of smaller firms acting in order to enforce the interests of 'the 
big combines' on the industry as a whole. Accounts of the behaviour of the Building Societies 
Association in running its interest rate "cartel" in the interests of the larger societies prior to its 
disbandment in 1984 would appear to confirm that this is not merely a historical curiosity. 
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'Me Saving version of the dominant firm model could be seen to suffer from the same restriction 
in terms of scope of strategic asymmetry as the Clarke Davies model. In the particular 
formulation of Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980), more factors are permitted that additionally 
influence the outcome than the direct stance of the firms with regard to pricing. We have argued, 
following Cowling, that fl-ýs attitude can also be applied to the more limited forms of the 
dominant firm model such that many kinds of strategic decision making will influence the relative 
positions of the dominant firm(s) and the fringe. In this sense, in its conception of strategic 
asymmetry the dominant firm model may be considered a halfway house between the Clarke 
Davies type model and the Caves and Porter analysis. 
II. iii. Mobilijy barriers and entry barriers 
By viewing the allocation of firms to a dominant group or competitive fringe as the result of an 
endogenous strategic decision making framework, on the part of the firms as well as influenced 
by the exogenous parameters faced by those firms, the framework of the competitive fringe model 
can be seen as part of the more general theory of "mobility barriers" contained in the Caves and 
Porter (1977,1978) notion of strategic groups within industries. In the terms we have discussed 
above, the fringe 'strategic' group is limited by the dominant groups ability to construct 
appropriate mobility barriers. 
The Caves and Porter (1977) analysis is interesting, not least because it predates and anticipates 
many of the fiiture developments that were to be formalised in the game theoretic developments of 
the subsequent yearS5. The key element of the Caves and Porter theory is the assertion that there 
may be subgroups of firms within industries with "differing structural characteristics". Moreover, 
these subgroups are not simply a result of misdefinitions of industries, as the firms may be 
producing an identical product yet be classified into subgroups based upon the means of 
provision or production of this product. Once the existence of such subgroups is accepted, the 
conventional analysis of entry barriers may be applied to movement between subgroups and, 
5 For example, the intuition of the findings of Gilbert and Vives (1986) discussed below were 
anticipatcd almost exactly (Caves and Porter (1977) p247-8). 
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indeed, the strategic decisions conventionally associated with entry deterrence could also become 
pivotal in defining the subgroups. 
Analytically, once the existence of subgroups is acknowledged, the framework can be applied to 
these subgroups in the same way that the standard theories of entry are applied to the industry. 
However, it should be noted that some of the problems that can potentially occur with entry 
deterrence such as difficulties of co-ordination of oligopolists are eased when applied to industry 
subgroups because there is likely to be greater mutual interest between the firms that make up a 
separate subgroup than between firms in different subgroups. The primary implication of the 
theory, from the point of view of performance, is that "easy entry into an industry's fringe group 
is therefore no guarantee against monopoly profits"(ibid. p257). 
ILiv. Animal motifs. strategic substitutes and strategic complements 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) present a taxonomy of business strategies that formalises much of 
the expected relationship between leader and follower firms. Unlike most of the game theoretic 
explosion, this exposition posits asymmetry between firms and accounts for the strategies adopted 
by the leader (the followers as a result of their second mover status are reduced to "reactive" 
decision makers) in terms of the effect on the follower. The discussion takes the form of a two 
stage game in which in the first stage the leader firm chooses the level of a strategic variable, 
which may in principle be any strategy but is commonly a capacity or advertising intensity 
decision, to adopt. In the second stage, the two firms compete with respect to a different strategic 
variable, cornmonly price or quantity, assuming that firm two chooses to compete in the second 
stage at a116. IMere are two key determinants of the first stage strategies adopted by the leader 
firms. Firstly, does the level of the strategic variable increase or decrease the follower's profits in 
the second period? In the terms set out by Fudenberg and Tirole, is the strategy tough or soft? 
Secondly, are the strategies employed in the second stage competition strategic substitutes or 
6 If entry does not occur the leader firm acts as a monopolist albeit constrained by the strategy adopted 
in the first stage. 
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strategic complements? 7 The answers to these two questions, combined with the follower firms 
entry decision determine the adopted strategy. The four animal motifs used by Fudenberg and 
Tirole in principle comprehensively characterise the possibilities. The insight added by this 
taxonomy is that the strategies adopted by the leader firm are contingent upon the nature of the 
relations. Therefore, in answering the question implicitly posed by Encaoua and Jacquemin, does 
advertising expenditure limit the scale of the follower firms? the answer must be ambiguous. In 
certain industries advertising by dominant firms is likely to inhibit the scale of entry by the 
follower firms. However, if the advertising raises prices for all firms this is likely to increase the 
number and scale of the follower firms. 
A fiirther issue that arises for all of the models of strategic asymmetry is the ability of 
oligopolists to act in concert as a single monopolist. Conventionally such co-ordination is 
influenced by the number of firms in the group and the degree of heterogeneity within the group 
(see Scherer and Ross (1990) Chp 8). A question addressed by Gilbert and Vives (1986) is 
whether in a noncooperative environment oligopolists; will be able to sustain such strategies. Ileir 
model is specific to their context (a top dog strategy is required by the model) but the intuition 
spills over into other models. In principle, if one firm's action deters or limits entry or mobility, 
the other firms benefit and can therefore free ride on the strategic action of their rival. This could 
potentially lead to a failure of co-ordination in the conventional public good sense. Gilbert and 
Vives show that this will not tend to occur if the spoils from deterrence are distributed according 
to the contribution to the deterrence strategy. The further point that oligopolists may not replicate 
the full monopoly solution is of only marginal relevance. The important point is that it is fully 
conceivable that non co-operative oligopolists can deter or limit entry and the precise (and usually 
empirically unobservable) conditions under which it will occur are of lesser importance. From an 
empirical point of view the implication is that for some strategic actions, those where the rewards 
are distributed according to the participation in the strategic action rather than being equally 
7 Strategic substitutes and complements as Bulow, Geanakopolous and Klemperer (1985) define and 
elaborate upon. 
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distributed according to the consequence of the action(s), the degree of co-ordination amongst the 
oligopoIy group may be irrelevant to the success of the actions. 
Can we empirically operationalise this taxonomy? There have been a number of theoretical 
examples given of the different strategies but we are not aware of attempts to investigate this 
empirically. Ex ante it is difficult to see that it is possible to identify specific industries on the 
basis of the taxonomy because of the concon-dtant difficulties of giving ex ante responses to the 
two relevant questions. Ex post the problem of tautology arises, we may categorise industries to 
different motifs on the basis of observed performance and strategies but do not have any clear 
prediction. Indeed, observation of performance is not trivial, the observed capacities do not help 
us differentiate, for example, between lean and hungry and top dog cases because we cannot 
observe the counterfactual level of capacity associated with a decision taken in the absence of 
(potential) rivals. On a less ambitious level we can perhaps suggest that there exist some 
industries in which advertising leads to dominance while others where advertising through 
spillovers tends to lead to equal levels of performance, if not equal sizes. The effect of advertising 
is therefore potentially variable across different industries. This would therefore reformulate 
Bain's (1956) idea that combination of strategies where MES interacts with advertising and 
concentration to give differing levels of performance. 
111. Previous empirical tests of the theories of intra industry nerformance 
As discussed above the extent to which the fourth approach to intra industry performance can be 
incorporated into empirical testing is difficult to assess and there is only one formal empirical 
studys that has attempted to examine this issue. Cross industry tests of the dominant firm - 
competitive fringe are similarly rare although there have been a number of studies of single 
industries9. Perhaps as the dominant firm framework is a special case of the Clarke Davies 
framework, it has been regarded as incorporated within the cross industry tests of this framework. 
8 Slade (1995a) analyses the saltine cracker market, see Slade (1995b) for a general discussion of 
strategic models. 
9 Roberts (1984) examines the coffee market, Suslow (1986) the aluminium industry and Yamawaki 
(1985) the iron and steel industry. 
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Given these gaps in the literature, we focus, for this discussion of previous studies, on the two 
established forms of test; firstly, those based around the Clarke Davies framework; secondly, the 
tests examining the Caves and Porter mobility barriers hypothesis. 
Before considering the specific papers, it is worth examining the general overview presented in 
Schmalensee (1989a) in relation to intra, industry hypotheses. This overview can be encapsulated 
in the four stylised facts in relation to intra industry studies. 
4.10. The profitability of industry leaders in U. S. manufacturing may be positively related to 
concentration; the profitability of firms with small market shares is not. (ibid. p983) 
4.11. In samples of U. S. firms or business units that include many industries, market share is 
strongly correlated with profitability; the coefficient of concentration is generally negative or 
insignificant in regressions including market share. (ibid. p984) 
4.12. Within particular manufacturing industries, profitability is not generally strongly related to 
market share. (ibid. p984) 
4.13. The estimated effect of market share on profitability in U. S. manufacturing industries is 
positively related to the industry advertising sales ratio. (ibid. p985) 
It is worth emphasising at this stage that the main theoretical focus for the previous 'facts' was the 
debate concerning the efficiency/market power explanations for profitability. We are not in this 
paper concerned with such discussions. The debate has, as such academic disputes are wont to, 
disappeared without any effective resolution. The reasons for this would appear to be relatively 
clear. Firstly, there does not appear to be any consensus on an appropriate empirical test for 
distinguishing between the hypotheses, and, indeed, it is severely questionable as to whether such 
a test could exist. Secondly, despite the fact that evidence has been presented that has apparently 
contradicted each of the hypotheses, this has merely led to either a restatement of the hypothesis 
in a way that permits acceptance of the evidence or rejection of the validity of the evidence. In 
short, neither side were learning (or willing to learn) a great deal from the empirical tests and in 
such an environment, academic interest is destined to wane. While those who maintain an interest 
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in such disputes may find the empirical results presented in this chapter to be of interest they are 
not intended for such a purpose. Instead, the aim is the more limited one of reassessing empirical 
regularities or stylised facts within a more sophisticated statistical framework. 
IIIJ. Estimating forms of conjectural elastici 
One of the main empirical foci for analysing intra, industry profitability has been the estimation of 
conjectural elasticities or other versions of conjectural variation terms. We briefly review three 
alternative forms of estimation for these studies and consider their application to our context. All 
centre around the Clarke and Davies (1982) reworking of the Cowling - Waterson (1976) model. 
At the firm level Clarke and Davies reformulate the Cowling and Waterson relation, 
E: cil 
= 
S'(1 + Ai) (1) 
P 17 
where A, 
CQ-' is the standard conjectural variation term as 
Cq7i 
c, ' 
= 
si + ai(I - s) (2) 
P 77 
where a, = 
IQ q, 
is a conjectural elasticity. Implicitly the relation between X and a is given 
a, s) by Ai . One of the difficulties in making such a model empirically workable is that a S, 
is not identifiable without placing strong restrictions on the parameters of the estimated model'O. 
Using the Clarke Davies reformulation Kwoka and Ravenscraft (1986) model a as a function of 
various structural variables permitting it to depend, in turn, on the level of concentration and the 
market shares of the large firms within the relevant industry. 7111ey add various additional 
variables but these are not entered into the specification as explaining (x merely as "control" 
variables that are presumably external to the theoretical specification adopted. Machin and Van 
Reenen (1983) approaching the same theoretical model, respecify the conjectural term as 
a,, (l - s) +. a2, although the theoretical justification for such a formulation is unclear and 
S, Si 
the only change to the estimable model is an implied firm specific intercept term the inclusion of 
which is justified on statistical grounds alone. In the Machin and Van Reenen study all additional 
10 For example, despite placing a structure on oL Kwoka and Ravenscraft still estimate odij rather than (x 
itself. 
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relevant variables, including a lagged dependent variable, are added interactively because al is 
assessed as depending upon them. Kwoka and Ravenscraft consider the possibility that the 
estimated coefficients will vary across firmsl and replicate Porter's finding that advertising 
matters for large firms but not for the follower firms. They also report estimates of interaction 
terms that indicate behaviour more aggressively competitive than Cournot behaviour ((x<O) on the 
part of all firms and especially those follower firms in industries where minimum efficient scale is 
important12. Geroski (1990b) argues that this observation of rivalrous behaviour may be a quirk 
of the Line of Business data used which is drawn from a single year, 1975, which is at an 
unhelpfully turbulent point in the business cycle. Both studies partition the data according to 
(different) industry characteristics and estimate separate results for these. 
III. ii. Empirical tests of the Caves and Porter hypothesis 
The strategic management literature is replete with studies of strategic groups models. See Reger 
and Huff (1993) for a survey of single industry studies. Schmalensee (1985) has examined the 
side issue of how important are industry factors relative to firm specific factors in determining 
profitability. Again within the strategic management literature this has been developed and 
discussed by, inter alia, Rumelt (1991), Cool and Dierickx (1993) and Powell (1996). By 
comparison the economics literature has been relatively silent on these issues. There are 
nevertheless difficulties in attempting to empirically analyse these issues. In principle, in order to 
avoid arbitrarily partitioning the data, detailed information on the firms sufficient to divide them 
into their respective subgroups would be necessary. However, even if this data were available, 
which it is not in this cross industry context, it would be difficult to avoid tautology, as by 
creating subgroups in the image of the theory, or otherwise, one could not 'prove' the validity of, 
or 'falsify, the theory. Caves and Porter (1977, p254) argue that allocation to subgroups will be 
11 Machin and Van Reenen, by estimating a fixed effects model, permit intercepts to vary across firms 
but do not compare otherwise. 
12 The chain of reasoning explaining this result is not completely clear. The implication appears to be 
that small firms suffer from cost disadvantages in industries where minimum cfficicnt scale is high and 
this therefore encourages aggressive behaviour on the part of the firms that operate at suboptimal levels. 
A point of note, which makes the use of minimum cfficient scale problematic, is that the correlation 
between minimum efficient scale and the cost disadvantage of sub optimal output is not necessarily exact 
as illustrated by Scherer et al. (1975). This reasoning also fails to explain why small firms in industries 
with low entry barriers should act in a less competitive manner than those protected by entry barriers. 
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according to the different endowments of the firms and, more importantly, that these endowments 
are distributed at random. Below we argue that this is unlikely to be the case, instead positing a 
much greater role for (some) firrns in choosing their strategic group. The consequence of this 
allocation problem is that some arbitrary partitioning of the data does occur, invariably according 
to the size of the firms. 
From the perspective of this thesis the comparison of firms of different sizes is our major focus 
and we are therefore not too troubled by such an imposition. It should be noted that for a more 
detailed attempt at testing the specific hypothesis it would appear to be preferable to also 
partition the industries according to other factors such as advertising intensity vertical integration 
etc.. However it can be argued within this context that size is a privileged measure for 
differentiating between firms. This derives from a belief that large firms have an advantage over 
small firms arising from their ability to reap economies of scale not just in production but more 
particularly, within the current context, with respect to advertising, research and development or 
the terms of access to capital. Therefore, in the absence of legal restriction or resource monopoly 
we would not expect a large firm13 to choose to locate in a subgroup that did not offer the best 
return. To paraphrase Steindl (1945), large firms can do anything that small firms can do but the 
reverse is not true14. This inability on the part of small firms to reap the benefits that accompany 
increased size therefore represent the fundamental strategic asymmetry which can be privileged 
above others. It can be fiirther argued that this size related asymmetry is likely to more 
pronounced for mobility barriers than for entry barriers precisely because a number of potential 
entrants will be large firms seeking to diversify into a new market and for these firms this 
asymmetry does not exist. To counter this argument, we have to accept the empirical observation 
that in a not insignificant number of industries small firms do out-perform the larger firms. In 
section 11 of chapter I we have outlined some of the potential reasons given, especially in 
Waterson (1989), for this finding. One of these reasons is that there are niche markets that may 
13 Or a firm with considerable access to resources. 
14 Steindl. was building upon the argument known as the "principle of increasing risk" advocated by 
Kalecki (1939; Chapter 4). The basis for such capital market disadvantages faced by small firms has 
been criticiscd by Stigler (1968 Clip 10) but has been extended more recently by Auerbach (1988). 
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only be accessible to small firms or which require specific or local knowledge to exploit. In this 
context, we have to accept that size is not uniquely privileged in providing asymmetry. However, 
we would still maintain that, from an empirical point of view, it is the most important readily 
observable indicator of asymmetric opportunity. 
The main empirical test of the Caves and Porter hypothesis'5 is contained in Porter (1979) which 
investigates 38 US industries for 1963-1965 and examines the correlation between the 
performance of leader and follower groups, where, in this case the leader group is taken to be the 
largest firms with a combined 30% share of the market, and the followers constitute the rest of 
the firms in the industry. The results of the multiple regression results reported by Porter indicate 
important differences in the relative determinants of the performance of the leaders and followers. 
In each case, the measure of performance is the rate of return on equity as the industry data 
source used is the accounting data size classes provided as part of the US IRS data Set16. Ile 
main explanatory variables used by Porter as part of his hypothesis were the four firm and eight 
firm concentration ratios and the relative average market shares of the leader and follower firms 
as measures of market structure. In addition, measures of advertising intensity, minimum efficient 
scale and n-tinimurn capital requirements and combinations of these were included as measures of 
barriers to either entry or mobility. A measure of industry sales growth and dummy variables for 
a regional market or a convenience goods industry were also included. 
Estimation was performed separately for three different level of observation, the industry level, 
leader level and follower level. Concentration emerged as a significant and negative determinant 
for the industry level equations and for the follower equations. The effect of concentration on the 
leader performance is weakly positive but insignificant. The growth rate of industry demand has a 
15 Caves and Porter (1977) p252 list a number of pieces of supporting evidence in footnotes. The only 
other published paper we are aware of that addresses this hypothesis directly is Bradburd and Ross 
(1989). This paper uses the FTC 1975 line of business data to examine the relative distribution of large 
and small firm sales in five digit relative to four digit industries and the relative performance of the 
large and the small firms. 
16 This is the same data set used by Schmalensee (1989b) although Porter merely uses three years of 
data which are averaged, whereas Schmalensee uses a series of years from 1953-1983 to construct his 
data. 
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positive and significant effect upon the performance of the follower firms but has no significant 
effect upon the performance of the leader firms. The overall effect at the industry level is positive 
but poorly determined. 'Me most notable contrast exists for the advertising sales ratio and the 
measures of scale economýies/capital requirements. Advertising intensity measured at the industry 
level had a strong positive effect on the performance of the leader firms, but had a negative albeit 
poorly determined effect on the follower firms. Increasing minirmun efficient scale had a positive 
effect on the performance of the leader firms and a negative but insignificant effect on the 
performance of the follower firms. Capital requirements, measured as the capital required to build 
a plant of minimum efficient scale, was a significant and positive determinant of follower 
performance. Neither of the dummy variables were significant at any reasonable level of 
significance. 
These results are very suggestive of the Caves and Porter hypothesis. It suggests that high 
advertising is something which will tend to benefit the larger firms in an industry. Such 
arguments are consistent to a degree17 with the dual structure arguments made by Sutton (1991). 
The evidence with regard to economies of scale is less clear cut. Minimum efficient scale appear 
to increase leader performance but not follower performance this is consistent with a simple story 
of cost disadvantage from being unable to achieve the required scale economies. By contrast, the 
presence of large capital requirements tends to increase the performance of the follower firms but 
has no effect upon the leader. Such a finding is consistent with an interpretation of capital 
requirements as a barrier to entry which therefore protects the follower firms in the industry as 
imperfections in the capital market restrict the entry of small firms. However, this capital 
requirement is not of benefit to the relatively larger firms, which is consistent with a view that 
such imperfections in the capital market are unlikely to affect potential large scale entrants. 
IV. Empirical testinE of intra industrv Performance usinR panel data 
17 Sutton's arguments largely depend for closure upon the assumption that profits are zero in long run 
equilibrium for all firms, which is inconsistent with observed higher profit performance. 
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Using the information presented within the UK Census of Production, we can create a data set 
which contains both a time series and a cross sectional dimension on industry size classes with 
which a superior econometric analysis of these issues can be examined. There are two major 
econometric problems which arise with the tests we have discussed in the previous section. Both 
arise from the cross section nature of the data set available. In this section, we discuss these 
difficulties and consider the additional econometric consequences of using panel data to attempt 
to understand these relations. 
The first criticism that can be made of cross sectional work is that observations of variables in 
any particular year may not be equilibrium observations, yet the hypotheses being tested imply 
that the data are generated by a long run equilibrium relationship. The conventional solution to 
this problem following on from the early studies of Bain (1951,1956) was to average data over a 
period of years (5 years in Bain, 1951) in order to establish an average relationship on the 
assumption that disequilibrium observations will tend to even themselves out over that period. 
More specifically, the key requirement from a statistical point of view is that "deviations from 
long run equilibrium must be uncoffelated with the independent variables employed" 
(Schmalensee, 1989a; p953). 
This approach has received specific theoretical justification from Pesaran and Smith (1995) who 
consider the problem of estimating the long run relationship when there is parameter 
heterogeneity across units of observations and Mairesse (1990) who considers the possibility of 
errors in variables. A priori, we cannot rule out either of these possibilities in our data set. 
Pesaran and Smith suggest that in data sets where both N and T are of a reasonable size" there 
are four types of estimation that can be used to estimate the long run relationship. The first is to 
pool the data into a panel for estimation purposes, the second is to aggregate the data and 
estimate an aggregate long run time series relationship, the third method involves estimating time 
series relationship for each of the n observations and averaging the coefficients, the final method 
18 Specifically they impose the inexact requirement that T is large enough to run "scnsible" regressions 
for each unit (firm /industry). 
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is to average over time and estimate a quasi cross section relationship. The second and third 
methods are not open to us as, with a maximum of 13 annual observations, 'sensible' time series 
estimation cannot be considered. Ile question reduces, in this instance, as to whether it is better 
to estimate a pooled regression making use of both the time series and cross section information 
or to estimate a cross section regression. There are clear difficulties in the adoption of the latter 
approach when interested in aggregate effects that vary over time because these are lost from the 
analysis. However, Pesaran and Smith indicate that the cross section approach is under certain 
assumptions19 robust to dynamic mispecification, whereas the pooled estimates are subject to 
potentially serious biases if there is either heterogeneity of the coefficients on lags of the 
dependent variable across groups, or the exogenous variables are autoregressive processes and 
have heterogeneous coefficients. Since neither can be ruled out a priori, such possibilities must 
be taken into account. 
Mairesse (1990) argues that, if variables are measured with error, cross section estimation on 
data averaged over time will minimise the effect of random errors producing consistent estimates, 
whereas estimates based upon first differences will amplify such errors leading estimates to be 
poorly determined and potentially biased towards zero. Mairesse also gives backing to a short 
run/long run ("transitory effects"/"permanent effects") interpretation of the difference between the 
within group and between group estimates respectively. 
The main alternative approach to estimating long run relationships that has been developed is 
Pesaran and Smith's first method, i. e. making use instead of both the cross section and time series 
properties of data to explicitly model adjustment to disequilibrium as an autoregressive 
distributed lag process from which long run relationships can be inferred. In the US, the data 
from the size class analyses is only available infrequently", therefore it is not possible to exploit 
19 The key assumptions are that the coefficients and the regressors are independent and the regressors 
are strictly cxogenous. 
20 This largely arises from the fact that the US census of manufactures is only published every five 
years. Therefore while the IRS size class analyses of accounting data arc published annually the industry 
level data necessary to test some of the relevant hypotheses only exhibit time series variation every five 
years. 
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such time series aspects of the relationship. While for Porter (1979) some of the measures of the 
variables used in the empirical analysis are averaged over two or three years in order to minimise 
the distortion of disequilibrium observations, for other variables only a single year's observation 
is available for each industry. By building up a panel of observations on intra industry 
performance for the UK, we are able to exploit the time series aspects of the relationship to 
directly estimate long run relationships. 
The second aspect of the criticism of the cross sectional nature of the studies relates to 
niispecification of the empirical relationship. The statistical indicator of this mispecification is the 
correlation between the independent variables and the error term. This mispecification can be 
decomposed into two eleme nts. The first is explored by Schmalensee (1989a; p954-5) in 
suggesting that many of the variables must be regarded as endogenous in the usual heuristic 
sense2l of being variables directly or indirectly determined by the strategic choices of the firms in 
the industry hence determined within the theoretical system. In addition, by reflecting on the short 
run nature of the decision making process we must also include as endogenous those variables 
which do not satisfy the statistical criteria of weak exogeneity (see Hendry (1995; p 1624)), for 
example, as a result of the dependence of the decision making process, upon the expected rather 
than the realised value of one of the independent variables. Within the context of a cross sectional 
estimation framework, Schmalensee denies the possibility of the existence of relevant 
contemporaneous exogenous variables that would enable unbiased estimation of these kind of 
relationships to be performed, as he puts it "in general there are no theoretically exogenous 
variables that can be used as instruments to identify and estimate any structural equation" 
(Schmalensee (1989a; p954)). However in permitting the exploitation of time series aspects of 
data sets it is suggested that appropriate instruments: can be found. Even here Schmalensee 
qualifies his argument suggesting that "panel data .... can yield consistent structural estimates ifan 
explicit model ofdisequilibrium behaviour is employed. " (ibid; p956, emphasis added). Without 
further elaboration, which Schmalensee does not give, this statement is slightly ambiguous. It is 
21 Using the Koopmans (1950) definition of exogencity "A variable is cxogenous if it is determined 
outside the system under analysis" cited in Hendry (1995, p157) 
129 
unclear whether the criticism refers to the practice of estimating static relationships with panel 
data thereby merely exploiting the increased degrees of freedom and making use of the 
availability of lagged values for the instrument matrix, in which case the model does not contain 
any disequilibriurn framework. If this is the limit of the criticism we can accept it, such models 
address the second problem of finding appropriate instruments but do not address the initial 
problem of correlation between the extent of disequilibrium, and the independent variables. 
However, if Schmalensee is going fiirther and suggesting that a specific form of equilibrium 
adjustment needs to be explicitly specified prior to estimation we would have to disagree. It seems 
unlikely that we are going to be able to specify a priori that firms adopt any specific process of 
adjustment or equilibrium correction with any satisfactory degree of confidence. In fact, such an 
assumption is unnecessary because with the exception of formulations that predict highly non- 
linear relationships between variables, many such formulations are readily reducible to restricted 
forms of autoregressive distributed lag modelS22. Imposing an a priori restriction is unlikely to be 
warranted in most cases. 
A fiirther and closely related aspect of the use of cross section data that needs to be considered is 
the inevitable omission of industry or firm specific factors which cannot be directly observed. 
Such factors when applied to the intra industry case presented here would include, by way of 
example, the degree of tightness of co-ordination between the dominant group within the industry 
which can only be imperfectly measured through observable structural variables and which are, 
at very least, likely to be partially determined by intrinsically unobservable elements such as 
industry norms and customs and the degree of trust and communication built up over time 
between members of the dominant group. If such unobservables are correlated with the included 
independent variables their omission will lead to bias in the point estimates on these right hand 
side vafiables. 'nerefore if, as seems plausible from both a heuristic and a statistical standpoint 
in this particular context, such unobservables are not randomly distributed across industries but 
are correlated with the observable structural variables of interest, a fixed effects approach to 
22 See Hendry (1995) Chapter 7 for an account of some of the commonly used restricted forms and their 
relation to the autoregressive distributed lag model. 
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estimation exploiting the time series characteristics of a panel is necessary to eliminate the bias 
that results. 
V. Alternative specirications of intra industry verformance relations 
In tWs section we will develop the empirical specifications that we will use to analyse the various 
approaches taken to study intra industry perfonnance. 
If we initially turn to the dominant firm competitive fringe model, this suggests that there are 
separate determinants of the performance of the fringe and the dominant groups and explicit 
relations describing these can be found. Following Saving (1970) we can determine the 
equilibrium relation for the Lerner index of the dominant firms as 
P-C = 
Ck 
(3) 
P 17. +0 - 
Ck) 6R 
where Ck is the k firm concentration ratio and the dominant group is made up of k firms. 17. is 
the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of the industry demand curve and eR is the elasticity of 
supply of the fringe firms. As has been suggested earlier, this elasticity may depend upon the 
competitive stance adopted by the fringe firms. The less competitive the stance and the steeper the 
joint marginal cost curve of the fringe, the lower will be this elasticity. In principle, the Lerner 
index of the ffinge firms should be equal to zero if they are fully competitive. In practice, because 
measurement of the Lerner index usually relies upon the difference between price and average 
variable cost rather than marginal cost, the measured Lerner index will not be zero. In the case of 
1 
the cost functions considered in Chapter 223 the fringe price cost margin is equal to 2 eR . 
The 
Lerner index of the fringe firms therefore depends upon the nature of the marginal cost function 
as well as the competitive stance. Any factor that increases the elasticity of supply reduces die 
price cost margin. 
Relation (3) is entirely static in conception but Encaoua and Jacquernin (1980) have extended the 
framework to a dynamic analysis where expenditures on the part of the dominant groups limit the 
23 See equations I and 13 from chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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scale of entry. Their prediction from this point of view is unusual as they predict that while a 
greater responsiveness of the fringe to such expenditures (limiting their scale of entry to a greater 
extent) increases the degree of monopoly power for the dominant firms, the advertising sales ratio 
itself will be inversely related to the degree of market power. One of the reasons for this 
prediction, which runs counter to most predictions in relation to advertising intensity24' is their 
assumption that such expenditures only serve to reduce the flow of entry and do not affect the 
price that can be charged. Non price competition will tend to increase the price being charged 
which will actually increase the supply of the small firms unless the mobility or entry barrier 
form of advertising dominates. In the Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) taxonomy, if there is no 
mobility barrier such advertising constitutes a fat cat strategy within this context, if it creates a 
mobility barrier advertising is likely to constitute a top dog strategy. It is therefore not possible to 
determine a ptiori the effect of advertising either on the fringe or the dominant group. The 
Encaoua and Jacquemin characterisation of the long run equilibrium is almost identical to (1) the 
difference being that eR must be interpreted as a discounted intertemporal elasticity of supply. 
From an empirical point of view, both Saving and Encaoua and Jacquemin predict that the Lerner 
index of the don-dnant group will be positively (if non-linearly) related to the concentration ratio 
and negatively related to the industry price elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply of the 
fiinge. 'Me effect of advertising intensity, whilst strictly predicted to have a negative effect within 
their framework, can work both ways in a less restrictive ftamework. More generally, because the 
elasticities are not observed and are unobservable we are forced into observing them through their 
potential determinants. Therefore, any factors that can plausibly effect either of these elasticities 
are candidates for inclusion in an empirical specification that attempts to discover the 
determinants of performance. 
Porter's study examines relations of the form 
7r. = fl ,V (CoticNESAIS, CapGrow, etc. ) 
24 The prediction is consistent with the Austrian school view of advertising as, for example, expounded 
in Kirzncr (1973; Chapter 4) although the intuition is very different. 
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where ; rij are the measured profits of size group i in industry j. Conc is a measure of industry 
concentration, MES is a measure of Minimum efficient scale, A/S is the industry level advertising 
sales ratio, Cap is a measure of absolute capital requirements, Grow is the growth rate of 
industry sales. No specific functional form is suggested and no explicit theoretical framework 
from which such a functional form could potentially be derived is posited. All of the variables can 
be approximated to some degree within our data set. 
With respect to MES, the Porter measure is derived by attempting to observe the median firm size 
using the size class analyses. While this measure has been relatively widely used within published 
studies, it is nevertheless arbitrary in design and has the relatively unsatisfactory implication that 
half of firms producing within every industry operate at inefficient output levels. Our measure of 
minimum efficient scale is simply the mean size in terms of sales of the firms in the smallest size 
class. As the UK census of production contains fewer size classes than the US data identifying 
the median firm is a more complicated task for the UK. Since the size distribution is skewed 
towards the smaller firms, it is likely that in a majority of cases the median firm would be in the 
smallest size class band, it would appear more consistent to apply this mean size in all cases. The 
mean size of the firms in the smallest size class represents the extent of size related barriers to 
entry into the industry faced by small firms. Within the Caves and Porter theoretical fi-amework 
entry barriers to the industry per se may be relatively low although entry into the dominant group 
are likely to be more significant. This is in keeping with the general impression given by the 
Scherer's studies (esp. Scherer et aL 1975) that the size of minimum efficient scale of production 
relative to market size generated from engineering -estimates is relatively small and the cost 
disadvantage from operating at levels substantially below minimum efficient scale is similarly 
low for many industries. Therefore, measures of minimum efficient scale are much more likely to 
represent obstacles to small entrants than large scale entry. 
The Porter measure of capital requirements is simply obtained by multiplying the estimate of 
MES by the industry capital sales ratio. Capital stock figures are not available for the industries 
covered by the UK Census of Production and therefore we have to improvise an alternative. For 
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this we use the average value of net capital expenditure for the smallest firms. For such a 
measure to approximate the capital requirements of entry requires the additional strong 
assumption that depreciation rates are constant across industries. We are relatively unhappy 
about having to make this rather unrealistic assumption but in the absence of better data there 
appears to be little alternative25. 
The measures of advertising intensity and industry growth are at the industry level. In Porter's 
analysis, an attempt is made to discriminate between the advertising expenditures of the small and 
large firms, but this proves unsuccessful. Tl-ýs is probably due to the existence of economies of 
scale in advertising which imply that while the size of dominant firms may increase, the 
advertising expenditures required in order to maintain that dominance do not increase in 
proportion. An analogous criticism is made in Schmalensee (1992) of the argument put forward 
by Sutton (1991) that as an industry (in which advertising expenditures are endogenous) 
increases in size so advertising expenditures must similarly increase in order to prevent entry. In 
practice, the important distinction both in Sutton's and Porter's work appears to be between 
industries in which advertising is intensive and industries in which it is limited. The industry level 
measures of advertising intensity and industry growth used here have been described in the data 
appendix to chapter 3 of this thesis. 
We can therefore provide by means of comparison with the Porter results four different forms of 
estimation. Initially we estimate a cross section OLS regression using the data on the relevant 
variables averaged for the years 1984-1992 for purposes of comparison as this most nearly 
approximates the method Porter uses for generating results. Secondly, we can include a dynamic 
adjustment parameter within the cross section framework following Pesaran and Smith (1995; 
p88) that potentially controls for disequilibrium. Thirdly, we can further obtain long run 
estimates of the effects of the relevant variables by estimating a transformed distributed lag 
25 We can comfort ourselves slightly by noting that Porter's proxy for capital requirements requires that 
we make the assumption that the median fi rm has a capital sales ratio equal to the industry capital sales 
ratio. Given the wide empirically observed differences in capital sales ratios between large and small 
firms (see for example Caves and Pugel 1980) this assumption seems equally lacking in realism. 
Unfortunately two bad proxies do not make a good one. 
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model. Finally, we can make use of the Arrellano and Bond (1988,1991) estimator for dynamic 
fixed effects models to control for the potential ornission of unobservables. 
Previous studies, both theoretical and empirical, while giving directions for analysis are not 
conclusive in providing empirical specifications for the analysis of intra. industry performance. 
Neither in the case of choosing the appropriate variables for inclusion nor in the conversion of 
theoretical equilibrium relations into empirical estimating equations do we have any clear prior 
knowledge that we can be confident about. If we are therefore to analyse these issues empirically 
we are forced unwillingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, into a form of ad hoc exposition26. 
VI. Analysis of Intra industry performance in UK Manufacturing 
Elementary descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 1-3. As a guide to interpretation we have 
used the following terminology for partitioning the industry: the "large" firms are the 5 largest 
firms in an industry taken as a group; the "fringe" firms are all the firms in the industry save this 
largest 5; the "small" firms are the firms with 1-99 employees, the smallest size category 
available within the UK census of production. In a small number of industries, the fringe consists 
entirely of small firms but in the majority of cases the fringe includes, in addition to the small 
firms, firms with more than 99 employees. Following from this discussion of the discontinuity in 
the data between 1983 and 1984 contained in Chapter 1, all estimation and summary statistics are 
for the period 1984-1992. 
Without resorting to estimation we can initially segregate industries in terms of the relative 
performance of the large and small firms and this proves instructive in confirming basic intuitions 
concerning the potential existence of strategic groups. In the upper quartile of industrieS27 when 
assessed in terms of the relative performance of large and small firms are 8 of the industries in the 
"food, drink and tobacco" sector and 4 industries centred around pharmaceuticals, man made 
26 The merits and demerits of this ad hocery are an ongoing question for industrial economics and are 
discussed further in Chapter 6. 
27 The upper quartile is marked by relative performance of large firms that is at least 17% greater than 
for small firms. 
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fibres and other specialised chemicals. In the latter case these industries are prominent in the UK 
for intensive research and development activity, in the former case Sutton (199 1) has argued for a 
strong role for advertising in determining the structure of the industry. Indeed, both of these 
sectors are also heavily represented in the upper quartile of our measure of advertising intensity28. 
Therefore from this rough assessment non price competition elements would appear to be 
important in determining relative performance. By way of contrast, industries in the lowest 
quartile" are dominated by the metalworking, mechanical and electrical engineering and, with the 
exception of motor vehicles, transport sectors. 
Table I indicates that there is a closer correlation between the price cost margins of the different 
industry subgroups than between the two definitions of price cost margin". It is also clear, and 
unsurprising given the overlapping definition, that the fringe and small firm price cost margins 
are more highly correlated (greater than 0.95) than either is correlated with the large firms price 
cost margins. Between price cost margins of the same definition all of the correlation coefficients 
are greater than 0.75. From Table 2 we can see that with the exception of the concentration ratio 
and the measures of minimum efficient scale, the correlations between the independent variables 
are relatively low which at least points to reduced worry concerning collinearity between variable 
that could lead to potentially n-dsleading estimation results. Table 3 presents the means and 
standard deviations of the relevant variables for the period 1984-1992. 
VI. i. Analysis of the cross section (between industEy) variation 
The first estimation is simply an attempt to replicate the cross section results of Porter (1979) 
with our data set. As there are differences in variable definition between that study and this as 
28 This is also somewhat reassuring from the point of view that our measure of advertising is a fairly 
rough proxy. A fuller descfiption of the industry distribution according to our measure of advertising 
intensity is contained in the data appendix to this Chapter. 
29 The lower quartile is marked by relative performance of small firms that is at least 6% greater than 
for large firms. 
30 The two definitions are as used in Chapter 3. The standard margins is defined as (net output - 
operative wages)/ gross output. The alternative margin has the same numerator but net output in the 
denominator. We have argued in Chapter 3 that it is more appropriate in empirical analysis to use the 
conventional margin and correct for vertical integration in other ways. Results for the net output 
denominator price cost margin are reported for purposes of comparison. 
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well as differences in the industry make up of the samples we would not expect too close a 
correlation between that study and the analysis presented here, but it is instructive to observe and 
following the Pesaran and Smith (1995) argument that this presents a potentially relatively robust 
means of obtaining estimates of the long run parameters. The results for this is presented in Table 
4. Separate estimates are presented for the large, fringe and small firm sub-samples. In each case 
three different specifications are reported. Initially, the conventional measure of the price cost 
margin using gross output as the denominator is used as the measure of performance but 
following the argument in Chapter 3 correction is made for the ratio of material inputs to sales. 
Secondly, estimation in the absence of such a correction was employed. Thirdly, the adjusted 
margin using net output as the denominator was used. In addition to the reported estimates, an 
additional adjustment variable to potentially correct for dynamic specification was included. This 
variable was never significant at the 5% level and as Pesaran and Smith (1995) argue that results 
omitting this adjustment variable can be robust we do not report these results in detail. 
In terms of an overview of the results presented in Table 4, the results for the fringe and the small 
firms are sufficiently similar that they can be considered together. Given the overlap in 
observation and the previously mentioned high correlation this should not be surprising and we 
will not discuss the two separately. Additionally, it is clear that the results differ substantially 
depending on whether or not differences in vertical integration are controlled for and we therefore 
discuss these results separately. The only clearly consistent result is that advertising intensity has 
a positive well determined effect on price cost margins for all industry subgroups and regardless 
of the measure/correction used. The effect is still clearly positive for the ffinge or small firms 
although the estimated coefficients are marginally lower for these subgroups. The estimated effect 
of advertising is much greater without a correction for vertical integration. 
Looking initially at the results with a correction, the effect of the other variables is less uniform. 
Large firms' price cost margins are positively and significantly related to concentration, an 
expected result given that concentration is the combined market share of these firms. For the 
small/fringe firms, concentration is not significantly different from zero in any situation, in 
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addition, the market share of small firms has no effect on their own or large firm price cost 
margins, the former at least being contrary to expectation. The MES and Capital requirements 
control variables are again not consistent with expectations. MES has a significant negative effect 
on large firm price cost margins and a negative yet poorly determined effect on the fringe/small 
firms. This result is replicated using the alternative measure of MES although these estimations 
are not reported. By contrast capital requirements has no effect on the margins of any of the 
subgroups. The only other result is that for all subgroups the mean industry growth rate has a 
positive effect on price cost margins but this effect is of a larger magnitude and is only significant 
for the large firms. 
Turning to those results that do not control for vertical integration. With the exception of 
advertising intensity the only well determined coefficients are capital requirements which enter 
negatively, and market share of the small firms which also has a negative effect, but only on the 
small/fringe firms. In both cases the negative effect is contrary to expectation. Concentration has 
a poorly determined negative coefficient as should not be surprising given the focus of Chapter 3. 
In general, it would appear there are two points that can be drawn from these results. Firstly, 
small firms do appear to benefit from being in an advertising intensive industry contrary to 
Porter's results but do not benefit from being in a concentrated industry, a result consistent with 
Porter's results. Secondly, the similarities between the results would appear to be greater than the 
differences. We can investigate this more clearly using direct tests by pooling the data or using 
measure of relative performance. This is investigated in the results in Table 5. 
Before we move on to discuss these comparative results it is necessary to consider a relevant 
point concerning the usefulness of analysing small firm data. It could be argued that the 
information on small firms may be little more than white noise because of the difficulties 
associated with collection of data on the smallest firms. Examining the F tests in Table 4 refutes 
this argument because in each case the coefficients are jointly significant at the 1% level. 
Therefore we can conclude that the information on small firms is not simply white noise. 
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Establishing this is important for the results which follow, because if the information on small 
firms was simply white noise with a relatively high variance it would be impossible to establish 
whether the determinant of small firm performance are different from large firm performance3l. 
This second question is addressed in the results presented in Table 5. This presents the results of 
estimates of the following relations, 
PCAdý, =X'j6+DX'F+ui. (4) 
PMCic is the price cost margin of size class c in industry i, X is a matrix of independent variables 
including a column of ones, P and r are vectors of coefficients and D is a dummy variable 
transformation with zeros for the large firm size class and ones for the small/fiinge size class. 
The test for differences between the determinant of large and small firm performance is therefore 
a joint test of the parameters in r. Alternatively following the empirical approach adopted by 
Kwoka and Ravenscraft and Machin and Van Reenen we can combine all size classes into a 
common sample and make use of interactive terms with the mean market share of the size classes. 
Pcm =m ,, sA + x,, fl+ ms,,, x, r + u,, 
(5) 
This allows us to interpret the estimates as unrestricted forms of the specifications, discussed in 
section IIIJ. above, used to estimate conjectural variation elasticities. The third approach involves 
straightforward estimation of the linear model implied in Table 4 but modifies the dependent 
variable creating a relative performance measure (PCMil/PCMis) thereby approaching the 
question from a different but related direction. 
Table 5 reports the results of these estimations. The results for fringe firms as before do not add 
anything to the results for small firms and therefore only the latter are reported. In the attempt to 
separate out significant differences in the determinants of performance from (4), in none of the 
cases is the joint test of the r parameters significant and indeed none are individually significant. 
Therefore, we must conclude that using this framework we cannot detect significant differences. 
This would argue against the validity of an intra industry split and in favour of an industry level 
31 It would in this case of course be impossible to establish anything with precision about the 
performance of small firms. 
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approach. Similarly a joint test of PO+F is never significant indicating that the effect of market 
share as a determinant of performance within this sample is negligible. Again the industry effects 
are more important determinants of performance. 
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Wii. Analysis of the pooled sample 
Turning to the pooled estimates we have to make use of a dynamic specification for the analysis. 
As suggested earlier an autoregressive distributed lag model imposes the least restrictions upon 
the specification and therefore it was adopted as a way of modelling the data. The implications of 
a dynamic specification in a fixed effects panel data model requires estimation using first 
differenced instrumental variables. At this we must raise the problem of the interpretation of such 
a relationship. Instead of viewing this as a way of estimating a relationship with fixed effects 
removed, we could alternatively view it as an estimation procedure that identifies a short run 
relationship between variables, i. e. simply a differenced data framework, see Hendry (1995). This 
makes a problematic interpretation of the results. We cannot directly infer that this is a long run 
relationship at all in the absence of fixed effects. Baltagi and Griffin (1984, p643) conclude that 
"the within estimator offers a good estimator of the short ran effects but can severely 
underestimate the long run response. " We must therefore bear this in mind when interpreting the 
first difference estimates. 
Table 7 reports the results of the first difference estimation of the relationship. Table 8 gives 
separate estimates for producer and consumer goods industries. Table 9 gives the results of the 
pooled estimates for the relative performance of large and small firms. Relative to the cross 
section estimates we drop the capital requirements measure from the specification. While the 
mean over time of investment per firm may be a reasonable proxy for capital requirements at the 
cross sectional level, the time varying behaviour of investment per firm cannot be expected to 
perform the same function. 
Initial estimates used an Autoregressive Distributed Lag ADL(2,2) representation of the data, 
however, joint tests of the significance of the variables dated t-2 were in all cases rejected. 
However, Baltagi and Griffin (1984,642-3) note the weak power of mispecification tests aimed 
at determining the appropriate length of lag structure in pooled models and therefore some 
caution has to be exercised. Adopting an ADL(l, l) framework and using the net output 
denominator margin, joint tests of the variables dated t-1 were only uniformly significant at the 
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10% level but were significant at the I% level for the gross output margin with the inputs to sales 
ratio on the right hand side. Dropping the variables dated t-I led to a failure of the Sargan 
statistics for each of the models, indicating model mispecification, and in the case of the net 
output denominator margin led to a failure of the tests for second order serial correlation, 
reinforcing the conclusion of mispecification at that level. We focus, therefore, on the ADL(l, l) 
estimates as the appropriate dynamic specification. Separate estimates were made for the net 
output margin and the gross output margin with input/sales ratio on the fight hand side. Columns 
(1), (2) and (3) are estimates for the large firms, (4), (5) and (6) for the small firms. Estimates for 
the fringe firms were made but were sufficiently similar to the small firms estimates that they are 
not reported separately. In each case the estimates are free from second order serial correlation. 
Yearly dummy variables are included and are in each case jointly significant. 
The first aspect to be considered is the degree of persistence of the performance measures, 
indicating the pace at which any adjustments to disequilibriurn are made. In general, estimates of 
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable are relatively low compared with previous 
estimates using firm and industry data in the UK. Studies such as Machin and Van Reenen 
(1993), Haskel and Martin (1994) and Geroski, Machin and Van Reenen (1993) all report 
coefficients in a first differenced framework between 0.4 and 0.532, although there is evidence 
that they display heterogeneity across firms: and industry sectors. The estimates in colurnris (1) 
and (4) of Table 7, where the inputs to sales ratio and lagged dependent variable are instrumented 
but the other independent variables are treated as exogenous, our estimates are in a similar range 
for the large firms (0.468) and slightly lower for the small firms (0.388). If small firms: are 
subject to a greater degree of competition than large firms we may expect their performance to be 
less persistent and therefore the coefficient to be lower. However, when the other right hand side 
variables are instrumented, significant estimates of the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable ranged between 0.2 and 0.3 but in a number of cases were lower than this and 
imprecisely determined. When separating out the sample into consumer and producer goods 
industries, only in the case of large firms in producer goods industries is there a significant 
32 Haskcl and Martin (1992) report estimates more comparable %%ith those reported here. 
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persistence effect. It may be the case that incorporating lagged effects of the right hand side 
variables, effects that are largely excluded from the previous UK studies, captures some of the 
persistence effects that might otherwise show up in the lagged dependent variables. In these latter 
estimates, we cannot identify with any degree of confidence differences between the degree of 
persistence of performance of large and small firms, confirming the general finding of the 
persistence of profits literature (see Mueller (ed. ), 1990). 
With respect to the right hand side variables, the most striking difference between the pooled and 
the cross section estimates is the lack of effect of advertising in the pooled estimateS33. The 
coefficients on advertising are frequently negative, especially for the small firms, and most 
commonly insignificant. There are two aspects that have to be considered in interpreting this 
result. Firstly, advertising may well be conceived of as a fixed effect leading to product 
differentiation and indicating differences between industries. However, in the short run, bouts of 
advertising competition may reduce price cost margins for the competing firms. The short run 
effect may therefore dominate in the pooled estimates. The second possibility that has to be 
considered is measurement error. We have acknowledged that our measure of advertising 
intensity is a proxy that contains other information. Griliches and Hausman (1986) argue that the 
within estimates, in the context of measurement error, can accentuate the noise component of the 
measurement error and that this will both magnify the variability of estimates and bias the 
coefficient towards zero. This can account for the fact that the estimates are relatively poorly 
determined but unless the measurement error is of a sufficiently systematic nature it cannot 
account for the negative coefficient estimates. In addition, if there is measurement error in the 
advertising intensity variable instruments dated t-2 are no longer valid and instruments dated t-3 
or further back must be used. However, the use of such instruments, in estimations not reported, 
had a negligible impact on the previously estimated coefficients on the advertising intensity 
variable. Therefore, we would prefer to interpret the advertising intensity relationship as a 
correctly (albeit imprecisely) determined short run effect. 
33 This finding is reported but passes without comment in Dornowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1987). 
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The estimates of the effects of the growth rate of industry sales are in most cases positive but are 
not all well defined and coefficient estimates are much smaller than the cross section estimates. 
'Me magnitude of the coefficients in the aggregate estimations are similar for small and large 
firms. When we separate into producer and consumer goods samples in Table 8, it is only for 
producer goods that there is a significant positive effect. The estimates for consumer goods are 
small and poorly determined. There is a tradition for assuming that the prices of producer goods 
may be more responsive to demand conditions because of steeper marginal cost schedules (see 
Kalecki (1939)) and our finding is consistent with that. From Table 9 we can see that for 
producer goods, the growth rate of industry sales tends to reduce the performance of large firms 
relative to small firms again contradicting the cross section results where the reverse is true. 
With respect to the structural variables, contemporaneous concentration has a positive effect on 
the price cost margin of small firms and a negative effect on the price cost margin of small firms, 
This effect is more pronounced for producer goods industries. The lagged concentration term has 
the opposite effect lowering large firm price cost margins and raising small firm margins. The net 
effect is uniformly positive for large firms, and is normally, though not exclusively, negative for 
small firms. The positive impact effect on large firm price cost margins is to be expected given 
that rising concentration implies rising market shares for these large firms. The lagged effect 
implies that not all of the initial impact may be long lived however. Increases in market share may 
bring temporary benefits but these effects are overstated if the changes in market share do not 
significantly influence the other elements of structure or conduct of the other firms in the 
industry. 'Me implied long run effects are of similar magnitude to the cross section effect on large 
firms. The rationale for the effect of concentration on small firms is less clear. The cross section 
estimates are positive but are not well determined. A negative coefficient may result because the 
increased market share of the large firms conditional on the market share of the mean market 
share of the small firms implies that some of the small firms may have left the industry to make 
way for the large firms. Therefore, increases in concentration may be coincident with pressure on 
the ability of small firms to survive. Again not all of the effect may be long lived if the normal 
pattern of conduct/per-formance of the industry is resumed fairly quickly. 
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With respect of the average market share of the small firms, the net effect is uniformly positive 
but with some evidence that the impact effect of contemporaneous changes in market share is 
offset by subsequent readjustments. This again contradicts the negative coefficients in the cross 
section estimation. In the estimates for all manufacturing it is noticeable that both the large and 
small firms benefit from a situation of larger small firms in the industry and the magnitude of the 
effect is greater for the large firms. However, it is noticeable that the size of the effect of market 
share on small firms is substantially greater in consumer goods industries than in producer goods 
industries. Indeed, the net effect of changes in market share in producer goods is negligibly small 
for small firms. This contradiction is made even more stark in Table 9 where it can be seen that 
increases in the market share of the small firms decrease the performance gap between large and 
small firms for consumer goods and increase the gap for producer goods. Minimum efficient scale 
has a positive effect on the performance of large firms in producer goods industries as may be 
expected if size and production costs matter to a greater extent in these industries, but the effect is 
negative otherwise. 
In general there is sufficient differences of magnitude and sign of the coefficients between cross 
section and first difference estimates to indicate that they are not necessarily measuring the same 
phenomena, i. e. the long run effects of the variables. Following from the discussion in section W 
above, we accept the cross section estimates as the 'true' long run and interpret the first 
difference estimates as a description of the short run relationships between the variables. In most 
cases, this is not problematic for our interpretation of intra industry performance. We can view 
that, in the long run, factors such as concentration and advertising intensity help to determine the 
framework within which prices are set, feeding through into performance. However, we can also 
learn something about the way in which short run changes in concentration and advertising 
intensity affect the short run outcome from the pre-existing framework and may have longer lived 
cffects as the framework adjusts over time. 
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VII Conclusion 
In conclusion we can usefully separate out the cross sectional results from the pooled estimate 
results. These estimates of the long run performance of the large and small firm sectors are 
interpreted as the degree of immunity of these sectors from competitive pressures especially in the 
form of entry pressures either into the industry or into the relevant strategic group. The results 
confirm that the main observable determinant of this long run performance is advertising intensity 
and that this is a quantitatively more important factor for the larger firms than the smaller firms. 
The share of the large firms in the industry is the other key determinant of the relative long run 
performance of the large and small firms. The other potential determinants do not appear in this 
data set to be important measures of long ran performance. 
Examining the pooled first difference estimates we can see that the disappearance of the effect of 
advertising intensity effect in these estimates is evidence, following the argument of Mundlak 
(1978), of the correlation of the fixed effects with advertising intensity. The results of the Pooled 
estimates do not point to any consistent determinants of performance and indeed point to 
important differences in performance between sub sections of manufacturing industry. The short 
run performance of consumer goods industries does not appear to be readily explainable in terms 
of the structural variables used. There is greater success in this endeavour in relation to producer 
goods industries indicating that the share of the small and large firm groups and the growth rate 
of the industry are all important in determining short run intra industry performance. These 
results indicate that for producer goods industries, at least, it is true to say that short run 
performance of the groups is affected by the relative strengths of the small and large firm groups. 
We can use these results to readdress the stylised facts suggested by Schmalensce (1989a) and 
considered in section III above. We can provide evidence in favour of the long run validity of 
4.10 in our sample. Large firnis benefit unambiguously from high concentration but small firms 
receive weak positive benefit when assessed in cross section and the impact is broadly negative in 
first differences. We can also provide some support for the assertion in 4.11 that in cross industry 
sample. market share has a positive impact on performance in the short run, but in the long run, 
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small firms do not, in our sample, benefit from higher market shares, the effect in cross section 
being small but negative. 4.12 states that within industries profitability is not strongly related to 
market share. Our test on relative performance indicate that this is not true with respect to 
producer goods industries where increasing market shares for the small firms reduces the 
performance gap and increasing market shares for large firms increases the gap. For consumer 
goods industries we must accept that no such relationsl-ýp exists. 
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Table 1: Correlations between Price Cost Margins (1984-1992) 
I lpam fpcm spcm lpcinl fpcml spcml 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
lpc--ml 1.0000 
fpaml 0.7387 1.0000 
pcrni 0.6891 0.9091 1.0000 
lpcmll 0.5125 0.2390 0.2010 1.0000 
fpcmll 0.3681 0.4056 0.3304 0.7323 1.0000 
spcmll 0.3124 0.2931 0.3276 0.7104 0.9027 1.0000 
Table 2: Correlations between Independent Variables (1984-1992). 
I conc 
----------------- 
concl 1.0000 
mesl 0.6769 
MS1 0.1923 
adintl 0.1866 
growl -0.0875 
capl 0.1712 
ines 
1.0000 
0.4463 
0.1429 
-0.0715 
0.0941 
ms 
1.0000 
-0.0752 
-0.1047 
0.0247 
adint grow cap 
----------------------- 
1.0000 
-0.0622 1.0000 
0.1261 -0.0186 1.0000 
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations (1984-1992) 
Variable Mean (Standard Deviation) 
spcm 0.306(0.084) 
spcml 0.706(0.085) 
fpcm 0.310(0.088) 
fpcml 0.714(0.091) 
lpcm 0.325(0.109) 
lpcml 0.718(0.113) 
conc 0.446(0.226) 
mes 0.728(0.678) 
ms 0.011(0.027) 
adint 0.149(0.063) 
gr 0.047(0.099) 
cap 0.336(l. 162) 
All variables are as defined in the Data Appendix to this Chapter. 
147 
E-4 
E-4 
w 
M z 
0 
u 
E-4 
)D 
3% 
14 
44 
01 0 
li 
93 
14 
fd 
14 
0 
91 
41 
0 
41 
vi 
0 
w 
u 
4) 
u z 0 u 
c. 
U 
U) 
WC: ri 
12 l'ý cý Ilý oý oý 
%D CD w 0%D 
fu rd M z 2 ;Z 
C> i uý cý . 0- . 0- 
(D- 
Ln r- r- ýr) 
fl) 14 Lr) 
CD- C>- 0- 
m ý; 0. ýý m ý; C). w -W" moo 
Cý li 9 Il 11 1ý 
0- 0- (D- 
I I I 
rd : :; 
LO 
Cli LO 
w C) 
to - - fu - C-3 ON ON ko 0 r- (IN ell ý4 Q. 00 LO 
C) 0 C) C) -4 C) 
C3 
I 
en ON ko m -0 OD 
C. CD -4 C, 0 -4 
C) (D (D C. a C, 
C, C) C) 
U 
Lf) C4 C14 kD -W w 
" 1-4 ýq ýl ýr cli 
CD C) C> C, C) C) 
0 c- 0- 
III 
tn ýZ -4 ýý _4 c, C! ri 9 Oý 0ý Oi 
'4 co n %D 14 ý4 _4 
rd (d 
(A r-4 
%D C13 C) C14 kD C14 
10 ý C C) Lý Cý 
. 
C, - 0- 0- 
,V (V (V ::; ý 
V-4 
;3 
ý4 
:w 
-W 
ý4 %D 0)0) fn r) 
m (D Ln C14 r- -4 
C, - _4 -0- 
L l 
r -2 . CD H 
C)- CD- 0- 
rý ý; 1-4 ;3 to :; m cli m r- U) 9 C? C! 99 
0 (D N C3 Cl C4 (a C) C> 9- 99 .. 
CD- 0- a- 
I 
ko ;q -W ý; 0) R Cý -4 0-4 0N 
Cý 99 
C, C, 
w Gý ko ýý co a 1ý 'ý 1ý Ili i Cý 
W k. 0 C14 W 
r. 4 -, -1 
to - cd - C4 -W (n 
q. 14 C14 04 to 
%D CD C14 C, Ln 0 
C; C; Cý 
(V (V ko -4 %D C, 
0- 1- 0- 
Ln 0) (14 co 
C) ON 
7 Cý 
0 0- 0-ý 
11 
0 %D kn r-4 
0- 
I 
a- 
I 
a- 
I 
0- 1 
) m iz %0 Z j; m (n rli M U') (h Ln 92 22 29 
0- CD- 0- 
CD (D (40 i C) C: ) C: ) (D .. 0- 0- 0- 
II 
C) M Ln 
01-4 ý41-4 
9) 
61 5 In 
44 f-4 
-4 14 fu 
ru u uu 4 u uu E u u 
ý4 04 Ow 04 f-4 CII at Cl. ial La. 
2 
cli 
KA 
4n 
F2 
10 
4. 
tA 
(U 
rA 10 
0 
"0 
rý ei- '0 
(U %. = 
Cý, Co 0 
ri. A e. 
Q 12 
0 
CU 
. c, 
r. 
,M 
==0 
0AA 
Z: Ici t- 
-0 
-e cu 
Lý 
« Z: -ý E2 
00 
Table 5 Cross Section Estimates: Interactive specifications (1984- 
1992) 
Independent. 
Variables 
(1) 
PCM 
(2) 
PCM1 
Independent. 
Variables 
(3) 
PCM 
(4) 
PCml 
D 0.027 0.062 MES -0.008 -0.012 
(. 019) (. 040) (. 010) (. 020) 
MES -0.024b -0.044c CAP 0.001 -0.007 
(. 011) (. 024) (. 011) (. 024) 
CAP 0.001 -0.001 MY -0.774a 
(. 008) (. 018) (. 034) 
CONC 0.084a 0.181a MSHARE -0.049 -0.426 
(. 027) (. 057) (. 168) (. 355) 
MY -0.77la GROW 0.160 0.361 
(. 034) (. 152) (. 308) 
ms -0.032 -0.333 CONC 0.039 0.076 
(. 129) (. 288) (. 027) (. 052) 
GROW 0.4lob 0.743c ADINT 0.359a 0.736a 
(. 174) (. 387) (. 065) (. 136) 
ADINT 0.406a 0.923a ADINT*MSH -0.032 1.179 
(. 072) (. 156) (. 830) (1.83) 
MES*D 0.015 0.029 CONC*MSH 0.310 1.044c 
(. 015) (. 032) (. 287) (. 601) 
CONC*D -0.038 -0.082 MES*MSH -0.126 -0.377b 
(. 039) (. 079) (. 091) (. 189) 
GROW*D -0.285 -0.440 GROW*MSH 1.987 3.551 
(. 235) (. 493) (2.04) (4.77) 
MS*D 0.043 0.070 CAP*MSH -0.016 -0.024 
(. 165) (. 361) (. 075) (. 169) 
ADINT*D -0.088 -0.230 CONS 0.670a 0.557a 
(. 096) (. 203) (. 021) (. 026) 
CAP*D -0.003 -0.010 -2 0.8373 0.3442 
(. 012) (. 028) R 
0.93 1.42 
CONS 0.647a 0.501a F-Test (6,161) (6,162) 
(. 024) (. 031) 
-2 0.8378 0.3426 R 
1.70 1.54 
F-Test (6,159) (6,160) 
Notes: 
1. Variable descriptions are contained in the Data Appendix. 
2. Huber heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. abc indicate a coefficient 
significant at the 1.5, and 10% levels respectively. 
3. F Test is a test of the joint significance of the interaction terms for (1) and (2) and the joint 
significance of MSHARE and the interaction terms in (3) and (4). Degrees of freedom are in 
parentheses. None of the F Tests are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6: Cross Section Estimates of Relative Perforznance (1984-1992) 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) 
RPCM 
(2) 
RPCM 
(3) 
RPCMl 
-- 
(4) 
RPCMl 
MES -0.058c -0.0451 -0.040ýý -0.0481 
(. 033) (. 026) (. 024) (. 022) 
CAP -0.008 -0.009 0.018 -0.002 
(. 016) (. 015) (. 011) (. 010) 
CONC 0.218c 0.177b 0.120c 0.152a 
(. 111) (. 080) (. 072) (. 055) 
RMY -1.187a -1.259a 
(. 123) (. 118) 
ms 0.179 0.175 -0.220 -0.112 
(. 422) (. 380) (. 351) (. 353) 
GROW 0.736 0.152 0.604b 0.389c 
(. 465) (. 376) (. 301) (. 229) 
ADINT 0.623b 0.747a 0.272 0.217 
(. 293) (. 280) (. 181) (. 179) 
CONSTANT 2.046a 2.117a 0.919a 0.923a 
(. 138) (. 119) (. 032) (. 031) 
-2 R 
0.6833 0.6792 0.1160 0.0764 
5.43a 3.21a 12.18a 7.75a 
F-Test (6,79) (6,79) (6,80) (6,80) 
Notes: 
1. Variable descriptions are contained in the Data Appendix. RPCM is the price cost margin of large 
firms/ price cost margins of small(fringe) firms. RPCMI is the same ratio but for a net output 
denominator price cost margin. (1) and (3) are the ratio with small firms (2) and (4) with fringe firms. 
RMY is the ratio of material inputs to gross output for the large firms/ the ratio of material inputs to 
gross output for the small(fringe) firms. 
2. Huber heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. abc indicate a coefficient 
significant at the 1,5, and 10% levels respectively. 
3. F Test is a test of the joint significance of the independent variables, excluding RMY. Degrees of 
freedom are in parentheses. All of the F Tests are significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 7: First Difference Estimates (1985-1992) 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) 
LPCM(t) 
(2) 
LPCM(t) 
(3) 
LPCM(t) 
(4) 
SPCM(t) 
(5) 
SPCM(t) 
(6) 
SPCM(t) 
MES(t) 0.011 -0.004 -0.013 -0.002 -0.021 -0.050 
(2.22) (0.37) (0.43) (0.66) (2.16) (1.86) 
MES(t-1) -0.009 -0.010 -0.013 -0.008 0.012 0.037 
(1.85) (1.01) (0.46) (1.51) (1.37) (1.28) 
GROW(t) 0.042 0.038 0.058 0.040 0.028 0.030 
(3.24) (1.38) (0.87) (4.27) (1.43) (0.52) 
GROW(t-1) 0.021 0.012 -0.0003 0.011 0.005 0.021 
(1.54) (0.88) (0.010) (1.45) (0.59) (0.99) 
ADINT (t) 0.046 -0.151 -0.419 -0.026 -0.029 -0.397 
(1.22) (1.43) (1.94) (0-84) (0.42) (1.35) 
ADINT (t-1) 0.045 0.072 -0.092 0.016 -0.030 0.0006 
(1.39) (1.07) (0.53) (0.73) (0.61) (0.004) 
MS(t) 0.352 0.069 0.219 0.131 0.142 0.208 
(4.52) (0.96) (1.69) (1.57) (2.37) (1.58) 
MS(t-l) -0.148 0.150 0.712 0.008 -0.063 0.272 
(1.49) (1.58) (2.12) (0.06) (0.65) (1.00) 
CONC(t) 0.098 0.085 0.219 -0.057 -0.065 -0.107 
(4.50) (1.67) (1.57) (3.00) (1.32) (0.74) 
CONC(t-1) -0.063 -0.024 0.021 0.032 0.057 0.216 
(2.45) (0.48) (0.15) (1.61) (1.40) (2.00) 
MY(t) -1.020 -1.001 -0.835 -0.883 
(8.11) (16.5) (9.55) (16.3) 
MY(t-l) 0.494 0.297 0.351 0.249 
(3.09) (1.96) (3.25) (2.24) 
PCM(t-l) 0.468 0.243 0.032 0.388 0.261 0.192 
(2.94) (1.66) (0.22) (3.96) (2.36) (1.94) 
Serial 
Correlation -0.182 -0.176 -1.675 0.381 0.253 0.109 
Sargan 19.7(13) 50.6(43) 76.1(45) 7.9(13) 45.8(43) 45.6(45) 
Time Dums 22.1(8) 16.7(8) 26.6(8) 41.9(8) 38.2(8) 43.6(8) 
Wald 73.2(10) 35.2(10) 45.0(20) 35.0(10) 12.2(12) 13.2(10) 
Notes: 
1. Variable definitions are contained in the Data Appendix. Dependent variable in (1), (2), (4) and (5) 
is standard price cost margin. (3) and (6) the net output denominator margin. 
2. Estimation is by the first difference instrumental variables GMM method outlined in Arrellano and 
Bond (1988). In (1) and (4) only MY(t), MY(t-1) and PCM(t-1) are instrumented. In (2), (3), (5) and 
(6) all right hand side variables are instrumented. Instruments are all independent variables and the 
lagged dependent variable dated t-2 and back. 
3. Asymptotically consistent and robust t ratios are in parentheses. 
4. Serial Correlation is a robust test of second order serial correlation distributed as N(O, 1). Sargon is 
the test of overidentilying restrictions degrees of freedom in parentheses. Tiine Dums is a Wald test of 
the joint significance of the yearly dummy variables. Wald is a joint test of the independent variables 
excluding MY. 
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Table 8: First Difference Estimates: Producer/Consumer Goods (1985- 
1992) 
Independent 
Variables 
Consumer 
(1) 
LPCM(t) 
Goods 
(2) 
SPCM(t) 
Producer 
(3) 
LPCM(t) 
Goods 
(4) 
SPCM(t) 
MESM -0.014 -0.022 0.029 -0.010 
(0.91) (1.81) (2.47) (1.02) 
MES(t-1) -0.013 0.005 -0.012 -0.003 
(1.26) (0.72) (1.29) (0.31) 
GROW(t) -0.016 0.010 0.068 0.045 
(0.76) (0.61) (3.98) (2.31) 
GROW(t-1) 0.004 0.011 0.019 0.017 
(0.29) (0.645) (1.10) (1.99) 
ADINT(t) -0.091 -0.021 -0.041 -0.124 
(1.20) (0.52) (0.41) (1.52) 
ADINT (t-1) -0.041 -0.020 0.045 -0.034 
(0.56) (0.45) (0.89) (0.58) 
MS(t) 0.282 1.110 0.112 0.135 
(0.432) (1.73) (2.08) (3.55) 
MS(t-1) 0.099 1.015 0.055 -0.123 
(0.094) (1.56) (0-92) (1.28) 
CONC(t) 0.078 -0.015 0.097 -0.105 
(0.94) (0.31) (3.03) (3.09) 
CONC(t-1) 0.020 0.048 -0-065 0.030 
(0.38) (0.95) (1.47) (0.99) 
MY(t) -0.896 -0.915 -0.909 -0.969 
(17.9) (15.2) (21.6) (14.9) 
MY(t-1) 0.099 0.167 0.244 0.106 
(0.53) (1.26) (2.46) (0.58) 
PCM(t-1) 0.050 0.150 0.217 0.102 
(0.264) (1.07) (2.107) (0.60) 
Serial Correlation 0.390 1.494 -1.378 -0.940 
Sargan 60.7(43) 58.9(43) 67.4(43) 54.4(43) 
Time Dums 26.1(8) 36.5(8) 20.9(8) 23.9(8) 
Wald 7.9(10) 20.8(10) 81.9(10) 33.8(10) 
observations 328 328 368 368 
Industries 41 41 46 46 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the standard gross output price cost margin. 
2. Details of the estimation procedure and diagnostic tests are as in notes 2,3 and 4 to Table 7. 
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0 174-. 4- n4-FV ---- ý^ Vni-imnf, -n! Relatixin Performance (1985-1992) 
Independent Variables 
All 
(1) 
RPCM(t) 
Consumer 
(2) 
RPCM(t) 
Producer 
(3) 
RPCM(t) 
MES(t) -0.007 0.071 0.018 
(0.05) (0.60) (0.14) 
MES(t-1) -0.256 -0.223 -0.092 
(2.23) (2.03) (1.11) 
GROW(t) -0.352 -0.168 -0.187 
(1.38) (0.64) (1.19) 
GROW(t-1) 0.027 0.004 -0.125 
(0.30) (0.030) (1.37) 
ADINT(t) -0.437 -0.281 -1.059 
(0.49) (0.35) (1.26) 
ADINT(t-1) -0.574 0.178 0.458 
(0.77) (0.35) (0.68) 
MSM -0.441 -2.729 0.129 
(0.41) (0.34) (0.25) 
MS(t-1) 2.525 -10.10 1.801 
(1.81) (1.07) (3.28) 
CONC(t) 0.795 0.446 0.688 
(1.08) (0.72) (1.74) 
CONC(t-1) -0.791 0.397 -0.670 
(1.38) (0.71) (1.59) 
RMY(t) -2.288 -2.238 -1.977 
(4.93) (6.08) (6.80) 
RMY(t-1) 0.375 -0.029 0.127 
(2.17) (0.22) (0.63) 
RPCM(t-1) 0.106 0.015 -0.024 
(1.43) (0.18) (0.28) 
Serial Correlation 0.366 0.828 -0.314 
Sargan 36.8(43) 73.5(43) 56.0(43) 
Time Dums 5.9(8) 7.2(8) 7.0(8) 
Wald 27.1(10) 22.7(10) 61.2(12) 
observations 696 328 368 
Industries 87 41 46 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the ratio of the standard price cost margin of the large firms to the 
price cost margins of the small firms. 
2. Details of the estimation procedure and diagnostic tests are as in notes 2,3 and 4 to Table 7. 
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Data Appendix 
Data is taken from the UK census of production for the relevant years. Variables are as defined 
in the data appendix to Chapter 3 with the exception of those listed below. 
Ile data on intra industry groups is taken from the size class analyses (Table 13) of the UK 
Census of Production. The "large" firm group is the largest five firms. The "small" firm group 
is those firms with between 1-99 employees. The "fringe" firm group is obtained by subtracting 
the large firms from the industry totals. 
MS: 'Me mean market share by sales of the firms with 1-99 employees 
MES: The measure of minimum efficient scale is the average sales per establishment of 
establishments operated by the largest five firms. 
AMES: The alternative measure of minimum efficient scale is the average sales per 
establishment of establishments operated by the fringe firms. 
CAP: Capital requirements is measured as the average net capital expenditure per 
establishment of the establishments operated by the fringe firms 
ADINT: The advertising intensity variable using is the ratio of "cost of other non industrial 
services" to net/gross output at the industry level. Clearly the interpretation of the results on 
this variable are important for the chapter as a whole. Therefore need to assure ourselves that 
this is indeed a good proxy for advertising intensity. Through analysis of the distribution of 
industries according to this variable we can attempt to see whether it is indeed approximating 
advertising intensity. The industries in the upper quartile in terms of the mean of Adint 
measured in terms of gross output include "Pharmaceuticals", "Soap and toilet preparations", 
"Ice cream, cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery", "Spirit distilling and compounding", 
"Wines, cider and perry" and "Toys and sports goods". All of these would intuitively be on 
most lists of relatively high advertising industries. However deflating by gross output is 
potentially problematic for industries with a low ratio of net output to gross output. Using the 
measure of Adint deflated by net output adds to the previous list "Domestic-type electrical 
appliances", "Motor vehicles and their engines", "Soft drinks" and "Tobacco industry". Again 
these are consumer goods industries commonly associated with advertising expenditures. We 
would therefore argue that this proxy for advertising intensity is actually picking up the desired 
effects and can indeed be interpreted as such. 
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Methodological Appendix: Dyparnic Panel Data Estimation 
TWs appendix briefly describes the appropriate estimation procedure for a dynamic panel data 
models with fixed effects. Fuller descriptions are given in Hsiao (1986; p71-6) and Baltagi 
(1995; p125-132) 
The model is a straightforward linear model with a single lag of the dependent variable on the 
right hand side. Adding exogenous independent variables is statistically relatively 
unproblematic and therefore ignored. Iliere are observations for T time periods on N 
industries. 
Yit -= P+ Vu-i + Ilt i=l N t-- I 
P is a constant and y is the parameter of interest. We can decompose the error term into three 
elements, 
q, =-- ai + v, + et where a and v are the industry and time specific effects respectively that 
are constant across time and industries. F, represent unobserved effects over both time and 
industry. 
The conventional way of estimating such relationships was to use least squares but incorporate 
dummy variables for each industry and time period or equivalently estimate least squares in 
mean deviation form. Early estimates of this form such as Balestra and Nerlove (1966) 
produced relative low estimates of the y parameter. Nickell (19 8 1) identified that estimating 
such relations would result in a biased estimate of y if T was small even if N->oo. Ilis bias 
results from correlation between the mean deviation of the lagged dependent variable and the 
error term, a correlation that only tends to zero as T-->oo. The solution initially proposed to this 
problem by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) was to estimate the model in first differences of the 
form described below, suppressing the time dummies from the exposition. 
()ýj - Yi. t-l): "*: 70it-I - Yi. t-2)+(Ei, f - ri. t-1) 
Because of the correlation between (YU-1 -YU-2) and (e,, t - 
instruments must be found 
and Anderson and Hsiao suggested both YU-2 and (VU-2 - YU-3) were valid instruments hence 
either or both could be used to estimate y accurately. 
Arrellano and Bond (1988,1991) subsequently questioned the efficiency of the Anderson Hsiao 
estimator and developed a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator that made use of 
a larger instrument set by making use of further lags of the lagged dependent variable as they 
became available, i. e. towards the end of the data set more lags exist and using them as 
instruments enhances the efficiency of the estimator. It is this last estimator that is used in this 
and the subsequent chapter when estimating dynamic models in the pooled sample. 
This framework may also be used for the estimation of general instrumental variable models in 
the absence of dynamic specification to provide efficient estimates in the presence of 
correlation between contemporaneous right hand side variables with the error term. (See 
Blundell el al (1992) for a use in this context) As long as cit is serially uncorrelated lagged 
values of the endogenous right hand side variable dated t-2 and further back are valid 
instruments. First differencing generates a MA(I) error process therefore tests of higher order 
serial correlation are necessary in order to establish the validity of the estimation procedure. In 
each case robust tests of second order serial correlation are reported. 
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Making use of the additional lags as instruments means that the equation will be overidentified 
as there will be too many instruments relative to the number of included variables, or in the 
method of moments context, there too many moment equations to solve in order to identify the 
parameters. In order to identify the parameters some of the moment restrictions generating 
these excess equations have to be relaxed. Sargan (195 8) has presented a test of the validity of 
the overidentifying restrictions and this test is reported together with the parameter estimates. 
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Chapter 5: The Dynamic and Cyclical Behaviour of Intra Industry PerforLnance 
1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to examine how the performance of the size groups of firms within industries 
may vary across the business cycle. While the cyclical performance of firms and industries has 
recently been a prominent topic for discussion within industrial economics and macroeconomics, 
or at least some variants thereo& especially new Keynesian macroeconomics, there is a dearth of 
studies that look at intra industry performance in this context. The only study we are aware of is 
the study of US firms in Schmalensee (1989b). This study will be discussed in this chapter and 
we will produce estimates for the UK that may be compared with Schmalensee's results. As noted 
in the previous chapter, one of the reasons for this absence of previous work is the limited number 
of data sets that contain the requisite information. In this chapter we combine the panel of intra 
industry groups in UK manufiLcturing used for the previous chapter with data relating to cyclical 
movements at the industry level that has been taken from the C. B. I. Industrial Trends survey. 
This survey presents data on capacity levels and adequacy of inventories that enables us to study 
the issues in greater detail than merely relying on conventional measures of the cycle such as the 
growth rate of industry sales. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: firstly we will discuss the theoretical models that 
generate expectations concerning differences or similarities in the cyclical performance of large 
and small firms; secondly we selectivelyl summarise some of the previous empirical studies 
looking at cyclical performance; thirdly we present the empirical frameworks which form the 
basis for our analyses of the data; fourthly we present the results from the various empirical 
analyses. finally we offer some conclusions based upon these results. 
1 Relati%-cly comprehensive coverage of the studies up to the end of the 1980's is contained in 
Schmalcnsce (1989a) and Carlton (1989) therefore we concentrate upon the more recent studies in our 
survey. 
11. Theories of cvclical Performance 
In considering the determinants of cyclical performance we can usefully separate the short run 
from the long run effects. Our focus is mainly on the short run determinants but we have to take 
into account, in addition, the way that long run effects such as the effects of entry can vary in 
their influence over the business cycle. 
Il. i. Demand fluctuations and short run profit maximisation 
One of the simplest ways to analyse cyclical movements and their effect on performance is to 
represent demand fluctuations by a change in the elasticity of demand. This argument follows 
Harrod (1936) in assuming that, in addition to a secular fall over time in the absolute value of the 
elasticity of demand, demand will become more elastic in the slump and more inelastic in booms. 
The reasoning behind this assumption is that demand becomes more (in)elastic as consumers 
become more (less) price conscious due to lower (higher) or more (less) uncertain real incomeS2. 
A more elastic demand schedule can be conceived of in two ways: firstly as a flatter demand 
schedule as substitutes become more attractive, we can call this demand shift type I; alternatively, 
a shift inwards of the demand curve, due to a change in real incomes, but retaining a constant 
slope, which will also lead to a higher elasticity, this can be called demand shift type IL 
We start with the conventional formula for empirical price cost margins based upon short run 
profit maximisation. Initially, therefore, we are focusing on essentially comparative static 
analysis of the determination of price cost margins. Under the conventional assumption that 
marginal cost is constant the empirical price cost margin is equal to (1). 
p-avc, 
= 
s, (I+A, ) 
p 17 
2 Kalecki (1939 p35) cites Harrod as suggesting "In the slump consumers 'resent and resist the 
curtailment of their wonted pleasures .... Their cfforts to find cheapness become strenuous and eager. Nor 
are conuncrcial firms exempt from this influence upon their purchase policy; they, too, have received a 
nasty jolt and must strain every nerve to reduce costs. ' 
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An alternative formulation occurs if the cost function is of the quadratic form used by Mills and 
Schumann (see chapter 2), 
c(xi) = (xi + Oixi + 
X2' 
(2) leading to a price cost margin of the form, 
2yj 
p- avci 
= 
s, (I + Ai + ic) (3) 
P 77 
In (3) Ki=-X(p)/2yi and X(p) is the slope of the demand curve. Therefore ici is constant under 
the assumption of a demand curve with constant slope, demand type 11, and is variable otherwise. 
Note that constant marginal cost in this framework implies that marginal cost is equal to average 
variable cost and yi-+oo so Ki=O. Note also that Ki can be negative if marginal cost is falling, i. e. 
y<O. Taking the total derivative of (3) with respect to 71 yields (4) if the demand shift is of type II 
and (5) in the case of a type I demand shift. 
dPCM, ls, (I+lc, +A, ) OA 
-+ i 
Ll 
dq 77 77 017 77 O'q 77 
dPCM, I S, (l + Ici + A) A 025' 
(1+ K' +A') ++ 49A' S' 
dq 77 77 09ý7 77 0'77 77 4217 17 
The relations are fairly complex and therefore we need to be careful in interpreting them. The 
first term in both (4) and (5) is the direct effect and implies that as demand becomes more elastic 
the fall in price cost margins will be larger for firms with higher price cost margins, which ceteris 
paribus will be the larger firms. In the second term, the indirect effect of a change in demand 
causing a change in market share, the sign of Osi/Olq will clearly vary from firm to firm. 
Following from the discussion of output variation in Chapter 2 we would expect that as large 
firms are less prone to fluctuations their market shares will rise in recessions and fall in booms. 
Tberefore &i/o'Tl will be positive for large firms and will be negative for small firms. Conditional 
on the assumption that the final two terms in (5) are zero3, this indicates that the sign of the 
change in margins for small firms is (theoretically) unambiguous and negative. 'Me sign for large 
3 This implicitly assumes that either the demand shock is of type I or marginal costs are constant and 
also assumes that demand changes do not affect competitive stance. 
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firms is however ambiguous as the indirect effect of a change in market share could, in principle, 
outweigh the direct effect so that Os/-0ij-s/-q becomes positive. This will be the case if the 
elasticity of market share with respect to the price elasticity of demand is greater than unity. 
Therefore, the conclusion must be that, if there is no impact of demand movements on market 
shares, i. e. Osj1&zj=O, the price cost margins of large firms will be pro-cyclical and will be more 
pro-cyclical than those of small firms. If the prediction and empirical observation of chapter 2 is 
correct, so that &j/B^Iq>O for large firms, this effect is reduced to the extent that it is possible for 
large firms to exhibit counter cyclical price cost margins and therefore for the ratio of large firm 
price cost margins to small firm price cost margins to be counter cyclical. 
To complete the picture we also need in addition to introduce the possibility that either the degree 
of collusion will vary with the elasticity of demand4 or that the degree of distortion contained in 
measured price cost margins will vary with demand. Citing Kalecki (1939, p35) again "in the 
slump, cartels are created to save profits", "entrepreneurs avoid price cuts because it may induce 
their competitors to do likewise" and "cartels are not afraid that outsiders will appear". These 
arguments have been subsequently reiterated by Cowling (1983). Cowling suggests that although 
the initial response to an increase in the degree of excess capacity resulting from the onset of 
recession may be the cutting of margins in order to restore planned levels of inventory, a subject 
considered in more detail in subsection ILiv. below, the most prevalent medium and long term 
response to slump is to reinforce the degree of monopoly maintaining oligopolistic prices. 
However, Cowling considers an alternative to this norm, cut throat competition in order to 
eliminate rivals, a suggestion also considered by Kalecki. For this to occur Cowling (p 345) 
argues that there has to be "some fundamental asymmetry in the oligopoly group which was either 
not recognised or not acted on [previously] ...... While, as Cowling states, this is "unlikely to 
constitute the general case", it could form an important subset of cases. 
4 Clearly we do not have to pose a direct relationship. The degree of collusion is intuitively more likely 
to respond to the factors associated with an up or downturn in economic activity, that cause the elasticity 
of demand to change, rather than respond directly to the change in elasticity of demand. 
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For simplicity of analysis we now assume that Osj/&rl=O to eliminate the second term from (5). 
We can therefore rewrite (5) as (6). 
dPCMI S. IA ,=-: Ie+ + 
"i I(I -Al) (6) 
dY7 77 17 77 0177 77 0177 77 77 
From (6) we can see that ordinarily the price cost margin will be more pro cyclical the larger is 
the price cost margin. The extent of the counteracting effects depends upon a. and ork, the 
elasticities of ic and ). with respect to the price elasticity of demand. Type I demand changes 
require that aK be positive but by definition this elasticity cannot vary between firms5. We can 
see from (6) that in order for the change in the degree of collusion to create countercyclical price 
cost margins the following relation must be satisfied6, CFXý>>J. This implies that the increase in 
the conjecture term must be more than proportionate to the increase in the elasticity of demand. 
Taken separately it would appear that to generate countercyclical price cost margins it is 
necessary for either the conjectural term or market share to respond elastically to changes in the 
price elasticity of demand. Alternatively the effects could act in combination, reinforcing each 
other, although logically, increases in the degree of collusion on the part of an individual firm 
would tend to reduce rather than increase market share. 
As a point of note we can also investigate from these relations the theoretical bias that results 
from using average variable cost rather than marginal cost. The difference between the t-, N-o 
measures is expressed in (7) 
mc, - avci = 
si Ki (7) 
P 17 
The total derivative of which can be expressed as (8). 
P 
d(mci -avcy 
P. S, Ki + Si 
&i 
+ Ki 
a, 
(8) 
dq 77 17 77 0177 77 67 
5 This is because the proportionate change in K Only depends upon the effect on the slope of the demand 
curve which is common to all firms. This interpretation of (6) does point to the theoretical possibility 
that counter cyclical measured price cost margins could result from a high value OfaK i. e. a large 
change in distortion between high and low demand states. 
6 In this situation, where Osi/&9=0, the condition, cyk>> 1, is necessary but not sufficient. 
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It can be readily established that (8) is negative (i. e. the difference is procyclical) unless either 
market share or ic are positively elastic in respect of the price elasticity of demand. As neither of 
these cases can be assumed with any degree of generality it can be inferred that, allowing for the 
stated exceptions, the tendency is that using average variable cost in the measured margin will 
lead to a procyclical bias. This is intuitively the case if one considers studies such as Bils (1987) 
where marginal cost rises very steeply in times of booms and therefore price - marginal cost 
values are low at this point in the cycle compared to the relation between price and average 
variable cost. Such is also the case when considering the case of formal capacity constraints, 
where at the capacity point marginal cost is infinite, price is determined solely by demand, and 
price may therefore increase without limit relative to average variable cost in periods of high 
demand. Of greater import for our focus is whether the bias is greater or lesser depending upon 
firm size. From (8) we can state that if Ds/0'r1=0 the procyclical bias will be greater for firms 
with larger market shares. However, in this case, large firms are also predicted to be have more 
procyclical price cost margins in the standard framework. Also if &j/0-11#0 but Or,. /&q=O the 
direction of bias follows the large firms. If large firms' price cost margins are procyclical 
(countercyclical) the bias is also procyclical (countercyclical). T'herefore we can see that the bias 
will tend to amplify or overstate the 'true' relative time paths rather than confuse them. 
Il. ii. Capacily constraints and short run profit maximisation 
Before incorporating long run factors into this discussion we consider the role of capacity 
constraints in pricing decisions. The argument that firms are subject to a capacity constraint is 
relatively rarely advanced in empirical industrial organisation studies. This seems rather 
surprising given the early focus of models of imperfect competition on the relationship between 
excess capacity and imperfect competition (see Steindl 1952). In recent years the main study, 
comparable in form to the current study, that has investigated the issue of capacity constraints 
has been Haskel and Martin (1994). The way in which their model is theorised is fairly 
restrictive. They borrow from Bresnahan's (1982) consistent conjectures model and approximate 
capacity constraints with the slope of the marginal cost curve. In the same vein as the Kreps and 
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Scheinkman (1983) model, as firms approach capacity constraints, firms output levels more 
closely approximate Cournot rather than Bertrand levels. In this way it can be seen that capacity 
constraints influence the consistent conjecture adopted by the firm and therefore feed through to 
competitive stance. We would argue however that the equation of a change in the implicit 
conjecture with a change in competitive stance is a misleading confusion of conduct for 
performance. The output restriction, in the case of a binding capacity constraint, is involuntary, 
at least in the short run. The firm wishes to increase its output level but is unable to do so, and 
therefore the implied lower level of output is of a different order to output restrictions associated 
with monopolistic conduct7. 
The role of capacity utilisation or excess capacity in facilitating the oligopolistic co-ordination 
which in turn determines the price cost margin has been a subject of contention. Spence (1977) 
argues that the existence of excess capacity gives a greater incentive to deviate from any collusive 
agreement and will therefore reduce the mark-up. It has also been suggested however that excess 
capacity is a double edged weapon increasing both the incentive to deviate and the power to 
retaliate against deviators. Cowling (1983) argues that although the initial response to the 
creation of excess capacity may be the weakening of collusion when firms recognise their mutual 
adversity the degree of collusion hence the mark-up will increase. 
An alternative way to approach the question of capacity constraints is simply to examine the 
constrained short run profit maximýising decision of the firm8. 
The firm chooses output level, q, to maximise, 
;r= pq - c(q)- F s. t. q:! ý k where k is the level of capacity owned by the firm. The implicit 
assumption is in the short run the marginal cost of producing an output level greater than k is 
7 There is an asymmetry involved here. The recognition that a rival firm is likely to be capacity 
constrained may well lead the firm to adopt a different competitive stance, a possibility incorporated into 
the puppy dog strategy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). 
Bresnahan and Suslow (1989) make use of this kind of framework in examining the behaviour of a 
single industry. 
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infinite, or at least prohibitive. Maximising this profit function yields two potential situations. If 
the constraint does not bind we have the conventional relationship, 
P- MC' 
= 
S(I + A') 
and q<k . The alternative situation 
is where 
P 77 
P- TS 
= 
S(1 + A') 
+ V/ if q=k. Where xV is the Legrange multiplier associated with the 
P 17 
capacity constraint. In the case of a vertical marginal cost curve at q--k and the perceived 
marginal revenue curve intersecting with this vertical portion of the marginal cost curve, the ratio 
between price and marginal cost will be equal to zero as quantity is fixed and price is determined 
by the intersection of the effective demand curve with the capacity level of output. In this case, 
the ratio of price to average variable cost will rise, in theory without limit, according to the 
increase in the level of demand and will not normally, in this case, be influenced by the 
conventional structural determinants of the price cost margin. 
II. iii. EntKy. disgguilibrium and CY-Clical performance 
The next aspect we have to consider is the long run effects which must be considered in terms of 
the response to entry and other adaptations of industry structure/ conduct which may occur over 
the business cycle. Most fundamental is the question of the extent to which entry responds to the 
business cycle and/or long run profitability, effects which may temper the profitability effects of 
the business cycle. In addition we have to consider the effects of entry on the composition of the 
industry. If boom conditions attract marginal firms into the industry in greater numbers the effect 
will be to reduce average profitability of the small firms, on the apparently reasonable assumption 
that marginal entrants are small9. We can relate this to theories going back to Steindl (1952, esp. 
Chapter 5) that regard a theory of cost differentials between firms as central to explanations of 
industry performance. Steindl directly posits the concept of a marginal firm in an analysis that 
distinguishes between industries where entry is difficult and industries where small producers are 
plentifiil. This point also relates back to the point made by Kalecki (1939) that cartels are more 
prevalent in slump conditions because the threat of entrants moving in to benefit from the higher 
9 As support for this general position we can point to Geroski (1995, p424) who charactcriscs the entry 
process by new ("do novo") firms as "more common but less successful than entry by diversification". 
New small scale entry by firms accounts for a large proportion of both entries and subsequent exits. 
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profits is diminished. The implication of both of the above arguments is that the supply curve of 
fringe firms will shift between periods of recession and boom. The slope of the schedule will be 
steeper in times of recession as the flow of entrants is stemmed and flatter in booms as the 
number of potential entrants increases. 
An additional factor, that could lead to a potential flattening of the supply schedule of fringe 
firms, is the availability of finance. Either through improving the credit position of existing firms 
seeking to expand or the provision of credit to those seeking to enter, a relaxation of monetary 
policy on the part of the government or a less restrictive bank lending policy will tend to flatten 
the fringe supply curve. Gertler and Gilchrist (1991) develop a model which encompasses the 
asymmetry between firms access to finance in the context of demand fluctuations'O. In a model 
where sales are randon-dy determined they establish that as the potential costs of bankruptcy 
weigh more heavily for smaller firms an increase in demand more than proportionately reduces 
the risk of bankruptcy for these smaller firms. Also an expansion of the money supply by 
reducing the adverse affects of the credit market on smaller firms enables a higher proportionate 
level of output. Therefore changes in both demand and the money supply, which in the model 
operate independently, yield a more elastic sales response from smaller than larger firrns. They 
note that the model can be readily extended to incorporate differences in the level of internal 
funding. 717his approach is very sin-dlar in approach to the Mills and Schumann (1985) arguments 
which again focus on the relative elasticities of supply but in this case the difference in the 
elasticities is due to differences in the choice of technology. 
It would appear plausible that this finance constraint argument could also be applied to entry on 
the part of large firms in the form of diversification. The availability of funds for large scale entry 
or take-over is likely to be more limited in periods of recession and firms may wish to 
10 Gcrtler and Gilchrist (1991) incorporate imputed bankruptcy costs into the marginal cost schedules 
of the firm and thereby alter the slope of the marginal cost curve for a small firm. As the supply schedule 
here is a horizontal aggregation of many firms we do not need to adopt this approach but can merely 
identify possibility of finance operating as a constraint on output as a way of obtaining a steeper supply 
schedule in a recession period. 
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'consolidate' or 'focus on core activities' at these times. The effect is therefore to reduce the 
external competitive pressure in periods of recession and increase such competitive pressure in 
time of boom. We can relate these arguments back in turn to the competitive fringe model 
considered in the previous chapter. 
In examining the dominant firm model it is possible under the assumption that demand and 
marginal cost curves are linear and of the regular slopell to look for changes in price cost 
margins in response to demand changes. Hence, while the Lerner index will always be zero for 
the fringe firms, the price cost margin will be positive12. A upwards shift in the intercept of the 
demand curve will lead to an increase in price, hence, will lead to an increase in supply by the 
fringe. As the price cost margin for the fiinge is a measure of the divergence between marginal 
and average variable cost, and this, under our assumptions, will increase with output, so the price 
cost margin will increase with a demand increase of this form. 'Me same prediction applies to the 
price cost margins of the dominant firms as well as long as their marginal cost curve is not rising 
too steeply. These results are to be expected given the general preponderance in favour of 
procyclical price cost margins when abstracting from the changes in the degree of monopoly 
power. 
Placed in a dynamic context it can be seen that there are potential advantages for the dominant 
group from having a fringe of small firms. It can be readily shown within the context of the model 
that the optimal change in output in response to a horizontal shift in the demand curve is lower 
both in absolute and proportionate terrns for a dominant firm facing 4 fringe of small firms than 
for a monopolist with a similar industry demand curve. The same is true of the optimal dominant 
firm price which %%rill fluctuate less than the monopoly price. As one of the acknowledged ways in 
II That is the industry demand curve is linear and downward sloping, the supply curve of the fringe is 
linear and upward sloping and the marginal cost curve of the dominant group is linear and not 
downward sloping. All the comparative static results stated here are based upon tWs relatively general 
framework. The specifics of the algebra needed to develop the results is exceptionally tedious yet 
straightforward and therefore not reported. 
12 If the fringe cost/supply function is akin to the Mills and Schumann function the price cost margin of 
the fringe will be as described in equation (7) of Chapter 3. 
166 
which monopoly power is used is to reduce risk it follows that don-driant firms may actually 
encourage a fiinge of small firms which act to smooth out demand fluctuations This is likely to be 
more especially desired when there are substantial costs of holding excess capacity or operating 
at levels of overcapacity. Again the desirability of the fringe is subject to the proviso that the loss 
in profits is not sufficiently great to outweigh the benefits of demand smoothing. 
II. iv. Inventories, price adiustment and the business pycle 
The role of inventories across the business cycle is a subject of importance to macroeconomists 
but has been relatively neglected by industrial economists especially in applied work13. In the 
context of this chapter the importance of inventories lies in the trade-off of the relative costs of 
price and output adjustment in the context of variable or cyclical demand. The costs of price 
adjustment lie in two main areas, firstly and arguably of lesser importance is the "menu cost" 
argument that there are costs of changing prices because of the costs of inforn-dng customers of 
the new prices, secondly there is the cost in terms of market perturbance of the change in price. 
This market perturbance takes different forms; there is a potential loss of consumer loyalty if 
consumers dislike uncertainty concerning prices; in an oligopolistic context, there is also the cost 
of disruption to a tacit, or less commonly overt, collusive agreement, which may break down or 
weaken. On the other hand there are similar costs associated with output adjustments. There are 
similar direct costs of adjusting the level of production in terms of extra hiring, overtime, 
sackings or lay offs, and in terms of the capital/capacity costs of variable production. Indirect 
costs include stockouts that can lead to a loss of consumer loyalty and the presence of excess 
capacity can put pressure upon tacit collusive agreements. 
The presence of such obstacles to both output and price flexibility implies a general role for 
inventofies14 or order book adjustment in terms of the smoothing out of output, sales or price 
13 An exception to this is the stream of papers mainly from US economists attempting to assess the 
validity or othcnvise of the production smoothing hypothesis. Reference to some of this literature has 
been made in Chapter 2. 
14 The most common explanation for holding inventory is the production smoothing argument. This 
focuses on the presence of increasing marginal costs implying that a temporary positive shock to sales 
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fluctuations. Against these motives have to be weighed up the costs of holding inventory. On a 
direct level; for production to stock industries, these will constitute the storage and opportunity 
costs of leaving produced goods unsold; for production to order industries the direct costs are the 
more conventional costs of capacity adjustment. However it is equally clear that either the 
presence of inventory or order book adjustment still possess the potential for market perturbance 
effects. As Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) point out inventory can be used as a strategic weapon 
that can help or hinder maintenance of tacit collusion, excessive or insufficient inventory levels 
can have a similar impact as excess capacity or capacity constraints on the, pricing of 
oligopolists. 
As the firm is involved in a three way decision on prices, output and inventories, each of which 
have differing costs and impacts, it becomes difficult to obtain hard predictions. Rotemberg and 
Saloner argue that oligopolists will tend to invest in inventory in booms as a way of deterring the 
temptation to cheat which is greatest in periods of relatively high demand. T'hey therefore suggest 
a procyclical time path for the inventory sales ratio in oligopolistic; industries. It should be noted 
that if stockout costs are high, in terms of the loss of consumer loyalty, the level of inventories 
should be correlated with the level of sales because as sales rise the likelihood of stockout for a 
given level of inventory also rises. 
The most common prediction is that in the context of inventory or order book adjustment price 
fluctuations will tend to be lower than otherwise15. This is an important part of the basis for the 
theory of normal cost pricing16. The idea of normal cost pricing is that "output price is set by 
taking a constant percentage over average normal historical current cost" (Godley and Nordhaus, 
1972, p854). A proviso to this is that this percentage may not remain constant over time. In fact 
will increase the cost of production in the absence of inventory. Clearly this omits many of the 
alternative motives for price and output stability discussed above. 
15 See Amihud and Mendelson (1983) for a theoretical examination of the price smoothing role of 
inventories and Amihud and Mendelson (1989) for empirical evidence concerning inventories and 
market power. 
16 Fuller discussion of the issue of pricing behaviour can be found in Hay and Morris (1991, chapter 7), 
Sawyer (1983), Domberger (1983) and Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus (1978). An example of a recent 
empirical study examining the question is Geroski (1992). 
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over the period they examine, the 1960's, Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus (1978) observe a 
sustained decline in the mark-up whereas Geroski (1992) finds a sustained rise in the mark-up 
over the 1980's. However the strong implication of the theory is that prices are invariant to short 
term movements in demand or cost, the underlying rationale for which is that the various costs of 
short term price adjustments exceed the benefits that arise from stability. 
In applying these arguments to the firm size question it is not possible to investigate pricing at the 
level we require because observations on price are only available at an industry level hence no 
distinction between small and large firms can be made at an empirical level. However we can 
attempt to derive some suggestions for the relative behaviour of large and small firms. If small 
firms are more flexible than large firms in terms of having lower output adjustment costs, 
although this assumption is an open question as we have discussed in chapter 2, there will be a 
lesser need for use of either inventory or order book adjustment on the part of those firms. 
Similarly small firms are less likely to be engaged in collusive agreements and therefore the costs 
of perturbing such agreements are likely to be low. Unless advertising makes consumers less 
concerned by the such perturbations, consumer loyalty effects would appear unlikely to differ 
substantially between large and small firms17. 
Cowling (1983) argues that the growth of multi-plant firms will also reduce the impact of demand 
fluctuations on price in an analogous way to inventory/excess capacity as the effect on costs of 
adjusting production for these firms will be less than for single plant firms. Multi plant firms are 
able to change output by changes in the number of plants whereas the implied marginal cost 
curve for a single plant firm will be steeper. One would therefore expect margins to be less 
affected by the cycle for those large firms with more plants. For this reason one may expect the 
effect of the cycle to be less for larger multi-plant firms than for their smaller counterparts. 
17 In theory some firms may choose to compete on reliability of delivery relative to some other quality 
standard but there seems to be little justification for a systematic size related difference of this kind. 
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The main exception to this conclusion of inventories reducing price variability is the tendency to 
hold "sales" when inventory levels become excessive. Thus if demand falls unexpectedly firms 
may lower prices for a limited period to restore normal levels of inventory. If such "sales" are 
preannounced for a fixed period they need not create a market perturbance if both consumers and 
producers anticipate a relatively rapid resumption of the previous market situation. Clearly 
however such "sales" can lead to market disruption if there are asymmetries in the distribution of 
the demand shock or adjustment costs between firms. In this context we may expect an impact 
reduction in prices as excessive inventories accrue but that this effect is not necessarily long 
lasting. 
My. The persistence of profits 
Linking in with the notions of long run effects interacting with dynamic effects is the persistence 
of profits literature. This literature was developed in a number of studies18, however we focus on 
Geroski (1990a) as a representative exposition of the theoretical framework developed in this 
literature. Geroski's first point is that when considering the antitrust implications of structure 
performance relations we should be interested in the long run effects i. e. persistent profits not 
short term fluctuations around the long run. The point of note is that while the long run is the 
main point of interest from the conventional structure performance perspective, and was the main 
focus of the previous chapter, the additional focus of this thesis is on the short term responses to 
business fluctuations. As we have tried to show, in subsection Il. iii. above, the two interact 
closely, for example the ability to obtain profits above the norm in a boom (or slump) period is 
still likely to depend upon the susceptibility to entry or intra industry mobility. If anything when 
considering the short run responses it is the speed of response that is most important. 
The second point is empirical, when we observe profits we usually observe current period profits 
when the theoretical point of interest (subject to the proviso given above) is long run equilibrium 
19 Mueller (1986) was the principle monograph study but a numbcrof studies including Levy (1987) 
and Gcroski and Masson (1987) and the other studies reproduced in Mueller (cd. ) (1990) developed the 
perspective. 
170 
profits. If there are systematic measurement errors arising from this difference, and in particular 
if these systematic measurement errors are correlated with the other explanatory variables we will 
observe biased estimates of both the point estimates and covariance matrix. 
A time series model of profits is then developed by Geroski that incorporates these elements and 
indicates an appropriate specification. Iet19 nt be firm i's profits in time t and 7rpt be the 
competitive rate of return in the long run, pt=7q-7cpt is the excess profits in time t. Deviations 
from the competitive rate of return are governed by luck and entry factors where the former are 
orthogonal to the latter and entry factors can be loosely interpreted as all factors affecting the 
market behaviour of market participants so these are factors that are not random and are 
endogenous; to the determination of profits. These can be formalised in equation (9) 
Apt=00+yoEt-+-ylpt-l+p. t (9) 
where Apt-=pt-pt- I, Et is the rate of entry in period t, and Vt are the luck factors in period t and is 
i. i. d. with mean 0 and finite and constant variance. Both yo and yj are presumed to be constant 
and negative. The model is equivalent to a distributed lag framework where the coefficient 
1) where y* is the coefficient on the lagged term in a levels equation of excess profits. If Et is not 
observed, a dependence of entry on the previous levels of excess profits, relative to the norm of 
excess profits, can be specified such as of the form 
Eý7- ý(pt-j-p*) + ct (10) 
where p* is the norm of excess profits. Thus the coefficient on the lagged term in a levels 
equation of excess profits, with entry omitted, would become, through substitution, y* +ý70. The 
second part of this is simply the bias induced in the coefficient from the omission of entry as a 
right hand side variable. 
Econometrically the main studies estimated these lagged profits models separately for many firms 
and then looked for systematic differences between the estimated coefficients by regressing them 
on many structural factors that may influence either the degree of persistence or the level of 
19 The presentation closely follows Geroski (1990a) but the notation has been changed slightly. 
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excess profits. The question may be posed as to whether this is the most efficient method of 
identifýring this information. By estimating the initial coefficients while intentionally omitting 
relevant variables that are correlated with the lagged dependent variable both the estimated 
coefficients and standard errors will be biased. The bias in the coefficients may not be a 
problem20 as the magnitude of the bias is the subject of the second stage regressions. However it 
is not clear that the estimates will be efficient relative to a single stage procedure that takes into 
account such heterogeneity in the coefficients. Such a single stage procedure would involve 
pooling the data and permitting the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to 
systematically vary across units with the movement of the relevant variableS21. 
In terms of assessing the usefulness of the persistence of profits literature, we can see that it has 
made the significant step of shifting the focus of empirical analyses in industrial economics to the 
presence of long run supranormal profits and the process of dissipation of temporary 
supranormal profits. From an econometric point of view the literature has led to a general 
proliferation of the usage of dynamic specifications in industrial economic analyses and a clear 
framework for the interpretation of such specifications. 
II. vi. An overview of the different theories 
A lot of material has been covered in the previous discussions and it would appear necessary to 
draw some overall implications from the survey of theories we have undertaken. On a simplistic 
level it is possible to say that models of short run profit maximisation, with a number of 
qualifications and exceptions that have been discussed, predict procyclical price cost margins for 
all firms. There is also an implication that large firms may experience more procyclical price cost 
margins than small firms. Incorporating elements of intertemporal profit maximisation into the 
20 An example of an occasion when such first stage coefficient estimate biases may prove problematic is 
when observations are deleted from the sample for the second stage estimation on the basis of the 
possibly incorrect inference that the coefficient falls outside an acceptable range, e. g. Cubbin and 
Geroski (1990) eliminate estimates that are greater than 0.95 on the basis of the instability of estimates 
so close to unity. 
21 Implicitly a limited form of this approach is adopted in the interactions reported by Machin and Van 
Reenen (1993, Tables I and 111). 
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framework can reverse or mitigate this finding; the dynamics of collusion may lead to 
countercyclical margins which would be expected to have a greater impact upon large firms; 
mechanisms exist for smoothing the effects of the cycle such as inventories, order backlogs and 
excess capacity, the relative effects and usage of these mechanisms by large and small firms 
would appear to be an open question. We have also suggested that through the process of entry 
the business cycle may have longer lasting effects upon the performance of the industry and the 
firms in industries. This requires an explicitly dynamic framework for dealing with these issues. 
111. Previous empirical studies of cvclical Performance 
As stated earlier the only previous study of intra, industry performance over the business cycle 
that we are aware of has been Schmalensee (1989b). Before we discuss this paper we will 
examine the other recent studies of cyclical performance at the industry or firm level as these 
studies logically (but not necessarily in time) precede Schmalensee's developments. 
The first major panel data studies to examine cyclical performance at the industry level were 
Dornowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (DHP)(1986,1987,1988). These studies all made use of a 
panel of US manufacturing industries from 1958-1981. The studies examined the instability of 
the concentration margins relationship over time and in particular noted the weakening of the 
relationship over time such that the strength of the relationship was much weaker in the late 
1970's and early 1980's than in the 1960's. This finding was subsequently challenged by 
Salinger (1990) who argued that with a wider industry sample and adjustments to the measure of 
concentration to take into account both import competition and regional markets within the U. S. 
the relationship remained robust through the 1970's and to the mid 1980's. It is also interesting to 
note that Wachtel and Adelsheim (1977) provide clear evidence that, for the period 1946-1960, 
highly concentrated industries exhibit a countercyclical pattern of price cost margins while 
medium and low concentrated industries exhibited a procyclical pattern. The limited evidence 
from this study for the period from 1961 onwards is of procyclical price cost margins for all 
industries. This suggests that there may have been a structural break in the relationship at a much 
173 
earlier stage than the 1970's, and that this break that is on-ftted from the DHP studies because it 
occurred at the start of the time period of their study. 
'Me exception to the finding of universal procyclicality, in the post 1960 period, is Bils: (1987). 
Bils' study is, however, based upon estimates of marginal Cost22 that rise steeply as output 
increases. 'Me implication of the estimates provided is that firms reach forms of capacity 
constraints at high levels of output. We have noted, in section HAL above, that, as capacity 
constraints are reached, price and marginal cost converge, in the limit, and price increases in 
relation to average variable cost. Bils' estimates can be made perfectly consistent with the 
estimates from DHP by noting that these latter studies make use of a measure of performance that 
proxies the relationship between price and average variable cost, not the relationship between 
price and marginal cost. 
One of the main findings of the 1986 study was that price cost margins are more procyclical in 
concentrated industries. However, as Schmalensee (1989b, p353) notes, there may be two secular 
trends at work which are creating this correlation. DHP use both the growth rate of industry sales 
and the aggregate rate of unemployment as measures of the business cycle. However 
unemplo5ment is strongly trending over the period as, in the data set that DHP use, is the 
relationship between concentration and margins. A negative and significant coefficient on the 
interaction between unemployment and concentration therefore may be the spurious correlation of 
two trends. The two may or may not be related but if they are both trending we cannot tell if the 
correlation is economically meaningful or not. 
Studies for Japan, Odagiri and Yamashita (1987), covering 195 8-1982, and Germany, Neumann, 
B6bel and Haid (1983), covering 1965-1977, also confirm the finding of a greater strength on the 
relationship between concentration and price cost margins in times of expansion relative to 
22 An important reason for this observed rapid rise in marginal cost is the importance of increased 
overtime payments in the estimates of marginal cost for levels of output above normal. 
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recession and find no evidence that highly concentrated industries are less procyclical than 
industries with lower levels of concentration. 
UK studies of cyclical performance at the industry level include Haskel and Martin (1992,1994) 
examining UK data for 1983-1986. The 1992 paper concentrates on the role of trade unions and 
unemployment in the determination of industry level price cost margins. It is found that sectoral 
level unemployment has a positive direct effect on price cost margins but that the interaction 
effect with concentration is negative. The coefficients and variable means imply that for 
industries with below average levels of concentration unemployment has a positive (i. e. counter 
cyclical) effect while for industries with higher than average levels of concentration the effect is 
negative (i. e. pro-cyclical). Haskel and Martin qualify these results because of the short time 
period and differences in the data between their results and the DHP results An important point to 
note is that Haskel and Martin use the net output denominator price cost margin whereas DHP 
use the more conventional mar&. It is useful to note from their results that the finding is absent 
in the levels estimates, the coefficients being poorly determined and, in the case of unemployment, 
) 
of the opposite sign, and is only present in the first difference estimates. 
Haskel and Martin (1994) empirically examines the effect of capacity constraints on the price 
cost margins of industries. The theoretical framework adopted has been briefly discussed in 
section II. ii. above. Using data for 1983-1989 and again adopting the net output denominator 
margin they estimate number of interactive specifications, the effect of capacity constraints in a 
linear model proving insignificant. In the most readily interpretable format of interaction between 
concentration and capacity constraints they once again firid a negative (yet insignificant) cffcct 
for capacity constraints but that a positive interaction cffect. The estimated positive interaction 
effect indicates that capacity constraints have a positive effect on margins for mean concentration 
levels and that this increases with concentration23. 
23 This is based on our calculations from a rescaling of their reported results. Taking the coefficients as 
reported and basing calculations on the reported means of the variables indicates a negative cffcct for all 
concentration levels, a finding that is inconsistent with the rest of their statistical results. It was therefore 
assumed that an unreported rcscaling of both coefficients and means had been made. No calculations of 
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Machin and Van Reenen (1993) exan-dne firm level cyclical effects using accounting data for the 
UK. Using an accounting approximation to the price cost margin they find procychcal margins in 
the sense that they are negatively related to the aggregate unemployment rate. However they do 
not investigate industry or firm level cyclical effects nor do they investigate differences in cyclical 
effects between firms of different sizes. 
While the focus of Schmalensee's paper is explicitly wedded to the debates concerning market 
power/efficiency explanations of inter and intra. industry performance, a debate we have 
deliberately side stepped within this thesis as it is not seen as presenting a useful way forward for 
increasing understanding, the results of the analysis can be interpreted more generally and applied 
outside of that fi-amework. Schmalensee's principle objective is to attempt to identify the reason 
why industry level price cost margins are more procyclical in concentrated industries. In 
particular the objective is to find if the prominent influence is inter industry or intra industry 
differences in cyclical performance. To this end Schmalensee estimates for each year of his data 
set, 1953-1983, elasticities of profitability with respect of firm size24' seeking to abstract the pure 
size effects from industry effects. These estimated elasticities are then examined for cyclical 
variation using various aggregate measures of the cycle including capacity utilisation. There were 
two clear results from this analysis. Firstly the inter industry component of the elasticity was 
positive and made a significant contribution to the total effect using conventional measures 
approximating the price cost margin25. However the inter industry component exhibited no 
significant variation over time. All of the time series variation in the overall elasticity was 
generated by time series variation in the pure size, or intra industry, effect. Secondly this time 
varying intra industry component, hence the overall elasticity, was both declining secularly over 
this form are reported by Haskel and Martin and similarly the significance of such interactions is not 
assessed. 
24 Detailed discussion of the estimation technique used is reserved for section VJ. below. 
25 Schmalensec tests 12 different measures of profitability, 6 using assets as the size measure in the 
denominator and 6 using sales as the denominator. In the former case the inter industry effect was 
negligible in size and/or insignificant. The latter are the more conventional approximations to the price 
cost margin and arc discussed above. 
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time and behaved in a countercyclical manner. This indicates that, for Schmalensee's sample, 
there is little role for industry effects in determining the procyclical profitability in concentrated 
industries. Instead we must conclude that large firms are less procyclical than small firms. 
Schmalensee squares this with the DHP results by arguing that the missing element must be the 
industry level effect that differs between concentrated and unconcentrated industries. That is, 
industry factors that affect the profitability of both large and small firms, keeping the inter 
industry relationship between the two constant, must be at work. 
TV. Framework for analysis 
The starting point for the empirical analysis of the cyclical and dynamic aspects of intra industry 
performance is that most of the previous analyses are partial in focus. Many studies focus upon 
one element of the business cycle (e. g. inventories or capacity constraints) in isolation. We have 
seen from section II of this chapter that there are many different factors that potentially come in 
to play in analysing cyclical performance. Ideally we wish to simultaneously incorporate as many 
of these factors as possible. The reasons for the partial nature of some of the previous analyses is 
the theoretical, and usually, by implication empirical, complexity associated with the multiple 
decisions implicit in a fully specified intertemporal profit maximisation framework. Whilst 
parsimony may be a suitable resolution of this problem from a theoretical perspective, enabling 
clarity of analysis, it is less attractive for empirical work where the potential costs of omitting 
relevant variables are usually greater than the costs of including irrelevant variables. In general 
therefore we have sought to make the specification of the empirical analysis as general as 
possible. This contains costs in itself on two grounds; firstly it can tend to widen the distance 
between empirical specification and any relevant theoretical specification; secondly the 
interrelationships between variables may be difficult to empirically separate due to possible 
collinearities. For these reasons the analysis may appear "data-driven". At all stages however we 
have attempted to be mindfid of the predictions arising from the discussion in section 11. 
177 
The empirical analysis takes four forms. Firstly in section VA. we present and discuss the 
summary statistics of the data we have collected. The second and third aspects of the analysis 
present results from our data set using ftarneworks developed in previous relevant analyses. in 
V. ii. we present estimates of the Schnialensee (1989b) elasticity of profitability with respect to 
firms size. We are using for all of the' analysis in this chapter a data set that is similar in 
construction to the one used by Schmalensee. By presenting our own estimates we can provide a 
comparison and in addition add to the variety of descriptive statistics. In section V. iii. we present 
analysis within the persistence of profits framework of the dynamic adjustment processes of large 
and small firms. The focus of the persistence of profits literature has been on estimating the speed 
of adjustment to the normal profit level whilst also trying to identify the factors that influence 
these pressures. The main focus in this regard has been on the role of entry (or exit) as a 
dissipation device for supranormal (or sub-normal) profits. However a series of other variables 
have been used in trying to examine the speed of adjustment26. In our analysis we focus perhaps 
to a greater extent on the disequilibrium adjustment aspect of the analysis examining the effect of 
the length of the production run and multiplant firms on the adjustment process. 
The fourth element to the empirical analysis is the estimation of the cyclical determinants of large 
and small firm performance. It has been argued in section 11 that there is a variety of data 
available for which there are sound theoretical reasons to expect to influence performance levels. 
Most analyses include only one measure of the cycle, yet not all measures of the cycle measure 
precisely the same phenomena. We feel that this is an interesting empirical area to develop and 
therefore we attempt to distinguish between the different potential determinants. Foremost 
amongst these are the twin aspects of the use of stocks and capacity utilisation but in addition we 
examine the effect of the growth rate of industry sales. Because we are using a panel approach we 
can also control for aggregate cyclical factors through the use of yearly dummy variables. 
26 By way of example Cubbin and Geroski's (1990) study of the determinants of the speed of adjustment 
for 239 UK companies includes advertising intensity, concentration, market share , growth and capital 
intensity among other explanatory variables 
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V. Results of the analyses 
V. i. SummaEy analysis of d 
The data set used is the same panel of UK manufacturing size classes used in the previous 
chapter. In addition this data has been merged with data taken from the CBI Industrial Trends 
Survey on the proportion of firms operating below capacity and the net proportion of firms with 
excessive levels of inventory. A description of this CBI data and the methods used to compile it 
are contained within the data appendix to this chapter. 
Table I reports the coefficients of variation for the relevant cyclical variables, separating out the 
high, medium and low concentration industries. Both the inventory sales ratio and the price cost 
margin are, in general, more variable for the large firms than for the small firms. It has been 
suggested that, in theory, the inventory sales ratio may vary more as large, or oligopolistic firms 
have a wider set of motives for varying inventories and our results would appear to confirm this. 
However as most of these motives relate to a desire to smooth prices or costs it is perhaps 
surprising that the price cost margins of the large firms are more variable. It may be the case that 
the entry and exit of marginal firms serves to sufficiently dampen the variability of small firm 
price cost margins. However it is also the case that for both large and small firms price cost 
margins are more variable in highly concentrated industries. This combined with the greater 
variability of large firm price cost margins points to the existence of market power as the factor 
increasing the variability of price cost margins. It may therefore be the case that large firms have 
higher variability of price cost margins in spite of their greater reliance upon inventory. 
It should also be noted that price cost margins are lower for both small and large firms in highly 
concentrated industries as a result of the lower level of vertical integration in those industries. 
Using the alternative net output based price cost margin, that partially corrects for such 
differences in vertical integration, the statistics for which are not reported, the more concentrated 
industries have higher price cost margins but the same pattern of higher coefficients of variation 
in the industries with higher levels of concentration is repeated. Tlicre is no substantial evidence 
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of a greater variability of the stocks to output ratio in more highly concentrated industries. This 
finding runs counter to the Rotemberg and Saloner and other market power arguments that the 
inventory sales ratio should be more variable for both large firms and for firms in more highly 
concentrated industries. 'Me only slight confirmation for this is that the stocks to output ratio is 
higher for larger firms and the variability is higher for larger firms in medium and low 
concentration industries. The latter argument relies upon an intra, industry view of market power 
rather than an industry wide view. 
V. ii. Estimates of the profitabili1y (dis)advantage of large firms 
The next step of the application to the UK data is to estimate versions of Schmalensee's 
profitability advantage of large firms for the period 1980-1992. Schmalensee's methodology for 
calculating the elasticities of profitability is described in Schmalensee (1989b; p342-345) and this 
method is followed almost precisely here, with the exception that the size classes used are just the 
largest and smallest firms 27 and the size class bands are in terms of enterprise employment rather 
than assets. The method involves regressing gross profits, 7ri, which can be measured in three 
different ways, on some measure of size and the number of firms per size class. 
The three measures of gross profits used are, (i) the standard measure taken from the census, in 
this case net output minus operative wage costs. (ii) a 'synthetic' measure of gross profits which is 
the level of gross profits that each size class would have if the size class price cost margin was 
the same as the industry price cost margin. This measure of gross profits removes within industry 
variation and therefore focuses upon inter industry differences in profitability, (iii) an 'adjusted' 
measure of gross profits which removes the inter industry component focusing only on the intra 
industry component. More precisely, 
(i) ; r,,, is the gross profits of size class c in industry i. The 'synthetic' measure is then calculated 
by, 
27 There are relatively fewer size class bands in the UK census data due to the greater level of 
disaggrcgation used, many industries only have two or three size bands. For this reason it was decided to 
focus on the two size bands for which there is consistent data for all industries i. e. 1-99 employees and 
the largest five enterprises in the industry. 
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(ii) 7ej, = -L' s,,, where 7ci and si are gross profits and the measure of size at the industry level and 
Si 
sic is the size measure for class c in industry i. The 'adjusted' measure is tlicn calculated by, 
(iii) -1rT). si,, where 7rm and sm are gross profits and a measure of size at tile 
Si S. 
level of manufacturing as a whole. The two measures of size used were net output and gross 
output as these are the most commonly used in forming price cost margins. I'lic regression then 
takes the form, 
cw,,, +, 8s,,, ej, where nic is the number of firms in size class c of industry i. 
A regression of this form28 is estimated for each year, for each of the measures of gross profits 
and for the alternative size measures. Each regression can be used to form an estimated elasticity 
of profitability with respect to firm size which is derived (Schmalensee p342) as 
a O=- - a+Ps 
where s is the mean size of firm and relevant standard errors can also be calculated for these 
estimateS29. This leads to six different estimates for ý. 
Original Synthetic Adjusted 
Net Output ýI ý3 ý5 
Gross Output ý2 ý4 
The result of estimating three different elasticities for each size measure is that it becomes 
possible to decompose the elasticity of profitability with respect to size into those effects which 
can be attributed to inter industry characteristics and those which result from the profitability 
(dis)advantage of large to small firms across the economy as a whole. The original elasticity 
28 In addition there is a constant term included. All estimation is performed by OLS. Inference is based 
upon the heteroskcdasticity robust covariance matrix. 
29 The standard crrors arc calculated using the usual Taylor Series approximation ror testing non- 
linear restrictions (see Greene (1993), p218-220) where 
-2 
as aýs 
var(O)= var(a)+ ý var(#)+ -- cov(afl) 
(a +2 (a + fis) 2 (a +, 6S)4 
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should be a summation of the synthetic and adjusted estimates. Schmalensee regressed the 
estimated elasticities on various measures of the business cycle and discovered that they were 
countercyclical. As we have only thirteen annual estimates such small sample regression seems 
inappropriate in this case. Instead the estimates are presented in Tables 2 and 3 and are displayed 
graphically in Figures 14. 
Figure I presents the measures using net output as the size measure, Figure 2 presents the gross 
output estimates. From Figures I and 2 it is clear that for both measures of size the original 
elasticity of profitability with respect to firm size (ýl and ý2) are negative at the start of the 
period. Using gross output as the measure of size gives an original measure of the profitability 
advantage which is negative throughout the period. When we decompose this into an intra 
industry effect and an inter industry effect we can see that the original effect is dominated by the 
inter industry effect which is strongly negative throughout and becomes more strongly so towards 
the end of the period, i. e. in the 1990's recession. This indicates that there is a strong industry 
effect that profitability is higher where small firms are more important. This is only weakly 
countered by the positive effect of size per se. This contrasts with the net output based estimates 
in which both the pure size effect and the industry effects are both negative at the start of the 
period, although they are insignificantly different from zero, indicating a weak overall 
profitability advantage for small firms. This is reversed through the period but, throughout, the 
industry effect is insignificant and it is the pure size effect which has the dominant cffcct on the 
overall estimate. By point of note, Sclunalensee's estimates of the inter industry cffcct were also 
of negligible size relative to the pure size effect. The presence of a significant inter industry cffcct 
with the gross output estimates can probably be explained in terms of the important inter industry 
differences in material input usage we have discussed in chapter 3. We can also note that 
Schmalensee restricted himself to 2 digit industry codes lience may have lost some of the inter 
industry heterogeneity present in the 3 digit industries used here. 
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Figure 3 compares the intra industry effects for the two measures and Figure 4 makes the same 
comparison for the inter industry effects. The time path of the intra industry estimates is 
remarkably similar both exhibiting a fairly consistent upward trend which appears to slow or be 
reversed in the two recession periods at the beginning and end of the period. The effect of the 
boom in the latter part of the 1980's would appear to have been the accumulation of a pure size 
profitability effect. However, as the time period is relatively short we must exercise caution 
before adopting a complete cyclical interpretation of the results. Manufacturing output in the UK 
was stagnant in 1989, fell in 1990 and 1991 and did not resume an upward trend until the start of 
1993, after the end of the period of analysis. The peak years for UK manufacturing, based on the 
CBI evidence in chapter 1, were 1987 and 1988.4 , the net output measure of the pure size 
effect, peaks in 1989 and remains higher through the subsequent recession than it was in 1987 or 
before. "Me measure increase once again in 1992, before manufacturing output as a whole 
recovered. The gross output measure continues to rise until 1990 and exhibits no significant 
subsequent decline. It, therefore, appears likely that there is secular effect, brought on by 
industrial restructuring in the early and mid 1980's, which are dominating the cyclical effect. This 
argument would appear particularly compelling in relation to the gross output estimates which 
appear devoid of cyclical movement. 
The inter industry effects are more markedly different. There is no discernible time trend from the 
estimates but in both cases there is a fall (rise) in the profitability (dis)advantage of large firms in 
the 1990's. This would indicate that industries where large firms are important have performed 
badly in the recent recession, but overall the industry effect does not vary very much. It is 
interesting to note from Figures 3 and 4 that the difference between the two measures of 
profitability, which has been explored in more detail in chapter 3, is almost exclusively an 
industry effect. 
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V. iii. Persistence of profits estimates 
The next element in the analysis of dynamic performance is to investigate the degree of 
persistence, the determinants of persistence and how these may differ between large and small 
firms. If the small firms do form a competitive fringe we should expect a low level of persistence 
as any profits will be short term as they will be competed away by entry into the fringe. 
The standard autoregression in profits of the form, 
PCM, =a+ APCMt-I + E, (11) 
was estimated for both the large and small firm size classes for each industry3O. Estimation was 
by OLS. It may be argued that, with 13 annual observations per size class, such small sample 
regressions are inappropriate. We would note that, in most of the previously published studies, 
the time periods have been less than 20 years in duration, therefore our estimates offer a 
reasonable comparison. These generated estimates were then regressed on the various structural 
variables. As has been suggested above the statistical properties of such estimation procedures 
are open to question. Therefore, in addition, we estimate interactive specifications within a pooled 
model in order to directly estimate, in a single equation, the determinants of persistence. Initially 
we estimate a model of the form, 
PCM, 
t = a+, 
8OXjt +, 8j(Xjt*PCMjt-j)+XPCMjt-j + rit (12) 
Xit is an independent variable such as concentration". Ile determinants of persistence can be 
assessed using this approach though investigation of the PI coefficient and the predicted value of 
the persistence effect can be obtained from the equation, A=X+P, X,,. These estimates arc 
obtained in both levels and first differences. Estimating in levels imposes a constant value of a 
across industries. First differencing permits cc to vary across industries. However, by first 
differencing, following from the discussion in chapter 4, we also shift the focus onto the short run 
rather than long run effects of the independent variables. We have seen that concentration and 
advertising may differ in their short and long run effect and we wish to be sure that we capture 
30 It has been more conventional for estimates of persistence to be based upon firm level data. I lo%%, cvcr, 
this has not been the case exclusively, see Kcssides (1990) for an industry level example. 
31 The estimates use the full set of independent variables. We present the ease of a single indepciidmit 
variable for simplicity. 
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accurately the effects of persistence. Therefore, we consider, in addition, a specification of die 
form, 
PCM, t=ai+, Boxi+A(xi*Pcmit-i)+XPcmit-i+eit 
(13) 
IT 
where X, Xit . First differencing to elirninate the 
industry specific fixe cffects yields an d T 
estimating equation of the form, 
APCM,, =fl, (Xi*APCMi, -, 
)+XAPCM,, 
-, +Aei, 
(14) 
where APCM,, = PCM,, - PCMit-I . Given this specification, despite the first differencing and 
the use of a pooled sample, the estimated degree of persistence depends upon the mean level of 
the independent variables. 
Considering the initial estimates from (11), contrary to most of the previous studies in die 
persistence literature, the estimates of X were substantially lower on average for the small firm 
size class, . 224, than 
for the large firm size class, . 381, despite the fact that three values of X 
greater than 0.95 were excluded from the sample of large firms because of the implied instability 
of the predicted path of profits. The mean predicted long run levels of profitability, were 
almost identical for the two groups, . 324 for small firms, . 327 for large firms. T'his contradiction 
between the two results may indicate that while individual small firms may maintain a high level 
of profitability in spite of potential or actual entry the small firms as a group are responsive to 
such profitability changes and entry and exit do occur as a result altering the performance of tile 
small firms. Nevertheless it is clear that adjustment is still not instantaneous even for die small 
firm sector. The magnitude of the mean cocfficient for the large firms is on the low side for 
individual firms estimates. This may be the result of intcr or intra large firm group mobility 
which may lower the persistence of performance for the group below that of the firm. 
The estimated coefficients from (11) were regressed, using OLS, on various independent 
variables to attempt to analyse the determinants of the degree of persistence. The independent 
variables used were the conventional structural parameters considered in this framework, 
advertising, concentration and small firm market share. In addition, following the arguments from 
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section 11 we include a proxy measure of the length of production run to see if firms are slower to 
adjust if their production run is longer. We also include the number of plants per large enterprise 
as a measure of one aspect of the ability of large firms to smooth production. The results of these 
estimates are presented in Table 4. The results of the pooled estimates of (12) and (14) are 
reported in Table 5. 
Table 4 reports F-Tests indicating that a significant relationship can be determined for the 
standard estimates. However, there are problems with the diagnostic tests in the pooled methods 
of estimating the determinants of persistence32. The levels estimates of (12) indicate significant 
first order serial correlation, which may be attributed to dynamic mispecification and/or the 
omission of the fixed effects. Estimating (12) and (14) in first differences eliminates serial 
correlation, but the Sargan statistic fails for the small firm sample in estimating (14) and fails for 
the large firm sample in estimating (12). It should also be noted that for the small firms from the 
test of the joint significance of the interaction terms in the first difference estimates of (12) and 
(14) we cannot reject the null of no relationship. We therefore have to exercise some caution 
when interpreting these estimates. 
The most striking result concerning the estimated persistence parameters is the effect of the mean 
market share of the smaller firms. 'Me market share of the smaller firms increases the speed of 
adjustment of the performance of the large firms group implying that the large firms experience a 
greater degree of competitive pressure if on average the small firms are larger relative to the size 
of the market. This effect is present in both the conventional and the pooled estimates. The 
exception is the first difference estimates of (12). We have noted above our concerns that these 
estimates may be picking up the short run effects and this result appears to confirm this concern, 
Small firms with higher market shares increase competitive pressures but increases in tile mean 
market shares of the small firms do not. The presence of a small firms group with relatively high 
market shares would appear to lead to a greater threat of mobility into die oligopolistic group, 
32 It should be noted that we have ignored the problem of scrial correlation, in common with the 
general persistence literature, in the cstiniatcs of (I I). 
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using the Caves and Porter framework, or alternatively a greater degree of head on competition. 
Either effect could lead to a reduced ability of the large firms to hold on to any temporary degree 
of monopoly they can create. For the small firms the effect of their own market share is not well 
determined and the estimates are contradictory. The pooled estimates indicate more rapid 
adjustment whereas the conventional estimates indicate slower adjustment. The signs of the 
coefficients on concentration are consistent with such an interpretation implying a greater ability 
to hold on to monopoly power for large firms and a more marginalised rapid adjustment rate for 
the small firms group. However, these effects are not significant in any of the estimates. 
Perhaps surprisingly advertising intensity does not appear to have a strong effect on the ability to 
sustain an increased price cost margin for either group of firms. The sign is consistently negative 
for the large firms indicating a reduced ability to hold onto excess profits, but this effect is only 
significant in one of the cases. Longer production runs appear to increase the speed of adjustment 
for the large firms and reduce the speed of adjustment weakly for small firms. WUlst the latter 
may seem intuitive the former does not. The measure of the length of production run is, by 
construction, highly correlated with the inventory - gross output ratio and it may be that the 
increased speed of adjustment is rather due to a greater level of inventory usage. Ilie multiplant 
coefficient is of the 'right' sign implying smoothing of adjustment but is insignificant for the large 
firms in all estimates and for the small firms in the pooled estimates. The cffccts of material 
inputs is not generally well determined but the sign of coefficients imply that the large f inn group 
can hold on to its higher price cost margins better when vertically integrated. 
The determinants of the predicted long run price cost margin are analysed in Table 4, advertising 
intensity is the only significant determinant and this applies to both small and large firms. It is not 
possible given the specifications reported in Table 5 to observe the implied long run value of the 
price cost margin. It is clear from the predicted coefficients generated by (11) that small firms are 
quicker to adjust to normal levels of profitability. However, the ability to detertnine the factors 
that effect the speed of adjustment for small firms is lower. The cstiniates point to the market 
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shares of the small firms and the length of the production run as important determinants of the 
speed of adjustment for large finns and to a lesser degree advertising and concentration. 
V. iv. The determinants of pyclical performance 
The next part of the analysis is an attempt to discover the cyclical determinants of the 
performance of small firms and large firms. The focus is upon attempting to discover whether 
some cyclical factors affect small firms/large firms to a greater or lesser degree. Consistent data 
is available for the period 1984-1992. Data between 1980 and 1984 is used for instrument 
purposes but not in the direct estimation. In addition to the cyclical components we include 
concentration, small firm market share and their lagged values, and the lagged dependent variable 
in the estimation process. These are the relevant included variables from the analysis in chapter 4. 
Further lags of these variables did not prove collectively significant hence we restrict the lag 
length to I in each of these cases. The cyclical variables considered are the proportion of firms 
reporting below capacity operation (PBC) and the net proportion reporting excessive levels of 
finished good inventory(ERM, both of these variables are taken from the CBI Industrial trends 
survey. In addition the growth rate of industry sales (GROW) and the ratio of stocks and work in 
progress to gross output (at the size class level) (INVSAL) are included from the UK Census of 
Production data. 
Determining the appropriate lag length for the cyclical variables is made more difficult by the 
need to maximise the number of observations available for estimation. The lag length of three was 
chosen as a compromise between this interest of maximising the number of observations and the 
desire to have as complete a description of the dynamic process as possible. In most of the cases 
considered for the large firms, a joint test of the variables dated W proves significant at the 5% 
level. For the small firms, however, such a test is only significant in the sample of production to 
stock industries. This is consistent with a more rapid response to cyclical factors on the part of 
small firms. Formally, the presence of significant tests of the variables dated 0 might indicate a 
potential problem of underspecification and the initial adoption of an insufficiently general 
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approaCh33. We should note, however, that all of the previous panel data studies on tile issue, 
discussed in section III above, have only made use of contemporaneous independent variables and 
restricted any dynamic specification to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variab104. T11c results 
presented here therefore represent a significant advance on the kind of dynamic specification 
previously adopted. 
A fiirther point of note regarding the specification is that we use the conventional (gross output) 
definition of the price cost margin and correct for vertical integration by included the ratio of 
material inputs as a right hand side variable. T'his correction is important. As has been shown in 
section V. ii. above, at an aggregate level, the conventional price cost margins exhibits less 
cyclical variation than the net output price cost margin. Estimation using the conventional margin 
with no correction yielded little cyclical movement and indeed frequently led to insignificant 
aggregate time effects measured by the yearly dummy variables, Estimation using the net output 
margin produces a more pronounced cyclical effect akin to the estimates Presented below. Our 
results therefore differ from those of Haskel and Martin (1992) who report that estimation 
without correction did not substantially effect their results. 
As we have no problems, given the focus of this chapter, with producing short run estimates of 
the parameters only the first difference estimates that implicitly exclude fixed cffccts from the 
data are considered. Estimation in levels always proved susceptible to serial correlation and was 
therefore rejected. Estimation was by the GMM procedure outlined in Arrcllano and Bond 
(1988). Following the concerns expressed in Schmalensee (1989a) regarding the cxogencity of 
any contemporaneous variables and, as all of the cyclical variables are potentially subjcct to 
33 The merits and demerits of parsimony in the selection of dynamic specification arc considered in 
more detail in Hendry (1995) esp. Chap 15 and Keuzcnkamp and McAleer (1995). 
34 An exception to this is Berg (1986) which examined the effect of excess capacity on collusion in 
Norwegian manufacturing industry making use of up to 6 lags of excess capacity, but not within a panel, 
instead estimating for different sectors. Berg's findings demonstrated important differences between the 
contemporaneous impact effect of excess capacity and the subsequent lagged cffects demonstrating the 
benefits in this context of a more general specification. 
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strategic manipulation of the firms concerned, we regard all of the contemporaneous cyclical 
variables as endogenous and they are therefore instrumented. 
Coefficient estimates and t ratios for the estimates of the cyclical determinants of price cost 
margins for both small and large firm groups for all manufacturing industries are given in Table 
6. The results of a subdivision of the sample into consumer goods and producer goods industries 
is reported in Table 7 and a subdivision into production to stock and production to order 
industries is reported in Table 8. Diagnostic tests for all estimates are presented in Table 9. 
The diagnostic tests indicate no problem of serial correlation in any of the results. In only one 
case does a test of the joint significance of PBC, EINV and GROW fail to reject the null of no 
relationship. This case, the large firm group in consumer goods industries, is apparently 
problematic because, in addition, it is one of two cases where the time dummies are not jointly 
significant and the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions fails. This is, therefore, an 
indication of some kind of dynamic mispecification for this case. In the other cases, only for the 
large firms in the production to order subdivision are there indications of problems from the 
Sargan statistic. There is limited evidence of collinearity between the cyclical variables. In two 
cases the joint test is significant while individual tests on each of these variables are all 
insignificant. However the correlation matrix reveals that the highest correlation between the 
independent variables is 0.5, the correlation between the contemporaneous values of EINV and 
PBC. 
Overall there is little evidence that the performance of small firms is less responsive to cyclical 
factors than large firms. The overall cyclical assessment needs to combine not only the estimated 
capacity, inventory and demand parameters but also the aggregate, economy wide cffccts 
captured by the annual dummy variables. In all cases the time dummies are jointly significant at 
the 5% level for the small firms estimates. For the large firms there are no significant aggregate 
effects for either the production to stock or the consumer goods subdivisions. In the case of 
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consumer goods we have already identified potential mispecification. as an issue, this 
mispecification may be either a cause or an effect of this absence of aggregate effects. 
Ile time dummies are important because they indicate a different time path over the cycle for the 
large and small firms. In the aggregate the large firms exl-ffit a relatively traditional procyclical 
path. The dummy variables indicate a peak in 1987/88, a trough in 1990 and a substantial 
recovery in 1992. This is also the time path in the producer goods and production to order 
subdivisions. No substantial movement is indicated for the other subdivisions. For the small 
firms, considering all manufacturing industries, there is a slight peak in 1987/88 followed by 
much larger declines in 1990 and 1992. These troughs in 1990 and 1992 are common to all 
subdivisions except production to order industries. The timing of the peak varies across 
subdivisions with producer goods experiencing a peak in 1989 and consumer goods in 1988. The 
smaller peak is consistent with the theories discussed in section 11 above that predicted that the 
effect of demand changes would be to increase large firm margins to a greater extent. Ile relative 
behaviour in 1992 is somewhat enigmatic, not only because, as the last year of the data, it 
anticipates questions concerning the performance in the subsequent years. 1992 was a year in 
which manufacturing output was stagnant after the declines of 1990 and 1991. It is therefore 
surprising that such a strong resurgence in margins of large firms should occur in the absence of 
capacity pressures or substantial demand growth. The fact that the rise was concentrated in 
producer goods industries may indicate that it is a result of increases in the degree of collusion, in 
the form of the conventional raw material 'cartels' response to prolonged recession, which were 
reported at this tiMe35. If this was the reason for the rise the small firms apparcntly did not 
benefit, indeed their price cost margins fell indicating greater competitive pressures. The reasons 
for the apparent absence of any discernible cyclical movement in consumer goods industries is 
unclear. 
35 The Economist 22MI994 reports tensions amongst several informal 'cartcls'that had been set tip 
over the previous two years. 
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The cyclical determinants of performance for small firms appear relatively constant across the 
sub samples of manufacturing industry. In each of the cases reported, PBC has a net positive 
effect on small firms perforniance, EINV has a negative effect on small firms performance and 
GROW has a positive effect on small firms performance. EINV is predicted to have a negative 
effect on performance if it induces "sales" of surplus stock or price cutting behaviour to restore a 
balance between production and sales. Similarly the growth rate of industry sales, as a general 
indicator or the state of demand, should lead to increased performance through the effects on the 
elasticity of demand discussed in section II. ii. above. The effect of excess capacity is perhaps 
more surpfiSing36. Capacity feeds through into performance in many ways so there is no 
unambiguous expectation of sign on these coefficients. It would be more strongly expected that 
large firms would benefit from excess capacity as a tool for enforcing collusion, but this 
expectation is not universally met. The magnitude of these effects varies from sample to sample 
but for small firms the sign does not. PBC and GROW play a quantitatively larger role in 
consumer goods industries and EINV a larger role in producer goods industries. GROW also 
plays a more important role in production to stock industries rather than production to order 
industries for small firms. 
The pattern is less clear for the large firm sample. Overall there is a weak positive effect of PBC 
but this masks a negative (procyclical) effect for producer goods industries and a positive 
(countercyclical) effect for consumer goods industries. EINV similarly reduces price cost margins 
of large firms in producer goods and production to stock industries but has negligible net effects 
otherwise. GROW has a strong positive effect on the price cost margins of large firms in 
producer goods and production to stock industries and a weaker effect elsewhere. 
Subsequent to these estimates, we present in Table 10 estimates of the cyclical detcrminants of 
relative performance, measured by the ratio of large firm price cost margin to small firm price 
36 Cowling (1983) has pointed to a potential problem with the measure of excess capacity. The measure 
on 
, 
ly identifies the proportion of firms reporting excess capacity not the degree of excess capacity. This 
distinction is potentially important because a recorded increase may simply indicate thit excess capacity 
is becoming more widespread within the industry rather than increasing in dcpth. 
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cost margin. These estimates attempt to identify the significance of differences in the determinants 
of the performance of the two groups of firms. This analysis includes that same subdivision of 
manufacturing industry. Diagnostic tests are presented in Table 11. The diagnostic tests indicate 
failure of the Sargan test for the consumer and producer goods subdivisions. The consumer goods 
example is to be expected given the problem with the large firms estimates in tws subdivision. 
Overall there is only a significant effect of the cyclical parameter in the producer goods and 
production to stock subdivisions. The analysis of the time dummies for this set of estimates 
confirms the above discussion of the separate estimates. There is a peak in the relative 
performance advantage in 1987/1988, a subsequent trough in 1990/1991 followed by a rapid 
recovery in 1992. Again this effect is concentrated in the producer goods and production to order 
industries. The time dummies are jointly insignificant in the other subdivisions. 
EM has a uniforn-dy positive impact effect which indicates that small firms fare worse, the 
effects on both large and small individually is negative, under conditions of oversupply and this 
effect appears to persist for at least a year. This may indicate that the cost of holding surplus 
stocks are greater for small firms hence they must sell at a loss while they can. Similarly large 
firms fare better when capacity is limited and worse when excess capacity reappears, although 
there appears to be a response lag of at least a year to this effect. This effect is particularly 
marked for the producer goods and production to order sectors. The effect of demand growth 
appears to be relatively evenly distributed across large and small firms except in the producer 
goods industries where large firms benefit, in the long run at least, from higher demand growth to 
a greater extent. 
VI. Conclusion 
In conclusion we can identify five main results in this chapter. Firstly, whilst differences between 
the cyclical performance of large and small firms exist they are not dramatic. It cannot be stated 
unambiguously from our results that large or small firms are more or less responsive to tile 
business cycle. The differences that exist are, in particular, unstable across subsectors of industry 
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and are not uniformly related to any particular measure of the business cycle either in aggregate 
or in terms of industry specific measures. This result which slightly overturns our prior beliefs 
wiII be discussed to a greater extent in the next chapter. 
Secondly, the analysis of the time dummies, in the estimates of the cyclical determinants of 
performance, and the estimates of the Schmalensee elasticities both point to difficulties in 
separating out cyclical from secular factors. The time path of the performance advantage of large 
firms has some cyclical elements but cannot be explained purely as a procyclical phenomenon. 
Ilie Schmalensee estimates point to a secular rise in the performance advantage of large firms the 
causes of which may lie in corporate and industrial restructuring over the period rather than 
cyclical factors. In the relatively short time periods that we have to analyse here, in common with 
most of the previous studies of the trade cycle, the business of separating trend from cycle is 
difficult. The absence of a significant downturn in the profitability of large firms in the 1990's 
recession is a particular feature of these aggregate estimates. 
Thirdly, the analysis of the time effects on relative performance have indicated a more complex 
cyclical path than could be accounted for in examining either the aggregate or the industry level 
growth of manufacturing output or demand. We have identified important differences in the 
response of the different subsectors both in their response to aggregate shocks embodied in the 
time dummies and in response to local demand, capacity and inventory levels. We have offered 
some potential explanations for these differences between the subsectors, but there is a need for 
further work to check both the robustness of the results contained here and to examine more 
closely the reasons why different types of industries react differently to the cycle. 
Fourthly, the analysis of the dynamic adjustment processes provides evidence that the 
perforniance of the small firms sector does adjust more rapidly to both cyclical factors and 
general disequilibriurn disturbances. If we combine these estimates with tile Previous estimates 
which indicate that, at the firm level, there is little evidence of more rapid adjustment by smaller 
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firms we can attribute this result to an effect affecting the small firm sample, i. e. the cffects of 
greater entry and greater intra, group mobility leading to smoother adjustment than for the more 
stable large firm group, rather than a result purely driven by differential sizes. 
Fifthly, we have been able to provide evidence that the presence of relatively larger small firms 
leads to a more rapid adjustment on the part of the large firms. In this case we cannot say 
definitively whether this is because the presence of larger small firms leads to greater changes in 
composition of the large firms group or because there is a greater competitive threat or a 
combination of the two. Intuitively the presence of a number of firms with market shares 
significant enough to approach the largest five is likely to provide both of these potential threats 
to the existing large firms. 
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Tahle 1: Summarv Statistics ranked bv Industrv Concentration 
All High 
Concentration 
Medium Low 
Coefficient of Variation 
INVSAL (large) . 187 . 197 . 156 . 209 (. 094) (. 083) (. 061) (. 123) 
PCM (large) . 148 . 171 . 141 . 131 (. 077) (. 092) (. 073) (. 058) 
INVSAL (small) . 157 . 203 . 122 . 146 (. 079) (. 101) (. 043) (. 058) 
PCM (small) . 113 . 176 . 089 . 073 (. 090) (. 124) (. 042) (. 037) 
Excess Inv. 1.086 1.332 . 971 . 957 (. 624) (. 836) (. 447) (. 453) 
Below Capac. . 331 . 355 . 327 . 310 (. 075) (. 093) (. 074) (. 047) 
Grow 16.04 17.5 19.6 11.1 
(37.5) (30.4) (54.6) (19.4) 
Mean 
INVSAL (large) . 214 . 249 . 187 . 205 (. 186) (. 292) (. 094) (. 101) 
PCM (large) . 317 . 293 . 321 . 337 (. 097) (. 090) (. 101) (. 099) 
INVSAL (small) . 169 . 175 . 163 . 169 (. 075) (. 105) (. 052) (. 060) 
PCM (small) . 302 . 286 . 304 . 316 (. 077) (. 087) (. 075) (. 068) 
Excess Inv. . 152 . 149 . 166 . 142 
(. 080) (. 086) (. 083) (. 069) 
Below Capac. . 583 . 574 . 586 . 588 (. 083) (. 093) (. 088) (. 068) 
Grow . 043 . 036 . 046 . 047 (. 028) (. 030) (. 030) (. 024) 
, No of Industries 
87 29 29 29 
Notes: INVSAL is the ratio of stocks and work in progress to gross output. PCM is the conventionally 
defined price cost margin. Excess Inv. is the net proportion of firms reporting excessive rather than 
insufficient levels of inventory. Below Capac. is the proportion of firms reporting below capacity 
operation. Grow is the growth rate of industry sales. Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses. 
I-ligh, Medium and Low Concentration samples are the top, middle and bottom thirds of the sample 
ranked by concentration. 
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Table 2: Estimates of Profitability Elasticities 
Net OutDut based estimates 
Year ý1- ý 
--I 
ý n, 
1980 -0.012 -0.006 -0.006** 
1981 -0.011 -0.005 -0.006* 
1982 -0.007 -0.001 -0.006* 
1983 0.010 0.008 0.002 
1984 0.013 0.009 0.004** 
1985 0.008 0.008 0.001 
1986 0.020* 0.014 0.006* 
1987 0.020* 0.011 0.010* 
1988 0.027** 0.010 0.019** 
1989 0.029** 0.009 0.022** 
1990 0.029** 0.005 0.026* 
1991 0.024 -0.001 0.026** 
1992 0.024 0.002 0.024* 
Notes: 
1* ý11 ý3, and ý, are the original, synthetic and adjusted estimates respectively, as defined in the tcx-t, 
2. * indicates test distributed as N(O, 1) that estimate is different from zero, significant at the 5% level 
** indicates same test, significant at the 1% level 
Table 3: Estimates of Profitability Elasticities 
Gross OutDut based estimates 
Year ý 2- ý 4 ý r, 
1980 -0. 095* -0. 096* 0.004 
1981 -0. 103* -0. 101* 0.001 
1982 -0. 106* -0. 106* 0.003 
1983 -0. 079* -0. 087* 0.008 
1984 -0. 094* -0. 107* 0.013** 
1985 -0. 095** -0. 101** 0.008 
1986 -0. 070* -0. 081* 0.012* 
1987 -0. 076* -0. 090* 0.016* 
1988 -0. 063* -0. 095* 0.031** 
1989 -0. 050* -0. 090* 0.038** 
1990 -0. 067* -0. 098* 0.032* 
1991 -0. 102** -0. 125* 0.025* 
11992 -0. 118** -0. 143** 0.029* 
Notes: 
1* ý21 ý, and ý6 are the original, synthetic and adjusted estimates respectively, as defined in the text. 
2. * indicates test distributed as N(O, 1) that estimate is different from zero, significant at the 5% level 
** indicates same test, significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4: Persistence of Profits Estimates (UK manufacturinL, 1980-1992) 
Xs X1 ((X/1-%) s ((X/ 1 -%) 1 
CONC -0.114 0.220 0.046 0.044 
(0.73) (1.38) (1.05) (1.68) 
ms 1.575 -3.416 -0.174 -0.277 
(1.69) (4.83) (0.59) (1.34) 
A, DINT 0.642 -0.078 0.377 0.542 
(1.01) (0.12) (2.62) (4.87) 
PROD 0.029 -0.019 0.0003 -0.002 
(1.22) (1.96) (0.04) (1.70) 
MP 0.016 0.004 0.0007 0.002 
(2.70) (0.54) (0.76) (1.18) 
MY 0.514 -0.533 -0.353 -0.853 
(1.41) (1.80) (1.20) (11.87) 
CONST -0.292 0.675 0.447 0.702 
(1.32) (3.80) (2.95) (15.05) 
F-Test 2.89 6.34 4.31 28.8 
(6,80) (6,77) (6,80) (6,77) 
Observations 87 84 87 84 
Notes: 
I. Dependent variables are based upon the estimated coefficients of a regression of the form 
PCMt=ot+XPCMt-l+et for each industry. s and I refer to the smal-I and large firms size classes 
respectively. Three observations were excluded from the large firm sample bemuse of the implied 
instability of the process from the estimated coefficients. 
2. CONC is the five firm concentration ratio, MS is the average market share of the small firms, ADINT 
is a measure of advertising intensity, PROD is the length of the production run, W is number of plants 
per large enterprise, MY is the ratio of material inputs to gross output. All independent variables are 
industry or size class means for the period 1980-1992. 
3. All estimation is by OLS. Heteroskedasticity robust t ratios are in parentheses. F-Tcst is a F-test of the 
joint significance of the independent variables, degrees of freedom in parentheses. All tests rcjcct the 
null ofjoint insignificance at the 5% level. 
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Table 5: Dvnamic Persistence Estimates (UK manufacturinz 1985-1992) 
M 
SPCM 
(ii) (iii) (iv) 
LPCM 
(V) (vi) 
CONC 0.036 -0.121 0.028 0.128 
(2.08) (1.49) (1.22) (1.68) 
CONC*PCM -0.074 0.157 -0.587 0.011 -0.325 0.338 
(1.31) (0.63) (0.93) (0.16) (1.86) (0.49) 
Ms 0.223 0.108 0.246 -0.025 
(1.84) (0.62) (2.44) (0.19) 
MS*PCM -1.506 -0.014 -5.077 -1.936 0.301 -7.288 
(2.09) (0.02) (1.47) (3.59) (0.45) (5.19) 
ADINT 0.023 -0.250 0.184 0.004 
(0.35) (1.19) (2.23) (0.02) 
ADINT*PCM 0.379 0.570 -0.378 -0.010 -0.724 -6.3S8 
(1.79) (0.89) (0.17) (0.04) (0.86) (2.18) 
PROD 0.007 0.008 0.001 -0.004 
(1.07) (1.41) (0.35) (1.53) 
PROD*PCM -0.015 -0.016 0.033 -0.006 0.007 -0.057 
(0.81) (1.13) (1.16) (1.45) (1.56) (2.99) 
MP 0.000 0.004 -0.000 -0.005 
(0.04) (1.67) (0.05) (1.23) 
MP*PCM -0.0003 -0.011 0.001 0.0001 0.009 0.003 
(0.13) (1.64) (0.03) (0.07) (1.47) (0.29) 
MY -0.380 -0.646 -0.322 -0.941 
(8.58) (4.46) (9.82) (5.46) 
MY*PCM -0.224 -0.865 -0.404 -0.603 -0.066 -0.892 
(1.90) (1.94) (0.21) (7.16) (0.14) (1.13) 
PCMt. 
-, 
0.5S6 0.485 0.880 0.772 0.143 2.039 
(4.13) (1.77) (0.70) (12.9) (0.46) (3.47) 
Serial Corr. 6.894 -0.656 -0.669 7.874 -1.439 -0.207 
Sargan N/A 52.5 76.2 N/A 83.7 5s. 7 
Time 2.99 56.4 26.0 12.8 27.3 25.6 
Wald 19.6 6.96 8.39 94.3 13.0 44.1 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variables are the price cost margins of the small and large firm groups in (i)-(iii) and (iv)- 
(vi) respectively. 
2. Estimation is by OLS in levels in (i) and (iv). Estimation in (ii), (iii), (v) and (vi) is by first 
diffcrcnced instrumental variables using the Arrcllano and Bond GMM procedure. Instruments are lags 
of the dependent and independent variables dated t-2 and back. Robust one step t ratios are in 
parentheses. 
3. CONC is the five firm concentration ratio, MS is the average market share of tile small firms, ADINT 
is a measure of advertising intensity, PROD is the length of the production run, MP is number of plants 
per large enterprise, MY is the ratio of material inputs to gross output. Tile interaction terms in 
(i), (ii), (iv) and (v) are the contemporaneous independent variable multiplied by the lagged dependent 
variable. e. g. CONC*PCM=CONCt*PCMt-1. In (iii) and (vi) indcpcndent variables are the industry or 
size class means for the period 1980-1992 interacted with the lagged dependent variable. 
4. Serial Coff. is a robust test of first order correlation in (i) and (iv), and a robust test of sccond order 
correlation in (ii), (iii), (v) and (vi). The test is distributed as N(O, 1). Sargan is the test of ovcridcntifying 
restrictions distributed as X2 with 43 degrees of freedom. Time is a test of the joint significance of the 
yearly dummy variables distributed as X2 with degrees of freedom in parentheses. Wald is a joint test or 
the significance of the interaction terms distributed as X2 with 6 dcgrecs of frccdoni. 
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Table 6: Business Cycle Estimates - All ManufacturinLT 
II LPCM. S 7cm. 
Pact 0.200 0.129 
(1.26) (1.03) 
PBC, 
_j -0.042 
0.168 
(0.35) (1.48) 
PBC, 
_, 
0.027 0.132 
(0.24) (1.33) 
Pact--A 0.004 0.310 
(0.02) (1.80) 
EINV, 0.086 -0.172 
(0.58) (1.51) 
EINVt-l 0.135 -0.060 
(0.87) (0.36) 
EI NVt 
_, 7 
0.142 -0.064 
(0.95) (0.40) 
EINV,, 
_, 4 -0.263 -0.186 (1.99) (1.76) 
GROW, 0.063 0.050 
(2.86) (2.17) 
GROW, 
_, 
0.057 0.043 
(1-84) (2.11) 
GROW, 
_q 
0.052 0.038 
(2.14) (2.02) 
GROWtýj 0.060 0.029 
(3.04) (1.88) 
INVSAL, -0.003 0.016 
(0.13) (0.32) 
INVSALt-I -0.054 -0.009 
(1.55) (0.17) 
INVSALt_? 0.063 0.011 
(1.99) (0.25) 
INVSAL,. 
_*A -0.055 
0.047 
(1.50) (0.66) 
MY, -0.963 -0.890 
(21.4) (17.8) 
MY, --I 0.104 -0.022 
(0.91) (0.19) 
CONCt 0.039 -0.135 
(0.71) (2.99) 
CONC, 
-, -0.097 
0.033 
(2.10) (0.70) 
ms, 0.333 0.261 
(3.95) (2.62) 
ms, 
_i 0.135 -0.027 
(1.33) (0.35) 
PcMI--l 0.136 -0.006 
(1.07) (0.05) 
Notes: Estimation is by first difference IV. LPCM is the price cost margins of the large firms. SPCM is 
the price cost margin of the small firms. Robust one-step t ratios are in parentheses. COefliciclits on PBC 
and EINV have been multiplied by 10. Instrument information, data definitions and diagnostic tcstsarc 
reported in Table 9 and its notes. 
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Table 7: Business Cvcle Estimates: Consurner/f 
Consumer 
LPCM, SPcM' 
PBC' 0.030 0.200 
(0.15) (1.37) 
PBC'-' 0.204 0.287 
(1.65) (2.19) 
PBct-, p 0.181 0.213 
(1.18) (1.94) 
Pac'-l 0.281 0.421 
(1.54) (1.88) 
EINV,. -0.019 -0.065 
(0.10) (0.38) 
EINV, 
_, 
0.158 -0.042 
(0.811) (0.28) 
EINV, 
_. > 
0.065 -0.165 
(0.401) (1.28) 
EINVj. 
_j -0.120 -0.226 (0.585) (1.70) 
GROW, 0.475 0.044 
(0.02) (2.06) 
GROW, 
_, 
0.027 0.046 
(1.10) (2.56) 
GROW, 
_q 
0.023 0.042 
(1.14) (2.63) 
GROW, 
_, A 
0.014 0.030 
(0.80) (1.85) 
INVSALt 0.032 -0.021 
(0.87) (0.51) 
INVSAL,. 
_, 
0.065 -0.017 
(1.19) (0.43) 
INVSAL, 
_, -0.085 -0.034 (1.87) (1.18) 
INVSAL,. 
_, 
0.044 0.011 
(0.72) (0.21) 
Ky'. -0.858 -0.977 
(13.0) (18.8) 
MY, 
_, 0.107 -0.212 (0.77) (1.55) 
CONC, 0.096 -0.051 
(1.09) (0.98) 
CONC, 
_j -0.002 
0.022 
(0.03) (0.32) 
MS'. -0.632 1.375 
(0.72) (2.19) 
MS'-' -0.363 1.514 
(0.34) (2.85) 
PCMI. 
-I 
0.064 -0.209 
(0.48) (1.40) 
NOWS: Sec notcs to Tablcs 6 and 9 
LPCM, 
-0.054 
(0.34) 
-0.002 
(0.02) 
0.026 
(0.19) 
-0.357 
(2.13) 
-0.049 
(0.43) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
0.019 
(0.18) 
-0.281 
(2.21) 
0.059 
(3.95) 
0.041 
(2.05) 
0.045 
(2.56) 
0.029 
(1.54) 
-0.026 
(0.70) 
-0.022 
(0.68) 
0.110 
(5.29) 
-0.012 
(0.31) 
-0.950 
(17.6) 
0.150 
(1.17) 
0.056 
(1.03) 
-0.065 
(1.43) 
0.348 
(4.98) 
0.042 
(0.69) 
0.125 
(0.96) 
Producer 
s 
0.068 
(0.49) 
0.181 
(1.91) 
0.197 
(1.98) 
0.099 
(0.64) 
-0.195 
(1.53) 
-0.232 
(1.80) 
-0.183 
(1.61) 
-0.157 
(1.92) 
0.040 
(2.50) 
0.017 
(0.95) 
0.005 
(0.28) 
0.006 
(0.39) 
-0.033 
(0.54) 
0.042 
(0.82) 
0.003 
(0.04) 
0.069 
(0.95) 
-0.888 
(10.7) 
0.059 
(0.53) 
-0.130 
(3.68) 
0.040 
(0.76) 
0.124 
(1.81) 
-0.076 
(1.18) 
0.043 
(0.39) 
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Table 8: Busineqq Cvcle Estimates: Production to Stock/Order IndivOrip-q 
Production 
LPCM. 
to Stock 
SpCm. 
Production 
LPCM. 
to Order 
SPCm. 
PBC' 0.120 -0.038 0.005 0.100 
(1.02) (0.29) (0.03) (0.59) 
PBC'-' 0.246 0.149 0.106 0.188 
(1.36) (2.07) (0.96) (1.40) 
PBC, 
-, 
0.184 0.077 0.075 0.200 
(1.19) (0.49) (0.49) (1.87) 
PBC'-. ' 0.087 0.251 -0.036 0.014 
(0.48) (2.18) (0.21) (0.09) 
EINV, -0.435 -0.195 0.182 -0.109 
(1.96) (1.29) (1.03) (0.84) 
EINV,. 
_, -0.351 
0.098 -0.018 -0.071 
(1.38) (0.55) (0.15) (0.55) 
EINV'-'l -0.290 0.046 0.017 -0.057 
(1.29) (0.26) (0.14) (0.48) 
EINV'-' -0.206 -0.067 -0.232 -0.122 
(1.30) (0.39) (1.89) (1.48) 
GROW, 0.047 0.035 0.055 0.077 
(2.34) (1.58) (3.00) (2.76) 
GROW, 
_, 
0.058 0.037 0.029 0.038 
(2.48) (1.96) (1.29) (1.62) 
GROW, 
_, 
0.045 0.053 0.029 0.026 
(2.14) (2.47) (1.34) (1.19) 
GROW, 
_, 
0.023 0.051 0.017 -0.021 
(1.10) (3.02) (1.09) (0.96) 
INVSAL,. 0.007 0.052 -0.009 -0.089 
(0.21) (1.95) (0.31) (1.15) 
I NVSAIt 
-1 
0.036 -0.020 -0.042 0.114 
(1.59) (0.93) (1.49) (1.41) 
INVSALI. 
_. > -0.062 -0.034 
0.086 -0.131 
(1.69) (0.94) (3.99) (1.69) 
INVSAL'-' 0.046 -0.074 -0.035 0.044 
(2.11) (1.60) (0.96) (0.55) 
MY, -0.852 -0.862 -0.983 -0.966 
(17.2) (17.6) (23.2) (24.9) 
MY, 
-, 
0.051 0.118 0.143 0.014 
(0.33) (1.17) (1.28) (0.10) 
CONC, 0.114 -0.088 0.089 -0.122 
(2.85) (2.00) (1.19) (2.83) 
CONCt. 
-I -0.012 
0.051 -0. '090 0.023 
(0.27) (1.18) (1.75) (0.53) 
ms, 0.244 0.225 -0.009 -0.112 
(3.18) (2.13) (0.012) (0.27) 
mst-, 0.056 0.033 0.030 0.010 
(0.83) (0.36) (0.05) (0.02) 
PCM'-' 0.024 0.142 0.139 -0.024 
(0.14) (1.47) (1.27) (0.16) 
Notes: See notes to Tables 6 and 9 
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Table 9: DiaLynostic Tests for Tables 6.7 and 8 
All Manufacturing 
LPCM SPCM 
Sargan 64.2(57) 55.3(57) 
Time Dums: 25.1(8) 34.3(8) 
Wald 37.1(12) 35.4(12) 
Serial Correlation -0.319 -0-065 
PBC 2.92 5.04 
EINV 6.62 5.01 
GROW 12.2 8.04 
INVSAL 5.75 1.12 
T-3 27.5 9.06 
Observations 696 696 
Cons umer Producer 
LPCM SPCM LPCM SPCM 
Sargan 95.4(57) 75.0(57) 67.6(57) 61.8(57) 
Time Dums 9.54(8) 34.6(8) 20.9(8) 21.7(8) 
Wald 9.15(12) 26.2(12) 89.9(12) 34.0(12) 
Serial Correlation 0.437 -0.118 -0.919 -1.352 
PBC 4.56 9.45 7.79 5.30 
EINV 1.84 4.77 11.2 4.60 
GROW 2.44 8.08 20.8 9.52 
INVSAL 4.55 4.76 34.8 3.06 
T-3 3.78 7.93 34.4 3.76 
Observations 328 328 368 368 
Producti on to Stock Production to Order 
LPCM SPCM LPCM SPCM 
Sargan 69.1(57) 64.1(57) 80.9(57) 69.5(57) 
Time Dums 7.24(8) 18.9(8) 19.4(8) 24.3(8) 
Wald 56.3(12) 43.1(12) 52.0(12) 72.4(12) 
Serial Correlation 0.823 -0.351 -0.955 0.447 
PBC 3.23 7.89 1.69 3.90 
EINV 4.96 12.9 5.98 2.44 
GROW 16.7 11.2 15.3 23.0 
INVSAL 15.4 7.76 18.9 4.27 
T-3 9.73 19.1 7.48 3.87 
observations 240 240 456 456 
Notes: 
1. Estimation is by first differcticed instrumental variables using the GMM procedure of Arrellano and 
Bond(1988). Instruments are lags of the independent and dependent variables dated t-2 and back. 
2. PBC is the percentage of firms reporting below capacity operation. EINV is the net proportion of 
firms reporting excessive finished goods inventory levels. INVSAL is the ratio of stocks and work in 
progress to gross output. GROW is the growth rate of industry sales. MY is the ratio of material inputs 
to gross output. CONC is the five firm concentration ratio. MS is the mean market share of the small 
firms. 
3. Sargan is a test of overidentifying restrictions distributed as j2 with degrees of freedom in 
parentheses. Time Dums is ajoint test of the significance of the yearly dummy variables distributed as j2 
with degrees of freedom in parentheses. Serial Correlation is a test of second order serial correlation 
distributed as N(O, 1). Wald is a joint test of the significance of PBC, EINV and GROW distributed as X2 
with degrees of freedom in parentheses. PBC, EINV, INVSAL and GROW arc joint tests of the 4 
cocfficients on each of these variables plus their lags. T-3 is a test of thejoint significance of the 4 
coefficients dated t-3. These tests are distributed as Xý with 4 degrees of freedom. Critical values for 
these latter tests are 9.49 and 13.3 at the 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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Table 10: Business Cvcle Estimates: Relative Performance 
All 
RPCM. 
Consumer 
RPCMt. 
Producer 
RPCM. 
P/Stock 
RPCM. 
P/Order 
RPCM. 
PBC' 0.192 -0.008 -0.042 0.087 -0.256 
(1.14) (0.04) (0.34) (0.79) (1.92) 
PBC, 
-l -0.212 -0.109 -0.235 -0.296 -0.302 (1.34) (0.82) (1.98) (1.79) (2.06) 
PBC'-' -0.064 0.088 -0.189 0.019 -0.290 
(0.41) (0.56) (2.42) (0.13) (2.29) 
PBC*--4 0.200 0.144 -0.019 -0.065 -0.049 
(0.96) (0.79) (0.11) (0.36) (0.33) 
EINVq. 0.286 0.216 0.125 0.283 0.402 
(2.00) (1.25) (1.53) (2.07) (2.76) 
EINV,. 
_, 
0.221 0.211 0.036 0.175 0.107 
(1.45) (1.13) (0.36) (0.77) (0.94) 
EINV, 
_? 
0.156 0.112 -0.022 0.048 0.119 
(1.09) (0.67) (0.23) (0.27) (1.28) 
EINVt_j -0.165 0.193 -0.188 -0.090 -0.034 
(1.50) (0.88) (1.94) (0.44) (0.27) 
GROWt -0.066 -0.072 -0.113 -0.017 -0.263 
(0.32) (0.42) (0.86) (0.09) (1.26) 
GROW,. 
_, 
0.109 -0.152 0.026 0.113 -0.421 
(0.44) (0.54) (0.23) (0.59) (1.53) 
GROW,. 
_* 
0.060 -0.200 0.113 -0.137 -0.306 
(0.28) (0.90) (0.97) (0.64) (1.26) 
GROWt--A 0.164 -0.216 0.355 -0.168 0.179 
(0.665) (1.16) (2.93) (0.72) (1.24) 
RINVSAL,. -0.092 0.037 -0.042 0.217 -0.037 
(3.16) (0.27) (1.43) (1.52) (1.41) 
RINVSAL, 
-, 
0.052 0.012 0.016 0.040 0.023 
(0.83) (0.12) (0.52) (0.36) (0.48) 
RINVSALt-7 -0.039 0.024 -0.023 0.182 -0.025 
(1.99) (0.23) (1.46) (1.86) (1.20) 
RINVSAL, 
--4 
0.115 -0.027 0.037 0.120 0.038 
(1.43) (0.27) (0.74) (1.35) (0.52) 
RMY,. -2.261 -2.380 -1.770 -2.525 -1.729 
(7.16) (8.73) (9.34) (8.07) (7.32) 
RMY, j -0.033 -0.159 -0.022 -0.163 0.122 
10.15) (0.66) (0.12) (0.61) (0.42) 
CONCt 0.974 0.720 0.529 0.570 0.691 
(1.50) (0.67) (1.31) (1.09) (1.34) 
CONC'. 
-' -1.266 -0.078 -0.321 -0.797 0.263 (2.01) (0.11) (0.82) (1.84) (0.44) 
MS, 0.075 -6.727 1.513 -0.253 6.032 
(0.05) (0.71) (3.48) (0.26) (1.25) 
Mst-, 2.790 -11.90 1.694 1.447 -4.980 
(2.21) (1.21) (3.66) (2.24) (1.03) 
RPCM, 
_j 
0.015 -0.023 -0.064 -0.021 -0.005 
(0.20) (0.32) (0.63) (0.36) (0.04) 
Notes: RPCM is the ratio of the large firms'price cost margin to the small firms'price cost margin. 
Robust one-stcp t ratios are in parentheses. Instrument information, data definitions and diagnostic tests 
arc reported in Table II and its notes. 
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Table 11 - Dia2nostic Tests for Table 10 
All Consumer Producer P/Stock P/Order 
RPCM RPCM RPCM RPCM RPCM 
Sargan 69.3(57) 99.1(57) 91.1(57) 74.0(57) 73.9(57) 
Time Dums 15.7(8) 4.31(8) 23.1(8) 10.1(8) 18.6(8) 
Wald 18.9(12) 5.50(12) 36.0(12) 15.6(12) 28.2(12) 
Serial Correlation 0.490 0.222 -0.235 -0.508 0.650 
PBC 4.40 3.28 6.22 5.24 10.6 
EINV 8.97 1.82 7.92 5.87 8.51 
GROW 1.76 1.61 10.1 4.12 5.57 
INVSAI 13.6 0.87 6.25 17.9 3.64 
T-3 6.17 3.09 17.9 2.19 2.74 
Observations 696 328 368 240 456 
Notes: 
1. Estimation is by first differenced instrumental variables using the GMM procedure of Arrellano and 
Bond(1988). Instruments are lags of the independent and dependent variables dated t-2 and back. 
2. PBC is the percentage of firms reporting below capacity operation. EINV is the net proportion of 
firms reporting excessive finished goods inventory levels. RINVSAL is the large firms' ratio of stocks 
and work in progress to gross output divided by the small firms' ratio of stocks and work in progress to 
gross output. GROW is the growth rate of industry sales. RMY is the large firms' ratio of material inputs 
to gross output divided by the small firms' ratio of material inputs to gross output. CONC is the five firm 
concentration ratio. MS is the mean market share of the small firms. 
3. Sargan is a test of overidentifying restrictions distributed as X2 with degrees of freedom in 
parentheses. Time Dums is ajoint test of the significance of the yearly dummy variables distributed as X2 
with degrees of freedom in parentheses. Serial Correlation is a test of second order serial correlation 
distributed as N(O, 1). Wald is a joint test of the significance of PBC, EINV and GROW distributed as Xý 
with degrees of freedom in parentheses. PBC, ER4V, INVSAL and GROW are joint tests of the 4 
coefficients on each of these variables plus their lags. T-3 is a test of the joint significance of the 4 
coefficients dated t-3. These tests are distributed as j2 with 4 degrees of freedom. Critical values for 
these latter tests are 9.49 and 13.3 at the 5% and 1% levels respectively 
4. Unlike the estimates presented in Tables 6,7 and 8 the coefficients on PBC and EINV in Table 10 
have not been multiplied by 10. 
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Data Annendix 
PRODL: The series for the length of production run were constructed in accordance with the 
method set out in Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus (1978, p37-4 1). Formally 
PRODL--(2*INV)/[GROUT*[I+(2*MAT)/(3*GROU'DIj where INV is the level of stocks, 
GROUT is the level of gross output, MAT is the level of material inputs. 
NIP: No of establishments/businesses operated by the largest five enterprises per enterprise 
Other data series taken from the UK Census of Production are as defined in the Data Appendix to 
Chapter 4. 
CBI Data Series 
The creation of the excess capacity series data was taken from the CB1 quarterly industrial trends 
survey, Question 4. 
*Is your present level of output below capacity? (i. e. are you operating below a satisfactory level 
of operation)" 
To which respondents fill in one of three boxes "Yes", "No" or "NIX' . 'Me proportions 
answering "Yes" -were collected for each industry category. 
The creation of the excessive inventory data is based upon Question 5c from the survey. 
"Excluding seasonal variations do you consider that in volume terms your present stocks of 
finished goods are " "More than adequate" "Adequate" "Less than adequate" "NIA" 
The measure is the difference between the proportion of firms reporting "More than adequate" 
and the proportion reporting "Less than adequate". A positive figure indicates on balance 
excessive stocks of finished goods, a negative figure indicates on balance insufficient stocks. 
In each case the annual figure is calculated as the mean of the 4 quarterly figures. 
Matching of CBI industry categories to SIC and MLH categories. 
The industry categories used and their correlation with the 1980 SIC categories are given in the 
Table below. In the majority of cases there is a direct correlation between CBI categories and the 
SIC industries, although most of the CBI categories cover more than one three digit SIC code. In 
some cases a three digit SIC code is covered by more than one CBI category. In this case a 
weighted average measure has been constructed where the weights are value added of the four 
digit SIC code. The additional problem in constructing the series was that some of the CBI 
categories changed at the end of 1983, having previously been based upon the 1968 MLH 
industry classification. Because of the broad nature of the categories this made less of a 
difference than may be imagined and most of the categories are essentially unchanged. However a 
number of industries were affected and the details of these are given below. 
223 2234=Fabricated Metal Goods 2235=Ferrous Metals 
251 2514,2515=Resins and Plastics 2511,2512,2513,2516=lndustrial and Agricultural 
Chemicals 
255 255 I=Consumer Chemicals 2552=1ndustrial and Agricultural Chemicals 
256 2562,2564,2565,2567,2568=lnd and Ag Chemicals 2563=Consumer Chem 2569=Rubbcr 
311 311 t=Feffous Metals 3112=Non Ferrous Metals 
455 4555=Fumiture 4556,4557=Other textiles 
467 467l=Fumiture4672=Timbcr 
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CBI category SIC codes 
Ferrous Metals 221,222,223 
Non Ferrous Metals 224 
Building Materials 241-246 
Glass and Ceramics 247,248 
Industrial Chemicals 2511-2516,2562-2569 
Agricultural Chemicals 2513,2568 
Pharmaceuticals 255,257,258,259 
Man Made Fibres 260 
Foundries 311,312 
Metal Goods n. e. s. 313,314,3162-3169 
Hand Tools 3161 
Constructional Steelwork 3204 
Heav%, Industrial Plant 3205 
Agricultural Machinery 321 
Metal Work 3221 
Engineers Small Tools 3222 
Industrial Machinery 323,324,327,3285-6 
Contractor's Plant 325 
Industrial Engines 3281,3283,3287-8 
Heating 3284 
Other Mechanical Eng. 326,3289,329 
Office Machinery 330 
Electrical Industrial Goods 341-3,3442,347-8 
Electronic Industrial Goods 3441,3443,3444,3453 
Electrical Consumer Goods 346 
Electronic Consumer Goods 3452,3454 
Motor Vehicles 351,352,353 
Shipbuilding 361 
Aerospace 362,363,364,365 
Instrument Engineering 371,372,373,374 
Food 411-423 
Drink and Tobacco 424-429 
Woollen Textiles 431 
Spinning and Weaving 432,433,434 
Hosiery 436 
Textile Consumer Goods 438,4555,4557 
Other Textiles 435,437,439,4556 
Footwear 451 
Leather 441,442 
Clothing and Fur 453,456 
Timber products 461-466 
Furniture 467 
Pulp and Paper 471 
Paper and Board Products 472 
Printing and Publishing 475 
Rubber Products 481,482 
Plastics Products 483 
Other 
1 
491-495 
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sic 
221,222 
223 
224 
241-246 
247,248 
251 
255 
256 
257-9 
260 
311 
321 
323 
325 
326 
327 
329 
330 
341,342 
346 
347 
351,352,353 
361 
362,363,364 
371,372,373,374 
411416,4 t9,421,422 
424,426429 
431 
432434 
435 
436 
437 
438 
441,442 
451 
453,456 
455 
Pre 84 
Ferrous Metals 
pt Fabr Metals 
pt Ferrous Metals 
Non Ferrous Metals 
Building Materials 
Glass and Ceramics 
Pt Resins and Plastics 
Pt Ind and Ag Chem 
Pt Consumer Chemicals 
Pt Ind and Ag Chemicals 
Pt Ind and Ag Chemicals 
Pt Rubber 
Pt Consumer Chemicals 
Consumer Chemicals 
Man Made Fibres 
pt Ferrous metals 
pt Non Ferrous metals 
Ag Machinery 
Textile Machinery 
Contractor's Plant 
Other Mech Eng 
Ind & Off Machinery 
Other Mech Eng 
Electronic 
Power and Industr Elect 
Electrical Consumer 
Power and Industr Elect 
Motor Vehicles 
Shipbuilding 
Other Vehicles 
Instrument Engineering 
Food 
Drink and Tobacco 
Woollen Textiles 
Spinning and Weaving 
Other Textiles 
Hosiery 
Other Textiles 
Other Textiles 
I, eather 
Footwear 
Clothing and Fur 
Pt Furniture 
Pt Other Textiles 
461464 Timber 
466 Misc Manufactures 
467 Pt Furniture 
Pt Timber 
Post 84 
Ferrous Metals 
Ferrous Metals 
Non Ferrous Metals 
Building Materials 
Glass and Ceramics 
Pt Ind Chemicals 
Pt Ag Chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals 
Pt Industrial Chemicals 
Pt Ag Chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals 
Man Made Fibres 
Foundries 
Ag Machinery 
Ind Machinery 
Contractor's Plant 
Other Mech Eng 
Ind Machinery 
Other Mech Eng 
Office Machinery 
Electrical Industrial 
Electrical Consumer 
Electrical Industrial 
Motor Vehicles 
Shipbuilding 
Aerospace and Oth Vehicles 
Instrument Engineering 
Food 
Drink and Tobacco 
Woollen Textiles 
Spinning and Weaving 
Other Textiles 
Hosiery 
Other Textiles 
Textile Consumer 
Leather 
Footwear 
Clothing and Fur 
Pt Textile Consumer 
Pt Other Textiles 
Timber 
Timber 
Furniture 
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471 Paper Pulp and Paper 
472 Paper Paper and Board 
475 Printing Printing 
481,482 Rubber Rubber 
483 Resins and Plastics Plastics 
491 Fabricated Metal Gds Other 
492-494 Miscellaneous Other 
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Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks 
This thesis started by noting that there was a tendency for economists and politicians alike to 
imply that small firms were more dynamically efficient than large firms. The initial response to 
this claim was that there was relatively little hard evidence to support the claim and that therefore 
evidence would need to be provided in order to adjudicate on the claim. In this final chapter we 
will summarise the results that have been generated within the thesis and then reassess this basic 
question. We will then outline proposals for future research that can fiirther help us to. shed light 
on this question. In addition we will address a subsidiary question that has been exposed in the 
process of completing the research of the appropriate methodological stance to adopt in 
conducting research of this form. 
Ile summary statistics Presented in Chapter I pointed to the fact that the small firm sector has 
grown in relative importance in UK manufacturing industry over the past 25 years while there has 
been a relative decline in the importance of very large firms over the same period. At the same 
time however the perforinance, measured in terms of price cost margins, of the remaining large 
companies has increased steadily over the same period and at a more rapid rate than for the 
smaller firms although the small firms did also increase their performance steadily over the 
period. In terms of most of the cyclical variables both large and small firms appeared to follow 
each other closely in a procyclical fashion and the important differences were in terms of the 
secular decline in the reliance on the use of excess capacity and stocks on the part of the larger 
firms, which had been much greater in the 1970's. From this data there is therefore no clear 
evidence one way or the other on the relative dynamic efficiency of large or small firms. 
In chapter 2 we assessed one of the most influential literatures that have been associated with die 
economic concept of small firms using dynamic cfficiency as a means of competitive survival 
when confronted with larger firms with lower per unit costs. We demonstrated that there is an 
observational equivalence between this 'flexibility theory and the more conventional theory that 
firms performance varies according to unit costs. Indeed we showed that the crucial element 
driving the link between sales variability and market share is in fact differences in unit costs and 
not differences in the slope of the marginal cost curve. This finding clearly does not demonstrate 
that small firms are less flexible than large firms. Instead the finding merely casts doubt on the 
interpretation of some of the major economic tests of the flexibility theory suggesting an 
alternative interpretation that does not imply superior dynamic efficiency on the part of small 
firms. 
Chapter 3 did not address the issue of the dynamic efficiency of small firms but instead suggested 
an empirical and theoretical respecification taking into account imperfect competition in the 
market for bought in inputs that is adopted in the analysis of chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 
examined the short and long run determinants of the relative performance of large and small 
firms. We found that in the long run large firms do experience higher levels of performance and 
that this higher performance is particularly marked in industries where there is high advertising 
intensity and high level of concentration. This indicate that competitive pressures do play a part 
in lowering long run performance for small firms and that small firms are less able to overcome 
these competitive pressures using strategies such as advertising. In our s=ple, however, the 
short ran performance of both large and small firms was not found to be strongly related to any 
of the conventional structural characteristics of industries. 
In chapter 5 we explicitly focused on the dynamic and cyclical determinants of perfonnance of 
the small and large firm sectors. If there were clear differences in the relative dynamic efficiency 
of large and small firms it is here that we would expect to find the most contrasting results 
between the different intra industry sectors. However as was noted in the conclusion to chapter 5 
there is no such clear cut evidence. This is somewhat surprising given the strength of conviction 
with which many argue that small firms possess greater dynamic cfficicncy and certainly 
overturns prior beliefs. Instead we find evidence that if anything it was the larger finns which 
benefited from the boom in the late 1980's and that they appear to have retained this advantage 
through the recession that has followed at the start of die 1990's. The limited evidence from 
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considcring subsectors of industry indicate that it is for the large firms that demand grovAh and 
the inventory sales ratio are most important in certain sectors for the determination of 
performance. In the case of the former this greater response is as predicted by conventional short 
run profit maximising models of behaviour. 
in summary we can therefore answer our original question by affirming that there is still 
relatively little hard evidence that small firms are more dynamically efficient than large firms. 
indeed perhaps because we have cast an element of doubt on the validity of some of the previous 
cvidcnce we may feel that N%, c have less evidence of this proposition than before. Nevertheless we 
cannot claim to have categorically decided the issue and there is a good deal of scope for fiirther 
tests that may be able to shed more light on the issue. We now turn to consider what kind of new 
directions might be usefully pursued. 
We have indicated in chapter 2 that it is still an open empirical question as to whether small firms 
are indeed more flexible in terms of their cost structures thaii large firms. However, a potentially 
viable way fon%-ard in the attempt to find a more complete answer to the question has been 
presented in the form of an alternative empirical framework. Studies of individual industries that 
can obtain estimates of the short run cost functions of the firms or that examine the relative sales 
and production variability of individual product lines are the only way forward in answering this 
question that do not suffer from the observational equivalence problem that affects the previous 
studies. These therefore represent one aspect of future research. An additional issue that needs to 
be considered in this context is the role of inventories in facilitating production flexibility or 
production smoothing. While this topic has received much attention in general in the literature the 
number of studies that address the issue of firm size is limited. 
In terms of the empirical analysis of the determinants of performance the discussion must clearly 
move onto new territory. In particular, the analysis of the business cycle has to move beyond the 
question of %%-hcthcr or not profitability is procyclical or countercyclical. The focus needs to be 
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tunicd on to the specific determinants of price setting behaviour, both in terms of the different 
folcs or inventories, capacity, order books, demand growth, input prices, etc. in the short run, and 
in tcrms of the historically contingent aspects of the analysis that relate to the longer term 
planning horizon such as modes of organisation of production, buyer-supplier relations, adoption 
of technology and, of course, the long term strategic interaction between rivals. However in 
addition to the role of inventories as determining performance and helping to determine the 
relative flexibility of Luge and small firms the study inventory usage in itself can help to enhance 
our understanding of the business cycle in relation to large and small firms. 
O%rrall the scope for fiirther investigation therefore lies in completing studies of individual 
industries, investigating the relative cyclical performance of the firms in those industries, and in 
mitching the focus onto the relative ability of firms to absorb and adapt to demand fluctuations 
through their inventory usage. 
thving addressed the primary question of this thesis we wish to now address a secondary focus; 
the methodological aspects of research and the validity of economic and econometric findings that 
had been generated both by previous research and the research contained within this thesis. The 
remaining part of this conclusion is devoted to remarks on this process of assessing the validity of 
economic arguments. 
'Me methodological concern has coincided with, although it has not been driven by, a debate, if 
not a crisis, within the mainstream economics profession concerning the relationship between 
theory and empirical testing (see, for a recent example, the special issue of Journal of 
Econometrics 1995 Vol 67 No 1). A number of solutions have been presented as ways forward to 
closing the current gap that exists between theory and empirical analysis. We would argue that 
technocratic solutions to the problem are unUely to be of much use. One such attempt to restore 
the status of econometric analysis, extreme bounds analysis developed by Leamer (1978) and 
applied to the concentration profits relationship by Cooley (1982), has not proved widespread as 
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a tool'. The problem with all technocratic solutions lies in the realisation that, whatever 
techniques are used, findings are still susceptible to the prior beliefs and prejudices of the 
rcsearcher2. The other extreme of reactions to the impasse is to resort, as McCloskey (1986) 
does, to rhetoric as the arbiter of science. Stettler (1995), with conscious irony, has described 
McCloskey's concept as a "market for ideas". McCloskeys implied call for a free market in ideas 
%%hcre the good ideas %ill prosper and the weak will fail is similarly problematic to more 
conventional notions of free markets. As in most markets the exploitation of first mover 
advantages, consumer loyalty and high switching costs are likely to lead to the market dominance 
of established views. From this perspective McCloskey's suggestion of persuasion or rhetoric as 
the standard of ideas seems nothing more than an argument for the perpetuation of the status quo, 
i. e. the neo-classical orthodoxy. As descriptive reality it may illustrate the problems associated 
with closing the gap between theory and empirics in what. to labour the analogy, may be 
considered a segmented market. However, it does not offer either a way forward or a prescription 
of method3. 
A third approach to the gulf between theory and empirical reality, one that is ultimately 
pessimistic, suggests that the theoretical and empirical modes are essentially couched in different 
modes of thinking. Empiricists or econometricians are likely to be structuralists by nature. 
T'heorists tend to be functionalists. This would appear to be especially true of game theorists but 
is also true of most theoretical economists. By positing a rational individual a functionalist 
perspective is forced on to all economic phenomena because all economic phenomena can be (or 
ought to be according to this logic) potentially explained as the outcome of the interaction of 
rational economic agentS4. However, maintaining a distance from the impositions of theory 
I Technocratic solutions are clearly not immune to criticism from within their own framework, for such 
criticism of Learner, and implicitly Cooley, see McAleer et al (1985) and Spanos (1986). 
2 Gould (1981) reports examples of unconscious data manipulation by scientists that biases results in 
favour of priors. 
3 We would argue that the rigid application of methodology is to be feared as much as the absence or 
ignorance of method. Hcndry (1995 p5) suggests in his prescription for good econometric methodology 
that one should'think brilliantly', 'be creativc'or if that and luck fail, stick to theory. 
4 For a clear and interesting example of how functionalism can prove less than illuminating by 
imposing an unsuitable function on (in this example non economic) phenomena and how a structural 
approach can prove more amenable, see Gould (1995). 
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cnables analysis of the data generating processes in a way which may be unexplained by theory 
and could at least in principle be unexplainable by credible theory. This points to the other side of 
functionalism, there is a desirc for completeness, which is only achieved by ascribing a function 
or motivc to each action, yet in doing so all action becomes sensible. 
Gcroski (1990a) cites Gould (1987) advocating a "consilience of induction" which is based upon 
the idea of many different tests which point to a particular conclusion. However, this would 
appear to be valid only as an ex post justification of methodology, rather than a starting point, as 
the validity of such an approach could only reject claims of verificationism if the tests are 
independent. But how can one set out ex ante to consider tests which are defined to be 
independent because such tests are, of necessity, constrained by the view of the researcher. 
Eclecticism does not constitute a way through to truth when consensus is determined within 
existing power relations. 
'Me conclusion from this discussion is that an we may hope for is to work towards and try to 
maintain an effective balance between theory and empirical analysis. We also need to be aware 
that this balance is ever shifting. Progressive developments in the two elements are neither 
uniform in magnitude nor linear in direction. Changes in the questions of interest generated from 
the polifico-economic situation and developments in the tool kits of both theorists and applied 
economists occur at different rates and have different rates of diffusion. We would like to imagine 
that there are forces, such as the theorists need for empirical support of a hypothesis, and the 
empirical economists need to place the search for a description of the 'data generating process' 
%%ithin the context of some hypothesis concerning the nature of that process, tending towards 
balance in this relationship. However the increasing segmentation of economics into sub 
discipitnes and the strength of resistance to any change in the basic tenets of the neo-classical 
core of the subject may indicate that these balancing forces are perhaps weaker now than they 
were twenty years ago. 
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